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Elements of Theology, Proposition 8
Jun. 17th, 2024 08:25 pmOn the First Good, which is called the Good Itself
COMMENTARY
The subject of today's Proposition is the Good Itself, which is identical with the One.
[What's that you say? You claim you read an earlier version of this post in which the author could not remember whether or not Proclus drew a distinction between the Good and the One or considered them the same? Well, I don't see that anywhere. You must be like one of those silly people who claim that Joseph Stalin was once photographed with Nikolai Yezhov.]
In any case, the point he is making here is that the Good is beyond beings. A few things to note:
First, "Good" in this case does not have the moral connotations that we're used to associating with this word-- or at least, it does not only have those connotations. The Good in the Platonic sense isn't a set of moral rules. We understand this intuitively. I keep a set of pens hidden amid my things because they are very good pens, and if my kids get ahold of them they will lose them. (Ask me how I know this.) When I say that they are good pens, I don't mean that they're very moral pens. They don't give money to the homeless, help old ladies cross the street, or refrain from drinking before 5pm. Nor do they help me to do these things. No-- they're good pens because they're good at being pens. In a similar way, a good runner is not a runner who gives to charity, but a runner who wins races. A good dog plays with children without biting, protects the family, and refrains from pooping on the carpet. A good cat... well, let's leave that for another time. The point is that the "good" of these things could better be understood as their excellence than their morality in the ordinary sense.
It isn't that morality isn't involved, though here we should make some qualifications. "Ethics" is probably a better term than "morality," simply because it isn't quite as loaded as the English word "morality" is. Both of these words, however, "ethics" and "morality," ultimately mean the same thing, as they come from words which mean "habits of behavior" rather than "rule-following." Ethics in the Platonic sense refers to possession of the virtues, which are habits of excellence. To be a virtuous human is to be a good human-- as to be a fast runner is to be a good runner.
Proclus tells us that "all beings desire good." This comes from Plato, of course, who taught that everything aspires after its good. The Good Itself, then, can also be understood as beneficence. This is how everything can truly be said to desire its good; it desire that which will benefit it. And that is to make it a good version of whatever it happens to be.
From this it follows that the Good itself cannot be a being among beings. If that were the case, then that being would no longer seek its good. Moreover, if the Good were a being, it would not be simple, but a compound of Being and Good.
That which is primarily good, and which is no other than The Good itself, is superior to all things which in any way whatever participate of good.
For if all beings desire good, it is evident that the Primary Good is beyond beings. If it is the same with a certain one of beings, either being and The Good are the same, and this particular being will no longer desire good, since it is The Good itself — for that which desires anything is indigent of that which it desires, and is different from it — or, being is one thing, and the good another. And if some one being and The Good are the same, being indeed will participate, and that which is participated in being will be The Good. Hence, on this hypothesis, The Good is a certain good inherent in a certain participant and which the participant alone desires, but is not that which is simply good, and which all things desire: for this Good is the common object of desire to all beings. But that which is inherent in a certain thing pertains to that alone which participates of it. Hence that which is primarily good is nothing else than The Good itself. The adding of any thing else to The Good is to diminish it by the addition, making it a certain or particular good instead of that which is simply good. For the addition, since it is not The Good but something less than it, will by its association diminish The Good.
COMMENTARY
The subject of today's Proposition is the Good Itself, which is identical with the One.
[What's that you say? You claim you read an earlier version of this post in which the author could not remember whether or not Proclus drew a distinction between the Good and the One or considered them the same? Well, I don't see that anywhere. You must be like one of those silly people who claim that Joseph Stalin was once photographed with Nikolai Yezhov.]
In any case, the point he is making here is that the Good is beyond beings. A few things to note:
First, "Good" in this case does not have the moral connotations that we're used to associating with this word-- or at least, it does not only have those connotations. The Good in the Platonic sense isn't a set of moral rules. We understand this intuitively. I keep a set of pens hidden amid my things because they are very good pens, and if my kids get ahold of them they will lose them. (Ask me how I know this.) When I say that they are good pens, I don't mean that they're very moral pens. They don't give money to the homeless, help old ladies cross the street, or refrain from drinking before 5pm. Nor do they help me to do these things. No-- they're good pens because they're good at being pens. In a similar way, a good runner is not a runner who gives to charity, but a runner who wins races. A good dog plays with children without biting, protects the family, and refrains from pooping on the carpet. A good cat... well, let's leave that for another time. The point is that the "good" of these things could better be understood as their excellence than their morality in the ordinary sense.
It isn't that morality isn't involved, though here we should make some qualifications. "Ethics" is probably a better term than "morality," simply because it isn't quite as loaded as the English word "morality" is. Both of these words, however, "ethics" and "morality," ultimately mean the same thing, as they come from words which mean "habits of behavior" rather than "rule-following." Ethics in the Platonic sense refers to possession of the virtues, which are habits of excellence. To be a virtuous human is to be a good human-- as to be a fast runner is to be a good runner.
Proclus tells us that "all beings desire good." This comes from Plato, of course, who taught that everything aspires after its good. The Good Itself, then, can also be understood as beneficence. This is how everything can truly be said to desire its good; it desire that which will benefit it. And that is to make it a good version of whatever it happens to be.
From this it follows that the Good itself cannot be a being among beings. If that were the case, then that being would no longer seek its good. Moreover, if the Good were a being, it would not be simple, but a compound of Being and Good.
