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Elements of Theology, Proposition 9
Jun. 18th, 2024 12:17 pmON THE SELF-SUFFICIENT
Every thing which is self-sufficient, either according to essence or energy, is better than that which is not self-sufficient, and depends on another cause for its perfection.
For if all beings naturally desire good, and one thing supplies well-being from itself, but another is indigent of something else, the one indeed will have the cause of good present, but the other separate and apart. To the degree, therefore, that the former is nearer to that which supplies the object of desire, to that extent will it be superior to that which is indigent of a separate cause, and which externally receives the perfection of its nature or its energy. For since the self-sufficient is both similar and diminished, it is more similar to The Good itself [than that which is not self-sufficient]. It is diminished indeed by participating of The Good, and because it is not primarily The Good, though it is allied to it in a certain respect so far as it is able to possess good of and from itself. But to participate good, and to participate through another, are more remote from that which is primarily good, and which is nothing else than good.
COMMENTARY
Today's Proposition concerns the self-sufficient. The first thing that we need to figure out is precisely what Proclus means by this. He begins reiterating Plato's maxim that "all beings naturally desire good" (or The Good). He then gives us two kinds of beings. One "supplies well-being from itself," but the other is "indigent of something." (The word "indigent" means "in want of.") Of these two, the first "has the cause of good present," while the second is "separate and apart."
So we have two types of things.
Thing 1: Has the Good present to it. As we saw last time, the Good is identical with the First Principle, the One. Such beings are "self-sufficent," it seems, precisely because they are present to the One-- or, to use the correct terminology, they "participate in the One."
Thing 2: Is separate from the Good. These types of things "receive perfection externally."
Some things, then, participate directly in the Good. These can be called "self-sufficient." Others participate in the Good in a secondary way, by "participating through another."
So far, then, it seems we have a three-tiered hierarchy:
The Good
Participants in the Good
Participants in the Participants of the Good.
It would be tempting to view the "Participants in the Good" as the Gods, and if the Elements up to this point is all we have to go on, that would have to be correct. The trouble is that very soon, Proclus is going to tell us about the "imparticipable," and the One itself is going to turn out to be imparticipable. The Gods, who are the unities or "Henads," are precisely the One-as-participated. The Forms are the immediate participants in the Henads. And so it must be the case, I think, that "the Good" here covers both the One Itself and the Henads, which are the One-as-participated. The Participants in the Good, which are self-sufficient and perfect themselves, are the Forms. All things in the world of our experience participate in the Forms.
Every thing which is self-sufficient, either according to essence or energy, is better than that which is not self-sufficient, and depends on another cause for its perfection.
For if all beings naturally desire good, and one thing supplies well-being from itself, but another is indigent of something else, the one indeed will have the cause of good present, but the other separate and apart. To the degree, therefore, that the former is nearer to that which supplies the object of desire, to that extent will it be superior to that which is indigent of a separate cause, and which externally receives the perfection of its nature or its energy. For since the self-sufficient is both similar and diminished, it is more similar to The Good itself [than that which is not self-sufficient]. It is diminished indeed by participating of The Good, and because it is not primarily The Good, though it is allied to it in a certain respect so far as it is able to possess good of and from itself. But to participate good, and to participate through another, are more remote from that which is primarily good, and which is nothing else than good.
COMMENTARY
Today's Proposition concerns the self-sufficient. The first thing that we need to figure out is precisely what Proclus means by this. He begins reiterating Plato's maxim that "all beings naturally desire good" (or The Good). He then gives us two kinds of beings. One "supplies well-being from itself," but the other is "indigent of something." (The word "indigent" means "in want of.") Of these two, the first "has the cause of good present," while the second is "separate and apart."
So we have two types of things.
Thing 1: Has the Good present to it. As we saw last time, the Good is identical with the First Principle, the One. Such beings are "self-sufficent," it seems, precisely because they are present to the One-- or, to use the correct terminology, they "participate in the One."
Thing 2: Is separate from the Good. These types of things "receive perfection externally."
Some things, then, participate directly in the Good. These can be called "self-sufficient." Others participate in the Good in a secondary way, by "participating through another."
So far, then, it seems we have a three-tiered hierarchy:
The Good
Participants in the Good
Participants in the Participants of the Good.
It would be tempting to view the "Participants in the Good" as the Gods, and if the Elements up to this point is all we have to go on, that would have to be correct. The trouble is that very soon, Proclus is going to tell us about the "imparticipable," and the One itself is going to turn out to be imparticipable. The Gods, who are the unities or "Henads," are precisely the One-as-participated. The Forms are the immediate participants in the Henads. And so it must be the case, I think, that "the Good" here covers both the One Itself and the Henads, which are the One-as-participated. The Participants in the Good, which are self-sufficient and perfect themselves, are the Forms. All things in the world of our experience participate in the Forms.
