Elements of Theology, Proposition 6

[readoldthings]

Every multitude consists of things united, or unities.

For that each of things many will not be itself multitude alone, and again that each part of this will not be multitude alone is evident. But if it is not multitude alone, it is either united, or unities ( henads). And if, indeed, it participates of the One it is united; but if it consists of things of which that which is primarily united consists, it will be unities. For if there is the One itself, there is also that which primarily participates of it, and which is primarily united. But this consists of unities. For if it consists of things united, again things united consist of certain things, and this will be the case to infinity. It is necessary, however, that what is primarily united should consist of unitites. And thus we have discovered what we proposed at first, viz. that every multitude consists either of things united, or unities.

COMMENTARY

The previous 5 propositions were concerned with the One. This proposition concerns UNITY. The concept of the One can be challenging for the modern mind, shaped as it is by Materialist ontology. I suspect, however, that the concept of unity in Proclus is even more challenging. This is becuase much of modern Materialism was formed in a culture which was still nominally religious. The Protestant reformation and its Catholic equivalent largely preserved God by setting Him outside of the material universe. When we start working with Proclus, it can be easy to grasp him by simply setting the One in the place of the God of Calvin-- real, sort of, but sufficiently outside the world we know as to make no difference.

As we continue, this becomes impossible. The One is entirely other, superessential-- that is, outside being. But the immediate production of the One is not the chaos of matter that we know. For Proclus, after the One come the Ones-- or, rather, the Unities; in Greek, the Henads. To put it another way, after God come the Gods. It is with their nature that this proposition is ultimately concerned.

Let's go over Proclus's notes one at a time.

For that each of things many will not be itself multitude alone, and again that each part of this will not be multitude alone is evident.

Take a collection of objects. On the desk in front of me, I see a houseplant, a housecat, the book we're reading, an empty cup of tea, a full cup of coffee. Together these are a multitude. None of them, however, is multitude as such: The cup of coffee is a unity; the teacup, a unity; the book, a unity; the plant and the cat are each unities. If the cat were multitude alone, it would consist of infinite cats infinitely multiplied; this is not only horrifying, it is (thankfully) impossible. (Imagine infinite cats knocking over infinite cups of coffee, forever.) Therefore, within each separate thing, some form of unity is present. The cat consists of head and tail and whiskers and so on, united into a single cat; the coffee cup consists of cup and coffee and half and half, bound together in liquid joy. Each of these is itself a multitude, but not multitude as such.

But if it is not multitude alone, it is either united, or unities ( henads).

Here Proclus is drawing a distinction between two different types of united things. A multitude may be either united, or may be a unity or henad. But what does this mean, exactly? We can imagine something which is united. This is the cup, coffee, and cream, all blended together. But what is a unity, and how is it different?

And if, indeed, it participates of the One it is united; but if it consists of things of which that which is primarily united consists, it will be unities. For if there is the One itself, there is also that which primarily participates of it, and which is primarily united. But this consists of unities.

One way to think of this distinction may be to consider the difference between the coffee and the cat. In order for the cup of coffee to exist, I had to get a cup out of the cabinet, pour coffee into it, and pour cream into the coffee. These are separate things, drawn together into a unity. Once I drink the coffee, the cup remains, the unity is dissolved. The cat, however, has a kind of existence which is prior to its parts. When it eats, it assimilates food to a being which has an existence prior to the food. It eats and excretes, it sheds its hair and grows more, but the unity of the cat persists, at least for a time.

In a similar way, immediately posterior to the One Itself there is "that which primarily participates of the One." Immediately after the One Itself, there emerges a kind of second One, which is sometimes called the One Being. This is the One which can be said to have parts, because it consists both of oneness and being or existence. Of course, two separate parts-- "one" and "being"-- can have no unity; they need a third to connect them. In practice, we call these three parts being, life, and intelligence. These parts, however, are radically united; they are together from the beginning, and not separate parts which come together afterward.

This is the sort of situation where a picture can help us to understand what is being said. If only someone had drawn an image of the One Being emerging from the One, perhaps using familiar theological names to help us understand....



Oh hey, what's that? It looks to me like the image of a Divine Triad emerging from pre-existing wholeness, with all this taking place "Beyond the Abyss," that is, prior to any sort of time or existence that we can understand. Thanks, mysterious stranger! 

But wait a minute, I'm still a bit confused about something. Why can't the first unity consist of things united? That is, why can't it be like the cup of coffee, put together out of an assemblage of cup, coffee, and cream? 

Proclus tells us: 

For if it consists of things united, again things united consist of certain things, and this will be the case to infinity.

That is to say, if there are particular things which can be put together, they must already have a certain unity to them. Otherwise, the things we're putting together will consist of infinite infinities, which can never come together in the first place. 

Therefore, the order of existence must go:

The One

Unity

Things United

And thus we have discovered what we proposed at first, viz. that every multitude consists either of things united, or unities.

Comments

[pauline_bicker]

Hi Steve,
I have read the Elements of Theology through to Proposition 6. Very interesting reading. At first, as is with much of your essays, it is as if my head is spinning, trying to sort out how to read what is written, along with the philosopher's way of stating matters. Fortunately with your essays and some books I have read. It is quicker to grasp, and understand. Often I know, only figuring out what is really written. I understand the concepts.
Steve, I really did enjoy reading each section. Increments are easier than a ream to scroll through.
Fortunately I have gone above the veil and appreciate your pieces even more so.
Thank you,

Pauline

[readoldthings]

Thank you Pauline!

Most of Proclus's work consists of very dense text. The Elements is so useful because it presents the whole philosophical system in digestible steps.