Reading Notes: Plotinus 1:1:6
Dec. 15th, 2019 04:22 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
readoldthingsWelcome back!
You may notice from the slightly different title that I'm messing with the format of this blog a bit.
It occurred to me that it might be slightly tedious for some to follow along with the line-by-line expositions I've been doing. My plan is to write a post summarizing the basic arguments and conclusion of each tractate once I reach the end of it; to read those posts, you won't have to read along with Mr. Plotinus himself. It may be a little while between those, though. In the meantime, you're welcome to follow along as I struggle to make sense of this!
Last time, Plotinus determined that experience could not be rooted in the Couplement of Soul and Body. Certain affections, he pointed out, giving sexual arousal as an example, require the body, while others are based in the Soul alone. Meanwhile, it isn't clear whether the affections originate in the body or the Soul. How can this be? Let's continue to read and see what we find out! As always, you can follow along here.
It may seem reasonable to lay down as a law that when any powers are contained by a recipient, every action or state expressive of them must be the action or state of that recipient, they themselves remaining unaffected as merely furnishing efficiency.
To say this another way: consider motion. A thing in motion moves-- it is the recipient of the power of motion. But Motion itself remains unaffected.
But if this were so, then, since the Animate is the recipient of the Causing-Principle [i.e., the Soul] which brings life to the Couplement, this Cause must itself remain unaffected, all the experiences and expressive activities of the life being vested in the recipient, the Animate.
If I understand correctly, then if the relationship of Soul to body is like motion to a moving thing, then the Soul would not have any experiences at all-- because it cannot be affected, if this is the case. If that were the case, what would the Soul even be? Plotinus anticipates this problem, saying--
But this would mean that life itself belongs not to the Soul but to the Couplement; or at least the life of the Couplement would not be the life of the Soul; Sense-Perception would belong not to the Sensitive-Faculty but to the container of the faculty.
If this is the case, then your Soul is basically detached from your body, experiencing nothing, not even life; it's just there as a kind of outside cause, enabling life to happen. But this doesn't make sense--
But if sensation is a movement traversing the body and culminating in Soul, how can the soul lack sensation? The very presence of the Sensitive-Faculty must assure sensation to the Soul.
Once again, where is sense-perception seated?
In the Couplement.
Yet how can the Couplement have sensation independently of action in the Sensitive-Faculty, the Soul left out of count and the Soul-Faculty?
Plotinus is about to bring this section to conclusion, in the chapter to follow.
As stated above, my plan is to continue to go through these one chapter at a time-- there are 13 total chapters, so we're almost at the halfway mark. At that point, I will summarize the basic argument and the conclusions, and give some thoughts on it. And then we'll move forward!
Now, if you're following along and finding Plotinus makes your head hurt, don't despair. I plan to alternate close reads of The Enneads with more broadly-focused posts on complete works, like the one I did on Dion Fortune below. Specific texts I want to consider include Hesiod's Theogony, a medieval Taoist meditation manual entitled The Secret of the Golden Flower, and Catholic St. Louis de Montfort's book of Mariology, True Devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary. What do all of these have in common with each other? Stick around, and maybe we'll find out!
You may notice from the slightly different title that I'm messing with the format of this blog a bit.
It occurred to me that it might be slightly tedious for some to follow along with the line-by-line expositions I've been doing. My plan is to write a post summarizing the basic arguments and conclusion of each tractate once I reach the end of it; to read those posts, you won't have to read along with Mr. Plotinus himself. It may be a little while between those, though. In the meantime, you're welcome to follow along as I struggle to make sense of this!
Last time, Plotinus determined that experience could not be rooted in the Couplement of Soul and Body. Certain affections, he pointed out, giving sexual arousal as an example, require the body, while others are based in the Soul alone. Meanwhile, it isn't clear whether the affections originate in the body or the Soul. How can this be? Let's continue to read and see what we find out! As always, you can follow along here.
It may seem reasonable to lay down as a law that when any powers are contained by a recipient, every action or state expressive of them must be the action or state of that recipient, they themselves remaining unaffected as merely furnishing efficiency.
To say this another way: consider motion. A thing in motion moves-- it is the recipient of the power of motion. But Motion itself remains unaffected.
But if this were so, then, since the Animate is the recipient of the Causing-Principle [i.e., the Soul] which brings life to the Couplement, this Cause must itself remain unaffected, all the experiences and expressive activities of the life being vested in the recipient, the Animate.
If I understand correctly, then if the relationship of Soul to body is like motion to a moving thing, then the Soul would not have any experiences at all-- because it cannot be affected, if this is the case. If that were the case, what would the Soul even be? Plotinus anticipates this problem, saying--
But this would mean that life itself belongs not to the Soul but to the Couplement; or at least the life of the Couplement would not be the life of the Soul; Sense-Perception would belong not to the Sensitive-Faculty but to the container of the faculty.
If this is the case, then your Soul is basically detached from your body, experiencing nothing, not even life; it's just there as a kind of outside cause, enabling life to happen. But this doesn't make sense--
But if sensation is a movement traversing the body and culminating in Soul, how can the soul lack sensation? The very presence of the Sensitive-Faculty must assure sensation to the Soul.
Once again, where is sense-perception seated?
In the Couplement.
Yet how can the Couplement have sensation independently of action in the Sensitive-Faculty, the Soul left out of count and the Soul-Faculty?
Plotinus is about to bring this section to conclusion, in the chapter to follow.
As stated above, my plan is to continue to go through these one chapter at a time-- there are 13 total chapters, so we're almost at the halfway mark. At that point, I will summarize the basic argument and the conclusions, and give some thoughts on it. And then we'll move forward!
Now, if you're following along and finding Plotinus makes your head hurt, don't despair. I plan to alternate close reads of The Enneads with more broadly-focused posts on complete works, like the one I did on Dion Fortune below. Specific texts I want to consider include Hesiod's Theogony, a medieval Taoist meditation manual entitled The Secret of the Golden Flower, and Catholic St. Louis de Montfort's book of Mariology, True Devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary. What do all of these have in common with each other? Stick around, and maybe we'll find out!
