Reading Note: Plotinus 1:1:13
Feb. 26th, 2020 09:32 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
readoldthingsWelcome back! Today, we look at the final section of the First Tractate of the First Ennead. As always, you can follow along here. The first post in this series is here.
Plotinus's words are in boldface; my comments in plain script. All that said, let's jump right in!
And the principle that reasons out these matters? Is it We or the Soul?
In other words, is it us down here below doing all this thinking, or is it the Soul itself?
We, but by the Soul.
How is that, then?
But how, "by the Soul"? Does this mean that the Soul reasons by possession [by contact with the matters of enquiry]?
Why not? I suppose: Insofar as those matters are things of the material world, the Soul cannot come into contact with them.
No; by the fact of being Soul. Its Act subsists without movement; or any movement that can be ascribed to it must be utterly distinct from all corporal movement and be simply the Soul's own life.
So.
We are illuminated by the Soul, as we have seen.
The Soul acts without movement, being beyond the material world. Reasoning, then, is something inherent in it. As we possess the Soul, so we possess reason. We do it, but without the Soul, we couldn't do it.
And Intellection in us is twofold: since the Soul is intellective, and Intellection is the highest phase of life, we have Intellection both by the characteristic Act of our Soul and by the Act of the Intellectual Principle upon us-- for this Intellectual-Principle is part of us no less than the Soul, and towards it we are ever rising.
...This is much easier to understand if you can visualize it.
As individuals, we have Souls, and we also have something higher than the Soul; we have the Intellect.
Do you remember way back in the day, when we said that a multitude of red objects all have the one thing in common-- the color red?
In the same way, a multitude of Souls all have in common Soul Itself. And a multitude of Intellects have in common Intellect Itself.
The intellectual Principle in an individual is to his personal Soul, as the Intellect Itself is to Soul Itself.
Thus, we have Intellect in two ways. First, we have our own Intellect, which acts upon our Soul directly. Second, we have Intellect Itself as it acts upon Soul Itself, and through Soul Itself, upon our individual Soul
...At least that's what I think Plotinus is saying. I'm basing this upon the fact that his much later intellectual descendant Proclus makes a big deal about this two-fold participation. (See Proclus, Elements of Theology, Propositions 108 and 109.)
It's worth noting, here, that Intellect in ancient Greek thought means something different than what it does for us. Intellect is the respository of the forms; in us, it is the highest aspect of the mind, which allows for contact with higher things and sudden leaps of insight.
(Anyway, that's how I understand it).
....And there you have it, folks!
We've made it through one tractate of one of Plotinus's Enneads!
Next, I'll post a summary of Tractate One, and we'll move on to Tractate Two. See you then!
Plotinus's words are in boldface; my comments in plain script. All that said, let's jump right in!
And the principle that reasons out these matters? Is it We or the Soul?
In other words, is it us down here below doing all this thinking, or is it the Soul itself?
We, but by the Soul.
How is that, then?
But how, "by the Soul"? Does this mean that the Soul reasons by possession [by contact with the matters of enquiry]?
Why not? I suppose: Insofar as those matters are things of the material world, the Soul cannot come into contact with them.
No; by the fact of being Soul. Its Act subsists without movement; or any movement that can be ascribed to it must be utterly distinct from all corporal movement and be simply the Soul's own life.
So.
We are illuminated by the Soul, as we have seen.
The Soul acts without movement, being beyond the material world. Reasoning, then, is something inherent in it. As we possess the Soul, so we possess reason. We do it, but without the Soul, we couldn't do it.
And Intellection in us is twofold: since the Soul is intellective, and Intellection is the highest phase of life, we have Intellection both by the characteristic Act of our Soul and by the Act of the Intellectual Principle upon us-- for this Intellectual-Principle is part of us no less than the Soul, and towards it we are ever rising.
...This is much easier to understand if you can visualize it.
As individuals, we have Souls, and we also have something higher than the Soul; we have the Intellect.
Do you remember way back in the day, when we said that a multitude of red objects all have the one thing in common-- the color red?
In the same way, a multitude of Souls all have in common Soul Itself. And a multitude of Intellects have in common Intellect Itself.
The intellectual Principle in an individual is to his personal Soul, as the Intellect Itself is to Soul Itself.
Thus, we have Intellect in two ways. First, we have our own Intellect, which acts upon our Soul directly. Second, we have Intellect Itself as it acts upon Soul Itself, and through Soul Itself, upon our individual Soul
...At least that's what I think Plotinus is saying. I'm basing this upon the fact that his much later intellectual descendant Proclus makes a big deal about this two-fold participation. (See Proclus, Elements of Theology, Propositions 108 and 109.)
It's worth noting, here, that Intellect in ancient Greek thought means something different than what it does for us. Intellect is the respository of the forms; in us, it is the highest aspect of the mind, which allows for contact with higher things and sudden leaps of insight.
(Anyway, that's how I understand it).
....And there you have it, folks!
We've made it through one tractate of one of Plotinus's Enneads!
Next, I'll post a summary of Tractate One, and we'll move on to Tractate Two. See you then!
