Plotinus began-- if you can remember this long ago-- by asking about "pleasure and distress, fear and courage, desire and aversion-- where have these affections and experiences their seat?" 

Coming to the end of this tractate, we have the beginning of our answer.

The Soul, for Plotinus, is something that never enters into incarnation in the material world. The Soul exists, instead, in the world of Forms. Our individual Souls are forms, and they participate in the Universal Soul, which our translator sometimes renders Soul Itself. What is that? Well, if your body is a red object, your soul is the Color Red as it exists prior to any red objects. And Soul Itself is Color Itself, as it exists prior to any individual colors?

With me so far?

The experiences that we have in the world are the experiences of the Couplement of Soul and Body. Again, this Couplement doesn't exist by Soul descending into the material world. Instead, the Soul acts like a lantern, emitting a beam of light which illuminates the body as the lantern illuminates a wall. The Couplement is the illuminated wall.

All of our experiences in the material world are experiences of the illuminated wall. Our various material faculties are all powers of the soul refracted down through the couplement, "like images caught in a mirror," descending from sense-perception all the way down to the urge toward procreation.

We are thus hybrid beings, consisting of a Soul which is beyond the material world, and a set of faculties which allow us to act in the material world and which allow the material world to act upon us.

The consequences of this are as follows:

1. It is our choice where we direct our attention. In childhood, the lower faculties naturally dominate. Over the course of a lifetime, we gain the capacity to turn more and more toward the highest things-- if we choose. But we must choose.

2. On the other hand, our Soul Itself is blameless when it comes to our sinful acts. But we still must be purified of them. Plotinus mentions the possibility of descent into the Lower World after death, and of reincarnation as an animal.

****

3. This is not in Plotinus's work. It certainly seems to me, though, that considering the Soul as an ideal-form (like The Color Red) is another bit of evidence in favor of reincarnation. Consider-- we can discern the existence of the color red by the fact that there is a multitude of red objects. From this we can infer that there is something called "red," by which the red objects exist. If there was only-- not just one red object, but only one possible red object, anywhere in the entire universe, wouldn't it be harder to imagine a form of red? Wouldn't that object in fact BE the form of red-- since there is only one of it in existence or possible, and it cannot in any way be divided (because then there would be more than one of it)? Similarly, it seems that if our Souls are forms, then there must be more than one object animated by that form. These objects-- our bodies-- will then be separated in time rather than in space.

...And that's all for now. Join us next time, when we move on to the second tractate of the First Ennead!

 Welcome back! Last time we worked through the 10th section of the first tractate of the first of Plotinus's Enneads. Today we'll move on to Section 11

Let's jump right back in.

In childhood the main activity is in the Couplement and there is but little irradiation from the higher principles of our being: but when these higher principles act but feebly or rarely upon us their action is directed towards the Supreme; they work upon us only when they stand at the mid-point.

Last time, we saw that, for Plotinus, the Soul is not identical with the experiencing self. The Soul is an eternal principle, beyond material incarnation. The total person-- the human system, if you like-- is like a series of beads on a string. The highest bead is the Soul. The lowest represents the faculties of generation. Our experience is able to range up and down the string, connected to this bead or that bead according to circumstances.

Here, Plotinus is telling us that, in the early part of our life, most of our experience is centered here below, in the life of the body. I think that this is something anyone would agree with, and it certainly fits my own experience of childhood through roughly age 30.

The last section appears to be another victim of this garbled and half-comprehensible translation. We are told that "when these higher principles act but feebly or rarely upon us their action is directed towards the Supreme" and also that "they work upon us only when they stand at the mid-point." 

But does not the We include that phase of our being which stands above the mid-point?

(The word "We" in this sentence is missing in the link I provided.)

Okay, this clarifies the previous sentence a bit. It appears that he means that the higher principles of our being are acting above the mid-point. When we ourselves are experiencing life below that mid-point-- the mean between Soul and Body-- we are unaware of them. And here he responds to the objection, but isn't that higher part of us, well, part of us? 

It does, but on the condition that we lay hold of it: our entire nature is not ours at all times but only as we direct the mid-point upwards or downwards, or lead some particular phase of our nature from potentiality or native character into act.

Are you following this? This is, it seems to me, a critical idea. Parts of us only exist in potential, and parts of us are beyond manifestation in the material world. They are, indeed, part of us. But our talents are only real insofar as we manifest them as skills. And our higher spirit is only a part of us insofar as we turn our attention towards it, and unite ourselves to it, through spiritual practice, rather than to our lower self, through obeying our bodily urges, passions and impulses. 

This next part is neat:

And the animals, in what way or degree do they possess the Animate?

If there be in them, as the opinion goes, human Souls that have sinned, then the Animating-Principle in its separable phase does not enter directly into the brute; it is there but not there to them; they are aware only of the image of the Soul [only of the lower Soul] and of that only by being aware of the body organised and determined by that image.

If there be no human Soul in them, the Animate is constituted for them by a radiation from the All-Soul.


In the Timaeus, Plato has it that we are first born into the bodies of men. If we mess up, we're reborn as women. If we mess up a second time, we are reborn as animals. 

This idea is clearly reflective of the prejudices of its age, and is unacceptable to the modern reader. (In the same way, many of our prejudices will not be revealed as such for 1, 2, 5 or 10 centuries; then they will appear cruel and nonsensical in just the same way.) However, it is interesting to note that, for Plotinus, only those animals who were previously human beings have individualized souls-- with which they are unable to make contact in this life. For the rest, their soul is actually a group soul-- the Universal Soul. 

To my mind, it makes more sense to view animals as possessing individual souls as do we, though they are far more removed from them than we are. Some animals would indeed be human beings that have failed to make it at the human level, and were sent back a grade, so to speak. Others would be our younger brothers and sisters, on the journey with us.

It's also fun to consider that at least some animals are at the same level we are. This may be incorrect, but I like to think that dolphins and whales, and also parrots or crows, are at the same level as human beings. This allows for there to People of the Earth, Sea and Sky. 

Now, it's also worth taking a minute to view the world the way Plotinus would have, on his own terms. What would it mean to think of animals as participants in the Universal Soul? What would it mean to think of ourselves the way that he does?
Welcome back!

You may notice from the slightly different title that I'm messing with the format of this blog a bit.

It occurred to me that it might be slightly tedious for some to follow along with the line-by-line expositions I've been doing. My plan is to write a post summarizing the basic arguments and conclusion of each tractate once I reach the end of it; to read those posts, you won't have to read along with Mr. Plotinus himself. It may be a little while between those, though. In the meantime, you're welcome to follow along as I struggle to make sense of this!

Last time, Plotinus determined that experience could not be rooted in the Couplement of Soul and Body. Certain affections, he pointed out, giving sexual arousal as an example, require the body, while others are based in the Soul alone. Meanwhile, it isn't clear whether the affections originate in the body or the Soul. How can this be? Let's continue to read and see what we find out! As always, you can follow along here

It may seem reasonable to lay down as a law that when any powers are contained by a recipient, every action or state expressive of them must be the action or state of that recipient, they themselves remaining unaffected as merely furnishing efficiency.

To say this another way: consider motion. A thing in motion moves-- it is the recipient of the power of motion. But Motion itself remains unaffected.

But if this were so, then, since the Animate is the recipient of the Causing-Principle [i.e., the Soul] which brings life to the Couplement, this Cause must itself remain unaffected, all the experiences and expressive activities of the life being vested in the recipient, the Animate.

If I understand correctly, then if the relationship of Soul to body is like motion to a moving thing, then the Soul would not have any experiences at all-- because it cannot be affected, if this is the case. If that were the case, what would the Soul even be? Plotinus anticipates this problem, saying--

But this would mean that life itself belongs not to the Soul but to the Couplement; or at least the life of the Couplement would not be the life of the Soul; Sense-Perception would belong not to the Sensitive-Faculty but to the container of the faculty. 




If this is the case, then your Soul is basically detached from your body, experiencing nothing, not even life; it's just there as a kind of outside cause, enabling life to happen. But this doesn't make sense--

But if sensation is a movement traversing the body and culminating in Soul, how can the soul lack sensation? The very presence of the Sensitive-Faculty must assure sensation to the Soul. 

Once again, where is sense-perception seated?

In the Couplement.

Yet how can the Couplement have sensation independently of action in the Sensitive-Faculty, the Soul left out of count and the Soul-Faculty?


Plotinus is about to bring this section to conclusion, in the chapter to follow. 

As stated above, my plan is to continue to go through these one chapter at a time-- there are 13 total chapters, so we're almost at the halfway mark. At that point, I will summarize the basic argument and the conclusions, and give some thoughts on it. And then we'll move forward!

Now, if you're following along and finding Plotinus makes your head hurt, don't despair. I plan to alternate close reads of The Enneads with more broadly-focused posts on complete works, like the one I did on Dion Fortune below. Specific texts I want to consider include Hesiod's Theogony, a medieval Taoist meditation manual entitled The Secret of the Golden Flower, and Catholic St. Louis de Montfort's book of Mariology, True Devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary. What do all of these have in common with each other? Stick around, and maybe we'll find out!

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