Every thing which is able to return to itself is self-subsistent.

For if it returns to itself according to nature, it is perfect in the conversion to itself, and will possess essence from itself. For from every thing to which there is a return according to nature, there is equally a progression according to essence. If, therefore, it imparts well-being to itself, it will likewise undoubtedly impart being to itself, and will be the lord of its own hypostasis or nature. Hence that which is able to revert to itself is self-subsistent.

COMMENTARY

This is the straightforward corollary to the previous proposition. We're still discussing the Henads, the Unities or Gods. These are self-subsistent, meaning they are their own cause, and they return to themselves, because they are themselves the source of their own good. Last time we learned that self-subsistent things are converted, or return, to themselves; this time we learn that things that return to themselves are self-subsistent. This is the process of "epistrophe" or reversion, the third term in the triad Mone-Prohodos-Epistrophe, or Abiding-Proceeding-Returning, which, as we have seen, underlies the whole of Neoplatonic metaphysics. 

 Every thing which is in another is alone produced, by another; but every thing which is in itself is self-subsistent.

For that which is in another and is indigent of a subject can never be generative of itself. For that which is naturally competent to generate itself does not require another base, because it is contained by itself, and is preserved in itself apart from a subject. But that which abides, and is able to be established in itself, is produc­tive of itself, itself proceeding into itself, and being connective of itself: and thus it is in itself, as the thing caused is in its cause. For it is not in itself, as in place or as in a subject: since place is different from that which is in place, and that which is in a subject is different from the subject. But this which is in itself is the same with that in which it is inherent. It is therefore self-subsistent, and abides in itself as that which is from a cause is in the cause.

COMMENTARY

What does it mean for a thing to be "in itself"? 

It is not the same, Proclus tells us, as being in a place, because "place" is different from "that which is in a place." A thing which is "in itself" is not located in itself. What then?

He tells us: "It is contained by itself, preserved in itself"... is "productive of itself, proceeding into itself, and connective of itself." 

We must, then, be speaking of the Gods, the Henads: They are self-caused and self-convertive. They are still, if it can be said this way, subject to the threefold movement of abiding, proceeding, and returning, but that to which they return is themselves, that into which they proceed is themselves, they contain and produce themselves. 
 Of all things which proceed from another cause, those which exist from themselves, and which are alotted a self-sufficient essence, are the leaders.

For if every nature which is self-sufficient, either by reason of its essence or energy, is more excellent than that which depends on another cause; and that which produces itself, since it produces the being of itself, is sufficient to itself with respect to essence; and that which is alone produced by another is not sufficient to itself; and the self-sufficient is more allied to The Good; and things more allied and similar to their causes subsist from cause prior to such as are dissimilar; — this being the case, the natures which are produced by themselves, and are self-subsistent, are more ancient than those which proceed into existence from another cause alone. For either there will be nothing self-subsistent, or The Good is a thing of this kind, or the first things which subsist from The Good. But if there is nothing self-subsistent, truly there will not be in anything self-suffici­ency. It will not be in The Good, since that being The One is better than self-sufficiency: it is also The Good it­self, and not that which possesses The Good. Nor will self-sufficiency be in things posterior to The Good: for all things will be indigent of that which is prior to their nature. But if The Good is self-subsistent, because it produces itself, it will not be The One. For that which proceeds from The One is not The One. And it would proceed from itself, if it was self-subsistent; so that The One would at the same time be one and not one. Hence it is necessary that the self-subsistent should be posterior to the First. And it is evident that it will be prior to things which alone proceed from another cause: for it has a more principal subsistence than these, and is more allied to The Good, as has been demonstrated.

COMMENTARY

Proclus's commentary on this proposition is, as is often the case, a mouthful, but it will turn out to be simpler than it looks once we break it down a bit. 

What is self-sufficient? That is to say, it causes itself, rather than being caused by another.

It can't be the One. Why? Because the One is radically simple, above every sort of cause. It needs nothing. It does not even cause itself, because it is not caused but precedes every cause

In our usual way of thinking, it would seem that the first beings after the One would be beings which are caused by the One. We're used to thinking this way, but it isn't Proclus's view. After the uncaused One come those beings which are most similar to the One and participate in the One, and therefore cause themselves. These are, of course, the Gods or Henads, the Unities.

It's interesting to think what happens if we accept Proclus's proposition, but insist on retaining the Holy Trinity within  Christianity. The Trinity is three and one, an Undivided Unity. How can God be radically simple if God is also three? 

The answer is that the theory of the Holy Trinity says that God is one in substance but three in person. 

But how can this be? The three cannot be radically simple, and so that which they share must be radically simple, and that is their common substance. 

What, then, is this substance?

It is nothing other than God, the Good, the One. 

But how, if it manifests as three?

The only possible way to understand it as a substance in which three participate is that it consists in Relation

It is impossible for one thing to relate to itself or for two things to relate to one another. The moment there are two things in existence there are also three. Those three are the first thing, the second thing, and whatever they share which allows them to relate to one another. 

For Proclus the One is the Good, and is beyond every being. But it is not inert or dead; it is rather more like an overflowing fountain of life. At once everywhere, and yet nowhere at all. If we consider that the One is mere relation, then the first manifestation of the One will be a triad, or Trinity. And it must be noted that this is the case in Proclus as well. 
Every being either alone essentially returns, or vitally, or gnostically.

For either it alone possesses being from its cause, or life with being, or it receives from thence a gnostic power. So far, therefore, as every being alone is, it makes an essential conversion, but so far as it lives, a vital, and so far as it knows, a gnostic conversion. For as it proceed­ed from its cause, so does it return to it, and the measures of its conversion are limited by the measures according to its progression. The desire to return therefore is to some according to being alone, this desire being an aptitude for the participation of causes; but to others it is accord­ing to life, being a motion to more excellent natures; and to others it is according to knowledge, being a conscious perception of the goodness of their causes.

COMMENTARY

Here we have the familiar Intelligible Triad of Being, Life, and Intellect. These three are arranged hierarchically, with Being coming first, then Life, then Intellect. In late Platonist thought, the Intelligible Triad became the first three levels of existence, followed in order by Soul, Nature, and Matter. 

Proclus give us three ways in which beings might return to their cause. Those which have being alone return through being, which Proclus calls "an aptitude for participation of causes." In other words, something about such a being's very nature inclines it towards its cause. Other beings both exist and are alive, and these have in them a natural "motion toward more excellent natures." Finally, there are those beings which exist, and are alive, and also know. These beings return through a conscious participation in their causes.

The reason that the Triad is arranged hierarchically is because it's clear from the examination of our universe that every thing exists, and so the power of being extends to all creation. But only some things both exist and live, and so the power of Life is less extensive than that of being. Finally, only a few sorts of beings exist, and live, and are capable of higher knowledge, and so Intellect's power is less extensive than either Life or Being. 

The variation on this idea seen in modern occult traditions such as Rosicrucianism sees Life and Intellect as something toward which every being progresses over the course of aeons of evolution. As far as I know, this idea was unknown to Proclus. I quite like it, however, because it implies that created beings re-capitulate the creative sequence which begins in the Divine, but we do so in reverse. The One brings forth first being, then Life, then Intellect, and so on down to the last of things. The last of things then rise back toward the One, proceeding first into Being, and then into Life, and then into Intellect. Indeed, this same sequence is repeated in miniature over the course of every human life. 
Every thing which proceeds from many causes returns through as many, and every conversion is through the same causes which produced the progression.

For since both progression and return become through similitude, that indeed which passes immediate­ly from a certain thing likewise immediately returns to it. For the similitude here is without a medium. But that which requires a medium in proceeding requires also a medium in returning. For it is necessary that each should be effected with reference to the same thing. Hence the return will be first to the medium, and then to that which is better than the medium. Therefore the causes of being to each thing are equal in number to the causes of well-being, and vice versa.

COMMENTARY

Here again we have what was known in later times as the Great Chain of Being. Everything proceeds from the First Cause. For Proclus, the Gods come first, but these too unfold in a series of progressions. First there are the Intelligible Gods, then the Intelligible-Intellectual Gods, the Intellectual Gods, the Liberated Gods, the Supermundane Gods, and the Mundane Gods, and I'm probably forgetting a few. From the Gods are suspended angels, spirits (daimones), heroic souls, and ordinary souls, and so on on down to animals, plants, and minerals. (In the tradition of the Kaballah, this was simplified by placing in order the unknowable Ain Soph, the Names of God, the Archangels, the Choirs of angels, the astrological planets, and on down to types of people and the other things of our everyday experience).

In the Phaedrus, Plato wrote that each of our souls is like a charioteer which naturally follows in the train of one of the Twelve Olympian Gods. But the Twelve are not the summit of creation, either for Plato or his successors. At the end of an age of the world, every soul is gathered back to the God in which it has its origin, and follows the God to the realms beyond. 

Proclus is telling us here that for all of us below the very highest of the hierarchies of gods, our process of conversion goes first to the powers immediately above us, and from there up the grades of being, to the One.




 Of all things which are multiplied in progression the first are more perfect than the second, the second than those posterior to them, and after the same manner succes­sively.

For if progressions separate productions from their causes, and there are diminutions of things secondary with respect to those which are first, it follows that first natures in proceeding are more conjoined with their causes, being as it were germinations from them. But secondary natures are more remote from their causes, and in a similar manner those which are successive. Things, however, which are nearer and more allied to their causes are more perfect. For causes are more perfect than things caused. But things which are more remote are more imperfect, because they are dissimilar to their causes.

 
COMMENTARY

Another very straightforward proposition. Of the things which proceed from their first causes into multiplication, the first are the most perfect. The further one proceeds from the First Cause itself, the more things are multiplied and the less perfect or complete they are. This is easy to understand if we visualize the universe as a pyramid, beginning in a single point, the One, and extending into a line of infinite extension, the Chaos at the bottom of things. In fact the One is not even a point, because then it would not be simply One, and the Chaos is not a line, because a line is one thing. At the end of things, there is no oneness, no unity, no identity, only fragments of fragments, infinitely divided. 

As Proposition 36 deals with Progression, Proposition 37 deals with Conversion. These two mirror each other, so let's have Proposition 37 now:

Of all things which subsist according to conversion, the first are more imperfect than the second, and the second, than those that follow; but the last are the most perfect.

For if conversions are effected in a circle, and con­version or return is to that from which progression is derived, but progression is from that which is most per­fect, hence conversion tends to the most perfect. And if conversion first begins from that in which progression terminates, but progression terminates in that which is most imperfect, conversion will begin from the most im­perfect. Hence in things which subsist according to conversion, the most imperfect are the first, but the most perfect are the last.
 

COMMENTARY

In the previous Proposition, Proclus described the Universe from the top down; now he proceeds, as it were, from the bottom up. The last of things, as we saw, is the most imperfect. Taking it as the first of things converted, we see that the first in the series is the least perfect. Simple enough, yes?
 Every thing caused abides in, proceeds from, and returns to, its cause.

For if it alone abided, it would in no respect differ from its cause, since it would be without separation and distinction from it. For progression is accompanied with separation. But if it alone proceeded, it would be unconjoined and deprived of sympathy with its cause, having no communication with it whatever. And if it were alone converted, how can that which has not its essence from the cause be essentially converted to that which is foreign to its nature? But if it should abide and proceed, but should not return, how will there be a natural desire to everything of well-being and of good, and an excitation to its generating cause? And if it should proceed and return, but should not abide, how, being separated from its cause, will it hasten to be con­joined with it? For it was unconjoined prior to its departure; since, if it had been conjoined, it would entirely have abided in it. But if it should abide and return, but should not proceed, how can that which is not separated be able to revert to its cause? For every thing which is converted resembles that which is resolved into the nature from which it is essentially divided. It is necessary, therefore, either that it should abide alone, or return alone, or alone proceed, or that the extremes should be bound to each other, or that the medium should be con­joined with each of the extremes, or that all should be conjoined. Hence it follows that every thing must abide in its cause, proceed from, and return to it.

COMMENTARY

There really isn't very much to say about this one. Basically, Proclus is summarizing the last several propositions and stating explicitly the threefold movement of abiding, proceeding, and returning. 

 Every thing which is converted according to nature makes its return to that from which it received the progression of its characteristic essence.

For if it is converted according to nature, it will have an essential desire for that to which it is converted. But if this be the case, the whole being of it depends on that to which it makes an essential conversion, and it is essentially similar to it. Hence also it has a natural sympathy with it because it is cognate to the essence of it. If this be so, either the being of each is the same, or the one is derived from the other, or both are allotted similitude from a certain other one. But if the being of each is the same, how is the one naturally converted to the other? And if both are from a certain one, it will be according to nature for each to be converted to that one. It remains, therefore, that the one must derive its being from the other. But if this be the case, the pro­gression will be from that to which the conversion or return is according to nature.
 
Corollary.— From these things, therefore, it is evi­dent that Intellect is the object of desire to all things, that all things proceed from intellect, and that the whole world, though it is eternal, possesses its essence from intellect. For the world is not prevented from proceed­ing from intellect because it is eternal: neither because it is always arranged is it not converted to intellect, but it always proceeds, is essentially eternal, always convert­ed, and is indissoluble because it always remains in the same order.
 
COMMENTARY

We have a couple of different terms to unpack here, and I think it's best to take it a step at a time. 

We start with conversion. We've already learned that conversion is the return of an effect to its cause. Everything caused is subject to the threefold movement of mone or abiding, prohodos or proceeding, and epistrophe or returning. 

Now we have the phrase, "according to nature." What precisely does Proclus mean by this? He goes on to say that something converted by nature "will have an essential desire for that to which it is converted." That word essential is important. Essence is the very being of a thing. To be "converted by nature" means that, for anything converted, its conversion is part of its very being. The "desire" Proclus speaks of is precisely the movement of any given thing toward its source. 

As we have seen, everything in the world of our experience has ultimately has its source in the higher world of Intellect. What this means is htat, in the final analysis, Intellect Itself is the object of desire for all things, because it is the source of all things. 
Every thing which proceeds from another and returns to it has a circular energy.

For if it returns to that from which it proceeds, it con­joins the end to the beginning, and the motion is one and continuous — emanating from the abiding cause and re­turning to it. Hence all things proceed in a circle from causes to causes: but there are greater and less circles of conversions (returns), some of which are to the na­tures immediately above the things which are converted, but others are to still higher natures, and so on to the Principle of all things. For all things proceed from this Principle, and return to it.

COMMENTARY

Everything which proceeds from another has a circular motion. Does this idea sound familiar? We encounter it frequently enough, but we always find it attributed to some foreign culture or to some sufficiently remote place. 
 
Everything an Indian does is in a circle, and that is because the power of the World always works in circles, and everything tries to be round . . . The sky is round and I have heard the earth is round like a ball, and so are all the stars. The wind in its greatest power whirls, birds make their nest in circles, for theirs is the same religion as ours. The sun comes forth and goes down again in a circle. The moon does the same and both are round. Even the seasons form a great circle in their changing, and always come back again to where they were. Our teepees were round like the nests of birds. And they were always set in a circle, the nation’s hoop.

If you encounter this quotation from Chief Black Elk, it is invariably accompanied by a certain feeling which I think might be unique to the Western mind. It's a sense of encounter with wisdom, and with people who were wise; a sense of loss, nostalgia, regret; an admiration for a wisdom which has passed from the world; a certainty that we are not wise in this way, but only knowledgeable, only powerful; and yet, hidden beneath this, a re-affirmation of our own power. 

One frequently encounters this combination of feeling. Sometimes other American Indians play the role that Chief Black Elk does here; sometimes, white writers masquerading as Indians; sometimes the wisdom is attributed to some other, sufficiently far away, people, such as the Tibetans or the Chinese Taoists or the Ancient Celts. 

But here is Proclus, teaching us that all things move in a circle, proceeding in endless circles from the First Principle of All Things. 

It must be so. All things abide in their cause; and proceed from it; and if they did not continuously return to it, they would be all together cut off from it. The three movements, abiding, proceeding, and returning, all happen together.

The Power of the World always works in circles. This is the sacred tradition of the Western world. Never fail to see this. Proclus is no outlier and his ideas were never lost. He himself is not an originator but a synthesizer of a tradition rooted in the ancients, in Pythagoras and Parmenides; Euclid and Empedocles; Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. His pagan faith may have faded-- it never really died-- but his philosophy endured in Dionysius the Areopagite, whose writings were treated nearly as scripture. In the West, these ideas were carried on by Eriugena, Aquinas, Bonaventure and Nicholas of Cusa; in the East, by Maximos the Confessor and many others. 

And what of America, the child of the heretical and Protestant branch of the West, the limb that cut itself off from the tree that birthed it? Didn't we, at least, lose the tradition? 

We never did. American culture was shot through with the old tradition from the beginning, or near enough. Look into the ideas of the early Quakers, who founded Pennsylvania and governed Delaware and Southern New Jersey. In their doctrine of the Inner Light and in their beliefs around reincarnation you see the echo of Plotinus. Pennsylvania became a refuge for Rosicrucians, occultists whose ideas were entirely rooted in Neoplatonism. In the 1700s, the Druid Revival itself was rooted in Neoplatonism, and Druids were found on both sides of the Atlantic. After the Revolution, the translations of Platonic and Neoplatonic texts by Thomas Taylor swept through the English-speaking world. The very words we read here were read also by Ralph Waldo Emerson-- Emerson, who was one of the founders not only of American letters but of American culture generally. This is our sacred wisdom.

Yes, there are fools who reject these ideas, and the worst by far are the supposed "Christians" who seek to purify their faith of "pagan" influence; and the worst by far of these, among our contemporaries, are adherents to the Catholic or the Orthodox churches. One well-known Orthodox convert YouTuber is found of regular panic attacks about the influence of Neoplatonism and the related Hermetic tradition in Holywood, apparently unaware of its influence on his own faith. One author on the "traditionalist" Catholic fringe spends his time railing about how the Church has been captured by the "Neoplatonic-Hermetic Gnosis," with this supposed to have happened in the Renaissance, seemingly unaware that the very text we are reading was also in the possession of Thomas Aquinas. A young convert to the Orthodox Church (an "Orthobro," as the current parlance has it) once told me that I ought to reject Platonism and instead look to such Orthodox thinkers as Maximos the Confessor. I ignored him until I'd finished reading through Plato's works, then took a look at Maximos, out of fairness. And found the ideas of Plato and Aristotle on every single page. 

All things move in a circle, proceeding from the One Principle of All, and returning to it. This is our sacred wisdom. 

 Every conversion or return is effected through the similitude of the things converted to that to which they are converted.

For every thing which is converted hastens to be conjoined with its cause, and desires communion and colligation with it. But similitude binds all things to­gether, just as dissimilitude separates and disjoins all things. If, therefore, conversion or return is a certain communion and contact, but all communion and all contact are through similitude — if this be the case, every conversion will be effected through similitude.

COMMENTARY

Today we have another simple one. Everything aspires to its cause, but how is its conversion to its cause effected? We learned before that every effect is both the same as and different from its cause. That which brings about the conversion is this similitude or sameness. 
Every thing which proceeds from another essentially, returns to that from which it proceeds.

For if it should proceed, indeed, but should not re­turn to the cause of this progression, it would not desire its cause. For everything which desires is converted to the object of its desire. Moreover, every thing desires good, and to each thing the attainment of it is through the proximate cause. Every thing, therefore, desires its cause: and the cause of being to any particular thing is likewise the cause of well-being (good) to it. But desire is primarily directed to the cause of well-being: and con­version or return is to that to which desire primarily tends.

 COMMENTARY

For Proclus, all things are subject to a threefold movement, viz. abiding, proceeding, and returning (mone, prohodos, epistrophe). In the previous Proposition he discussed remaining and proceeding. He now discusses the third movement, returning or conversion

We have seen that all things must both abide in and proceed from their cause. Everything must be united to its cause in some way, or it can't be caused by it; therefore, it remains in its cause on some level. But everything must also proceed from its cause-- otherwise, we wouldn't be able to call it a separate thing. This is somewhat alien to our usual way of thinking, but easy enough to grasp. 

But what about returning? 

Proclus tells us that everything must return to its cause, because otherwise "it would not desire its cause." This is a little less familiar even than the idea of abiding while proceeding. They key to it lies in Plato's understanding of the Good. The Good, Plato tells us, is "that which all things desire." As human beings, we are sometimes mistaken about what our good actually is. We are hungry; we think that a cookie will satisfy our hunger. We eat the cookie, desire three more, eat them, and wind up with a crash in our energy and an upset stomach, followed in short order by inflammation and weight gain. We mistake an apparent good for our actual good. Learning, we have a steak salad instead of a cookie; our body becomes stronger, our energy increases, we feel better. Rising still further, we refuse our hunger entirely for an hour or for a day, seeking instead to discipline our appetites by fasting. 

 The Good, which is God Himself, is both our source and our end. Proclus discusses this in a very beautiful passage from his commentary on Plato's Timaeus: 

 
All things that exist are offspring of the gods, are brought into existence without intermediation by them and have their foundation in them. For not only does the continuous procession of entities reach completion, as each of them successively obtains its subsistence from its proximate causes, but it is also from the very gods themselves that all things in a sense are generated, even if they are described as being at the furthest remove from the gods, [indeed] even if you were to speak of matter (hulê) itself. For the divine does not stand aloof from anything, but is present for all things alike. For this reason, even if you take the lowest levels [of reality], there too you will find the divine present. The One is in fact everywhere present, inasmuch as each of the beings derives its existence from the gods, and even though they proceed forth from the gods, they have not gone out from them but rather are rooted in them. Where, indeed, could they ‘go out’, when the gods have embraced all things and taken hold of them in advance and still retain them in themselves? For what is beyond the gods is That which is in no way existent, but all beings have been embraced in a circle by the gods and exist in them. In a wonderful way, therefore, all things both have and have not proceeded forth. They have not been cut off from the gods. If they had been cut off, they would not even exist, because all the offspring, once they were wrenched away from their fathers, would immediately hasten towards the gaping void of non-being. In fact they are somehow established in them [the gods], and, to put the matter in a nutshell, they have proceeded of their own accord, but [at the same time] they remain in the gods. 
 
But those beings which proceed forth must also return, imitating the manifestation of the gods and their reversion to the cause, so that they too are ordered in accordance with the perfective triad, and are again embraced by the gods and the most primary henads. They receive a second kind of perfection from them, in accordance with which they are able to revert to the goodness of the gods, so that, being rooted at the outset in the gods, through their reversion they can be fixed in them once again, making this kind of circle which both begins from the gods and ends with them. All things, therefore, both remain in and revert to the gods, receiving this ability from them and obtaining in their very being a double signature, the one in order to remain there, the other so that what proceeds forth can return. And it is possible to observe these not only in souls, but also in the lifeless beings that follow them.
 
That all things desire God is not a doctrine limited to pagans, or even to professed Platonists. Thomas Aquinas was generally hostile to Plato himself, but his thinking was so shaped by Dionysius and Augustine-- and by Aristotle, who could never escape his master's way of thinking, no matter how hard he tried-- that his work is filled with Platonic ideas and is incomprehensible without them:

All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being... And so of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence. 

On Prayer

A great help in our reversion to the gods is prayer. This also Proclus discusses at length in the Timaeus commentary

 
This is the best end of true prayer, in order that the conversion of the soul may be conjoined with its permanency, and that every thing which proceeds from The One of the Gods, may again be established in The One, and the light which is in us may be comprehended in the light of the Gods.
 
Prayer therefore, is no small part of the whole ascent of souls. Nor is he who possesses virtue superior to the want of the good which proceeds from prayer; but on the contrary the ascent of the soul is effected through it, and together with this, piety to the Gods, which is the summit of virtue.

Nor is prayer limited to human beings. As all things desire the Good, for Proclus, all things pray. Even a flower or a stone, by its very nature adores the Gods who are the source of its existence. 

But perhaps this is better expressed, again, by Proclus himself, in his hymn to the One: 

 
O, Absolutely Transcendent! (what else is it rightful to call Thee?)
 
How shall I fittingly hymn Thee, that art of all things most exalted?
 
How would words speak Thy Splendor? For words cannot name or denote Thee,
 
Sole Unspeakable Being, since Thou art the cause of all speaking.
 
How might the mind know Thy Nature? For mind cannot grasp or conceive Thee,
 
Sole Unknowable Being, since Thou art the cause of all knowing.
 
All things existing, the speaking and speechless together proclaim Thee.
 
All things existing, the knowing and nescient together, adore Thee.
 
All keen desires or lust, all painful passions are yearnings
 
Only for Thee. Thine is the whole world’s prayer; to Thee all,
 
Sensing Thy tokens within them, utter a paean of silence.
 
Everything issues from Thee. Only Thou art dependent on nothing.
 
Everything nestles within Thee. Everything surges upon Thee.
 
For Thou art the Goal of all beings. And Thou art One Thing, and All Things,
 
And yet neither one thing, nor all things.
 
O, Most-Named, how then shall I name Thee?
 
That art alone the Unnamable? What even Heaven-born Mind then
 
Could possibly penetrate Thy distant Shroud? I Pray Thee, be gracious!
 
O, Absolutely Transcendent, what else is it rightful to call Thee?’
 



 Everything which is produced from a certain thing without a medium, abides in its producing cause, and proceeds from it.

For if every progression is effected while primary natures remain permanent, and is accomplished through similitude, similars being constituted prior to dissimilars — if this be the case, that which is produced will in a certain respect abide in its producing cause. For that which entirely proceeds will have nothing which is the same with the abiding cause, but will be perfectly separ­ated from it. But if it has anything in common with and united to it, it will abide in its cause in the same manner as that abides in itself. If, however, it abides only but does not proceed, it will in no respect differ from its cause, nor will it while that abides be generated something different from it. For if it is something different it is separated and apart from its cause. If, how­ever, it is apart, but the cause abides, it will proceed from the cause in order that while it abides it may be separated from it. So far, therefore, as that which is produced has something which is the same with the pro­ducing cause, it abides in it; but so far as it is different, it proceeds from it. Being, however, similar, it is in a certain respect at once both the same and different. Hence it abides and at the same time proceeds, and does neither of these without the other.

COMMENTARY

Abiding and procession. Here we have two terms of another Platonic triad, that of Abiding, Proceeding, and Returning. 

Proclus tells us that everything produced by any cause both abides in that cause and proceeds from it

He demonstrates this using very simple logic. If A causes B, then we have three possibilities: 

1. A and B are the same. If this is the case, then A doesn't cause B, A simply remains A, and there is no B to speak of. To return to the example of colors: Color As Such produces the various colors we know. But if there is nothing about them which is different from Color As Such, then there are no separate colors. They're all simply Color, or, we might say, simply Light. 

2. A and B are entirely different. But if that is the case, then it is impossible for A to cause B, because they have nothing in common. Color as such produces red and green and blue, but it doesn't produce cats or 12 or the feeling of nostalgia.

3. A and B are both the same and different. So B has something of A in it, but also something which is different from A. Red is a color, but it is not Color Itself; it has something which is distinctly red about it. At the same time, a "part" of it-- not a physical part, of course-- remains color. That's why we call it "a color," and not a cat or the number 12 or an emotion. 

Remember that this is a work of theology first and foremost. On this way of looking at things, every effect abides in its cause. And, as we have seen, this universe is hierarchically ordered, descending by degrees first from God through the panoply of Gods, then to intellectual Ideas, souls, natures, and all the things of our experience.

The One is the First Cause of all things. 

And this means that a "part" of us-- not a physical part, of course-- always abides in the One. God is always present to us, by the very nature of reality; or we are always present to Him. An Orthodox saint or theologian-- I'm afraid I can't remember who, and can't find the reference-- once said that "If any soul suffers in Hell, you may be sure that Christ suffers with him." On Proclus's logic, this is necessarily the case. God is never distant; a part of us always abides with Him. "God," as Empedocles taught us, "is a circle whose center is everywhere, and whose circumference is nowhere."
   Every progression is effected through a similitude of second­ary to primary natures.

 
 
For if that which produces constitutes similars prior to dissimilars, the similitude derived from the producing causes will constitute the things produced. For similars are rendered similar through similitude, and not through dissimilitude. If, therefore, progression in its diminu­tion preserves a certain sameness of that which is gen­erated with that which generates, and shows that such as the generator is primarily so is that posterior to it secondarily, it will have its nature through similitude.

COMMENTARY

Here we continue our discussion of the fine details of the unfoldment of being from the One. This may only be a peculiarity of my psyche, but I find it easiest to see this in terms of colors. Red leads to orange before it leads to yellow, and yellow descends to green before blue. Of course, colors as such are arranged horizontally-- neither red nor blue nor yellow is ontologically prior to the other two. In the Platonic cosmos, this same idea applies to the vertical as well as the horizontal. Being brings forth Intellect before Soul. To get into the details of Proclus's pagan theology, the Solar Zeus constitutes the Sun, and Apollo proceeds from him, and from Apollo, Apollonian angels, daimones, heroic souls and ordinary souls-- the former category, of course, includes the souls both of Pythagoras and Plato himself; solar animals such as lions and roosters, solar plants such as marigolds and sunflowers, down to solar gems and minerals, like gold. 

Of course, the Christian version of this simply substitutes a Name of God and an appropriate archangel of the Sun for Zeus, Helios and Apollo; typically this is YHVH Eloah Veh Da'ath and either Michael or Raphael. But the idea is the same, and for all we know, the beings involved are the same as well. 
Every producing cause constitutes things similar to itself, prior to such as are dissimilar.

For since that which produces is necessarily more excellent than the thing produced, they can never be simply the same with each other and equal in power. But if they are not the same and equal, but different and unequal, they are either entirely separated from each other, or they are both united and separated. If, how­ever, they are entirely separated, they will not accord with each other, and nowhere will that which proceeds from a cause sympathize with it. Hence, neither will one of these participate of the other, since they are en­tirely different from it. For that which is participated gives communion to its participant with reference to that of which it participates. Moreover, it is necessary that the thing caused should participate of its cause, as from thence deriving its essence.
 
 
But if that which is produced is partly separated from and partly united to its producing cause, — if, indeed, it experiences each of these equally, — it will equally par­ticipate and not participate: so that in the same manner it will have essence and not have it from the producing cause. And if it is more separated from than united to it, the thing generated will be more foreign than allied to that by which it is generated, will be more unadapted than adapted to it, and be more deprived of than possess sympathy with it. If, therefore, the things which pro­ceed from causes are allied to them according to their very being, have sympathy with them, are naturally de­pendent on them, and aspire after contact with them, desiring good, and obtaining the object of their desire through the cause of their existence—if this be the case, it is evident that things produced are in a greater degree Med to their producing causes than separated from [28] them. Things, however, which are more united are more similar than dissimilar to the natures to which they are especially united. Every producing cause, therefore, constitutes things similar to itself prior to such as are dissimilar.

COMMENTARY

This proposition is the basis of a concept with which I believe most of us are familiar, that is, what was in medieval times called the Great Chain of Being. This was a universal concept in the European middle ages and through the early modern period. It is the image of the Universe hierarchically ordered, with God at its apex; angels following God in their successive orders; man after the angels; and, below Man, the beasts, plants, and minerals.



The basis of this whole idea is the very simple concept that every producing cause produces things similar to itself before things which are different from itself. In Pythagorean terms, the One first produces the duality of the One and the Dyad. These two, which are also Limit and Unlimited, then bring forth the Mixture, which is Being Itself. The Neoplatonists-- or some of them-- mythologically identified these principles with Chronos, the First One, bringing forth the dyad of Aether and Chaos, and then, in cooperating with Aether, producing a cosmic egg. The egg itself is an image of being, as it is a simple and limited form in which resides unlimited potentiality. From these, the whole panoply of deities of whom we've heard emerge. From the Gods are emanated angels and daimones, human souls, animals, plants, and minerals, down to the last of things. 

 
Every producing cause, by reason of its perfection and abun­dance of power, is productive of secondary natures.

For if it produced not on account of the perfect, but through a defect of power, it would not be able to pre­serve its own order immovable. For that which imparts being to another thing through defect and imbecility imparts subsistence to it through its own mutation and change in quality. But every thing which produces re­mains such as it is, and in consequence of thus remain­ing that which is posterior to it proceeds into existence. Hence, being full and perfect, it constitutes secondary natures immovably and without diminution, it being that which it is, and neither being changed into them nor diminished. For that which is produced is not a distri­bution into parts of the producing cause; since this is neither appropriate to generation, nor to generating causes. Nor is it a transition of one nature into another: for it does not become the matter of that which pro­ceeds; since it remains such as it is, and that which is produced is different from it. Hence that which gener­ates abides without alteration and undiminished; through prolific power multiplies itself, and from itself imparts secondary hypostases or natures.
 

COMMENTARY

I think that we have here a subtle point of Platonic metaphysics.

How are the succeeding levels of existence created? The One itself gives subsistence to everything, but after the one we have the whole series of Henads, and after the Henads, the Intellectual forms. Does the One change when it creates the universe? Or does the One become the universe? If it creates from itself, is there less of it afterward, in the way that a child might take half of the play-dough out of a bucket? 

No. 

Creation, in this account of the universe, is a consequence of perfection. To be Good, or to be Perfect, which is to imitiate the Good, is to be productive. God and the Gods are always actively creating and upholding the universe, by their very nature. As Proclus tells us, "that which is produced is not a distribution into parts of the producing cause," like the play-dough being taken from the tub and divided in half. "Nor is it a transition of one nature into another." The color Red isn't divided into the red cup, the red candle and the red lighter. If you wanted to add a red crayon, you wouldn't have to check and see if enough red was left over in the universe. For Proclus, everything is like this, even the very highest things.  "Everything which produces remains such as it is, and in consequence of thus remaining that which is posterior to it proceeds into existence." It is from the One that all things come to be. Remaining perfectly what it is, the One causes Being; Being causes Intellect; Intellect causes Soul; Soul causes Body.

Every cause which is productive of other things, itself abid­ing in itself, produces the natures posterior to itself, and those which are successive.

For if it imitates The One, but that immovably constitutes the things posterior to itself, everything which produces will possess in a similar manner the cause of productive energy. But The One constitutes things im­movably. For if through motion, the motion will be in it; and, being moved, it will no longer be The One, be­cause it will be changed from The One. But if motion subsists together with or after it, it will also be from The One, and either there will be a progression to in­finity, or The One will produce immovably, and every thing which produces will imitate the producing cause of all things. For everywhere from that which is primari­ly that which is not primarily derives its subsistence; so that the nature which is productive of certain things orig­inates from that which is productive of all things. Hence every producing cause produces subsequent natures from itself. And while productive natures abide in themselves undiminished, secondary natures are produced by them. For that which is in any respect diminished cannot abide such as it is.

COMMENTARY

This proposition is less about introducing new ideas than about reiterating and clarifying ideas we've already encountered, specifically the relationshp between the One and the Unities (Henads, Gods.)

Two concepts seem to me to be key:
 
The One constitutes things im­movably

and
from that which is primari­ly that which is not primarily derives its subsistence
and

the nature which is productive of certain things orig­inates from that which is productive of all things

The One gives existence to everything, and It does so from its very nature. It's worth noting that some, though not all, Christians object to this point, because they want the act of creating the universe to have been a decision by God. A decision takes place at a certain time, according to certain considerations; it's a particular act, not a constant act or a constant state of being. For Proclus the One is like an overflowing fountain which never ceases. In my own thinking, God is a river whose mouth is everywhere and whose source is nowhere. 

The Unities are secondarily what the One is primarily. To say it differently, the Gods are secondarily what God is primarily. From God, the Gods derive their subsistence. As the One, or God, produces all things primarily, the Gods, who originate from God, produce particular things. This, by the way, is one way that a Christian Platonist can reconcile Genesis with Plato's Timaeus. In the Timaeus, the Demiurge creates the universe, but delegates to the particular Gods the job of creating material forms; in Genesis, God does all the heavy lifting himself. But these can be seen as different ways of talking about the same thing, as, on Proclus's account, the Gods will cause secondarily what God Himself causes primarily. Of course, Proclus's own view of the creation story in the Timaeus is rather different, as he assigns the role of Demiurge to Jupiter, who derives his creative power from Saturn, the leader of the Intellectual Triad of which is the final term. 

One other thing which is worth considering. For Proclus, the One constitutes all things; the One is also radically simple. The Unities produce certain things, deriving their subsistence from the One. And, as we learned last time, everything perfect generates things like itself, imitating the First Cause. There is thus a sense here in which real being is necessarily creative. Being, in this sense, and the endpoint of beings like us who are doing the work here in the world of Time, is also creative power. This is precisely what is meant by "Will" or "True Will" in modern magical traditions. It's not about doing what you want, or getting what you want. The "wants" are of the lower phase of the soul, enmeshed in matter; these are passions, not actions. True Being is not in any way passive, but active, and the closer we approach to it, the more united we ourselves become, the more we become active. 
On the Perfect

Everything perfect proceeds to the generation of those things which it is able to produce, imitating the One Principle of all.

For as the one Principle by reason of its own good­ness is unically constitutive of all beings, — for The Good and The One are the same, so that the boniform is the same with the unical, — thus, also, those things which are posterior to the First Principle, on account of their perfection, hasten to generate beings inferior to their own essence: for perfection is a certain part or quality of The Good, and the perfect so far as it is perfect imi­tates The Good. But The Good is constitutive of all things: so that the perfect is likewise productive accord­ing to its nature of those things which it is able to pro­duce. And that indeed which is more perfect, the more perfect it is the more numerous are the progeny of which it is the cause. For that which is more perfect partici­pates in a greater degree of The Good. It is therefore nearer to The Good, is more allied to the cause of all, and is the cause of a greater number of effects. That, however, which is more imperfect, the more imperfect it is the less numerous are the effects of which it is the cause; for, being more remote from the producer of everything, it is the cause of fewer effects. For to that which constitutes, or adorns, or perfects, or connects, or vivifies, or fabricates all things, that nature is most allied which produces a greater number of each of these; but that is more remote which produces a less number of each.

Corollary.— From the premises it is evident that the nature which is most remote from the Principle of all is unprolific and is not the cause of anything. For if it generated a certain thing, and had something posterior to itself, it is evident that it would no longer be the most remote, but that which it produced would be more re­mote than itself from the Principle of all things; it would therefore be nearer to productive power, and, in addition, would imitate the cause which is productive of all beings.

COMMENTARY

As promised, today we have a discussion of the Perfect, and what is meant, in Proclus's system, by "perfection." 

We should take a minute to remember that the word "perfect" in its traditional sense means "complete." This is important because we tend to use it in common English to mean something like "super duper good." But, while I don't have access to the Greek, our original translators would not have selected the word "perfect" unless they intended the original meaning of the word. Something which is perfect is something which is complete. 

This has important implications before we even get into the rest of the proposition. Last time, we learned that Participants "receive their perfection from" that which they Participate. That is, to be a Participant is also to be completed by something else-- by that which is Participated. 

Furthermore, we learn:

To be complete is to be productive. To be complete or perfect is not to cease, but to produce, "in imitation of the First Principle of All." 

Therefore, the Perfect is not the same as the One Itself. Perfection, rather, "is a certain part or quality of The Good." And to be perfect is to imitate the Good. As the Good is the cause of all things, therefore, everything perfect is productive of natures inferior to itself.

Bearing in mind what we learned last time, we can now add another term to our hierarchy. It's worth reviewing what we've seen so far. Our levels of being are:
  • The Immovable     The Imparticipable    The One           The Good            The Cause            Superessential (Above Being)
  • The Self-Motive     The Participated        The Unities      The Perfect          The Concause     Being
  • The Alter-Motive    The Participants        The United       The Perfected      The Caused         Becoming

In this Proposition, we are introduced, finally, to a level of being lower than these. Proclus tells us, "the nature which is most remote from the Principle of all is unprolific and is not the cause of anything." This is the Last of Things, the extremity which effectively forms the bottom of reality. This Last is distinguished from other things in that it is not perfected. How do we know this? Because if it were to be perfected, it would then become productive. Being productive, it would not longer be the last of things-- something else, which it had caused, would become the last. Therefore, there must be a final level which, in these terms, we could call the imperfect or, better, the Unperfected. If we then add this fourth level to the series, we come up with:

  • The Unmoved    The Unparticipating   The Disunited     The Unperfected   The Uncaused   Nonbeing

Being most remote from the One, we can also call it the Chaos; being most remote from the Good, we can also call it Evil. Evil, then, is identical with Nonbeing. 

Speculation

Those of us who are in contact with matter and live in the world of time are necessarily part of the world of Becoming. As all of these terms are identical to one another, or different ways of talking about the same thing, we are also part of the world of the Perfected, and, as the Perfected, we receive our perfection from outside of ourselves. From what? The Perfect, as concauses with the Good Itself. The Good, remember, is that which causes all things, and that which all things desire. As members of the group of All Things, our ultimate desire is for the Good. And how do we achieve the Good? We become Perfect, which is the same as becoming United. And we do this not, or not entirely, through our own efforts, but by the activity of the Perfect. "Activity" or "Act" is another way of saying "energy," or, to put it in Christian terms, Grace. What is, in the Christian religion, called sanctity, sainthood or divinization, is precisely this perfection. Moreover, all this being the case, it is also the case that what Christians call a saint is made so by participation in God. Every saint, therefore, becomes productive in the same way that the Good Itself, or God, is productive.

In Greek terms, we could substitute the word "Hero" for saint. The same is also what is meant by the word xian in Chinese and Boddhisattva in the Buddhist tradition. All these are beings who have become perfected, and now participate in the creative process which unfolds the universe.

It's easy to prove to ourself that this is true. One of the effects of a new saint is a new cult, which is to say, a new set of activities appearing here in the world of Becoming that were not to be found prior to this particular saint's the attainment of sainthood. Here, for example, is a shrine to St. Therese of Lisieux. Therese lived from 1873 to 1897; she was canonized in 1925. Prior to this, there were no shrines to her, and the particular devotions, images, and motifs associated with her cult did not exist. We had a large chapel dedicated to her near where I grew up in Pennsylvania; when I was a boy I was taken there on her Feast Day and afterwards given rose petals blessed by a priest. This could not have happened prior to her canonization, an event in time which signifies her perfection, which is her ascension to a world beyond time and becoming. 

According to many Christians, the world of becoming will come to an end, and the dead will be reunited with the bodies left behind on Earth. This idea isn't original to Christianity. The same idea is found in Plato's Politicus, where it appears as a myth. Many of Plato's dialogues contain myths, but these are never to be read as literal descriptions of historical events but rather as sacred teaching stories. According to the myth of the Politicus, the day shall come when the Sun will reverse his course in the Heavens. And on that day Time will begin to turn backward. Jupiter will step down from the rulership of the Universe and return his throne to his father, Saturn. And on that day the Dead will rise from their graves, the Earth will give up her fruits without struggle, and the Golden Age will come round again.  

In his Platonic Theology-- a different volume from this one, I should mention-- Proclus discussed this myth, which is so similar to the Final Judgment in Christian tradition. But he explained that it is not an event in time. Rather, those who rise from their graves have returned to an existence outside of time, restored to the kingdom of the Father, Saturn, who preceeds the universe of becoming. 

It's my view that this is precisely what the saints are. They aren't sanctified souls waiting in Heaven for a pro-forma judgment; they aren't lawyers who can plead your case before God if you get to know them. They are the perfected souls, who now abide outside of time, participating in the government of the Universe.  

Every thing which participates is inferior to that which is participated by it; and that which is participated is in­ferior to that which is imparticipable.

For that which participates, since it is imperfect prior to participation, but becomes perfect through par­ticipation, is entirely secondary to that which is par­ticipated so far as it is perfect by participating. For so far as it was imperfect it is inferior to that which it par­ticipates, which causes it to become perfect. But that which is participated by a certain one and not by all, is on this account allotted an hyparxis or essence subordi­nate to that which is common to all things, and not to a certain one thing: for the latter is more allied but the former less to the cause of all.
The imparticipable, therefore, is the leader of things which are participated; but the latter are the leaders of participants. For, in short, the imparticipable is one prior to the many; but that which is participated in the many is one and at the same time not one; and every­thing which participates is not one and at the same time one.

COMMENTARY

This proposition is spelling out the ideas that we've already encountered in straightforward and simple terms. This is a hierarchical ontology, with forms having their cause on one level of being and proceeding through succeeding levels of being, down to the last of things.

I'm going to repeat something that I've discussed before. This may be unnecessary, but it's worth reminding ourselves that when we talk about "superior" and "inferior," we're not talking about "better" and "worse" in some kind of abstract sense. To think of God as a king and the highest gods or angels as spirits surrounding his throne is a metaphor. (As a metaphor, it may have worked better for people who were actually governed by kings.) Participants come after the Participated; the Participated come after the Imparticipable. This is an ontological description, not a political hierarchy. To return to the imagery we used last time, Color Itself (or Light Itself, which is invisible) is the Imparticipable. The Color Red Itself is Participated. The Red Pen is a Participant. Participants don't look cross-eyed from under their Red Sox hats at the Participated and say "You think you're betta than me!?" Things simply are as they are.

Proclus also introduces another idea in this proposition of which we'll be hearing more soon: The perfect. Participants, we are told, "are imperfect prior to participation," but "become perfect through par­ticipation." We will have more to say on this in the future.

Moreover, among the Participated and the Imparticipable, the very highest are those whose reach extends the furthest. Color Itself, for example, is manifest in the color spectrum and in one particular quality shared by physical objects, viz. visible color. Color is only one of many physical qualities; physical qualities are only one subset of all qualities. Quality Itself is thus prior to color. And the One is prior to all things.


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Every imparticipable produces the things which are partici­pated: and all the natures which are participated strive for imparticipable essences.

For that which is imparticipable, having the rela­tion of a monad, as subsisting from itself and not from another, and being exempt from participants, produces those things which may be participated. For either it is of itself barren, remaining within itself, and possessing nothing worthy of honor, or it will impart something from itself. And that which receives indeed from it will participate it; but that which was given will subsist. But everything participating of another by which it is gen­erated, is secondary to that which is similarly present to [23] all things, and which fills all things from itself. For that which is in one only is not in others. But that which is similarly present to all things, in order that it may illuminate all, is not in one thing, but is prior to all things. For it is either in all things, or in one of all, or is prior to all. But that indeed which is in all things, being distributed into all, will again require another thing which may unite that which is distributed. And all things will no longer participate of the same thing, but this of one and that of another, the one being divid­ed. But if it is in one alone of all things it will no longer be common to all, but to one thing. Hence, if it is common to all things able to participate, and is com­mon to all, it will be prior to all. But this is imparticipable, [because it neither is nor can be participated by anything.]
 

Taylor's translation is a bit different:
 
Every imparticipable gives subsistence from itself to things which are participated. And all participated hypostases are extended to imparticipable hyparxes.

COMMENTARY

Taylor notes in his translation that the text is somewhat garbled in the original. Still, it's easy to see what Proclus is talking about here.

Previously we were introduced to the concept of movement through three terms:
  • The Immovable
  • The Self-Motive
  • The Alter-Motive
The Immovable does not move, but moves others. The self-motive moves itself and others. The alter-motive is only moved. These three exist in a hierarchy, beginning with the immovable, proceeding through the self-motive, ending in the alter-motive.

Now we are being introduced to the same sort of structure, but this time it's being applied to the concept of participation. And so we have:
  • The Imparticipable
  • The Participated
  • The Participants
To understand what he is talking about, we need to return to our whole picture of the universe, which consists, as we have seen, of several different levels. First we have the level of Being. After Being, we have Intellect. After Intellect, Soul. After Soul, Body. Actually, there are two more levels which we can fit in there, but that's a subject for another time. Let's stick with four for now:
  • Being
  • Intellect
  • Soul
  • Body
At every level, there is that which is participated, and that which is imparticipable. To be participated means that it has contact with the level beneath it. To be imparticipable means that it does not.

It might be easiest to understand this if we start form the lowest levels. Your body participates in soul; we know that because you're alive and reading these words. Your body is a participant; your soul, participated. But there are souls which are not in bodies, and which never descend to the level of body; moreover, Soul Itself is not a body of any kind. These are imparticipable.

Moreover, of souls, some reach upward to the level of Intellect, but others do not. Intellect or nous is a faculty which seems to be peculiar to human beings, and perhaps to some animals-- Today, we'd probably assume that means dolphins or elephants, but the only animal which Plato mentions as having a nous is the crane! Our souls participate in Intellect, but there are Intellects prior to soul which are not participated.

Finally, at the level of Being, we have the One, which is imparticipable, and the unities, which are participated. These are also called the First God and the particular Gods. Note that the One is actually prior to Being and to every particular being. As Thomas Taylor says, "imparticipable being, is that which participates nothing of being, but is the source of being to others."

An easy way to understand it may be to think of colors. On my desk there is a red lighter, a red box, a red cup, and a text-message on my phone bordered in red. All of these objects can be said to participate in the color red. The color red itself is not a red object-- and, what's more, you can never actually encounter it, because any specific instance of red you encountered wouldn't be Red Itself, but another red object. And so Red Itself is participated. But prior to Red Itself is Color Itself, which is even further removed from the world of our experience. Color Itself is not participated; you can see a white wall or a black cat, but never a color wall or a colored cat. Every color you encounter is particular. These are akin, on a very different level, to the One and the Unities. The One is like Color Itself, prior to every color; Red Itself and Blue Itself and Green Itself are like the Unities (Henads or Gods), which can be participated. Make sense?

***

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Every thing which subsists primarily and principally in each order is one, and is neither two, nor more than two, but is wholly one alone.

For, if it be possible, let there be two things which thus subsist, since there will be the same impossibility if there are more than two; or let that which subsists pri­marily consist of each of these. But if, indeed, it con­sists of each it will again be one, and there will not be two things which are first. And if it be one of the two, each will not be first. Nor, if both are equally primary, will each have a principal subsistence. For if one of them is primary, but this is not the same with the other, what will it be in that order? For that subsists primarily  which is nothing else than that which it is said to be. But each of these being different is, and at the same time is not, that which it is said to be.
 
If, therefore, these differ from each other, but they do not primarily differ so far as they are that which they are said to be, — for this primarily experiences that which is the same, — both will not be first, but will be that of which both participating are thereby said to subsist pri­marily.
 
Corollary.— From these things it is evident that what is primarily being is one alone, and that there are not two primary beings, or more than two; that the first intellect is one alone, and that there are not two first in­tellects; and that the first soul is one. This is also the case with every form, such as the primarily beautiful and the primarily equal. Thus, too, with respect to the form of animals, and the form of man, the first of each is one; for the demonstration is the same.

COMMENTARY

This one is also straightforward enough. At every level of being, the level itself is one and one alone. Being Itself is one. Why? Because if there were two principle beings, they would both share Being Itself, which would then be... Being. Itself. The same holds at the levels of Intellect and Soul. The First Intellect is one, and the subsequent intellects proceed from it; the First Soul (the Universal or World Soul) is one, and subsequent souls proceed from it. 

This same structure holds at the level of forms or ideas. The Beautiful is one; if two things both share beauty, then the Beauty that they share is Beauty Itself. Note that a whole series of beautiful things are not beauty itself; as an idea, Beauty subsists at a different ontological level from things which are beautiful. The same is true of Equal itself, which is that by virtue of which equality can be found in subsequent objects. And we can say the same for the whole series of forms. The Good, the True, and the Beautiful; the Same and the Different; Justice Itself, Wisdom, Courage, and Temperance Themselves are all one and prior to those things which participate in them. 

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