Elements of Theology, Proposition 17
Jun. 29th, 2024 10:32 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
readoldthingsEvery thing which moves itself primarily, is able to return to itself.
For if it moves itself, and its motive energy is directed to itself, that which moves and that which is moved are at the same time one. For it either moves in a part or is moved in a part, or the whole moves and is moved, or the whole moves, but a part is moved, or the contrary. But if one part, indeed, is that which moves, and another part is that which is moved, it will not be essentially self-motive, since it will consist of things which are not self-motive, but which appear indeed to be so, yet are not so essentially.
COMMENTARY
In the last few propositions, we've been introduced to two different concepts: 1. The Self-Motive. 2. The Self-Convertive. The first refers to anything which is able to move under its own power, rather than being moved by another; this is explained as a medium between the immovable, which only moves others, and the alter-motive, which is only moved. The second refers to anything which is able to become one with itself.
We have learned that the self-convertive is necessarily incorporeal. No body is able to be converted to itself. Now we learn that there is an identity between the self-motive and the self-convertive. Anything which can move itself, can return to itself. And, therefore, anything which can move itself is incorporeal and has an essence which is free of any body whatsoever.
It follows that anything which is self-motive is incorporeal, and has an essence which is free of any body whatsoever.
A reader here, JP Russell, pointed out that the existence of the "self-motive" frees Proclus's cosmology from determinism. That is, if everything were only immovable or alter-motive, nothing could move itself; even allowing the Immovable to be God, the universe would be a clock set into motion once, with everything determined beforehand. The self-motive, therefore, is what we normally think of as the will. From this proposition we learn that the will itself is incorporeal and free of the body. The body, which cannot return to itself, cannot move itself; it is alter-motive.
For if it moves itself, and its motive energy is directed to itself, that which moves and that which is moved are at the same time one. For it either moves in a part or is moved in a part, or the whole moves and is moved, or the whole moves, but a part is moved, or the contrary. But if one part, indeed, is that which moves, and another part is that which is moved, it will not be essentially self-motive, since it will consist of things which are not self-motive, but which appear indeed to be so, yet are not so essentially.
If, however, the whole moves, but the part is moved, or the contrary, there will be a certain part in each which in one and the same subject moves and at the same time is moved. And this is that which is primarily self-motive. If, however, one and the same thing moves and is moved, it will have the energy of moving to and within itself, being motive of itself. But it returns to that toward which it energizes. Every thing, therefore, which primarily moves itself, is able to return to itself.
COMMENTARY
In the last few propositions, we've been introduced to two different concepts: 1. The Self-Motive. 2. The Self-Convertive. The first refers to anything which is able to move under its own power, rather than being moved by another; this is explained as a medium between the immovable, which only moves others, and the alter-motive, which is only moved. The second refers to anything which is able to become one with itself.
We have learned that the self-convertive is necessarily incorporeal. No body is able to be converted to itself. Now we learn that there is an identity between the self-motive and the self-convertive. Anything which can move itself, can return to itself. And, therefore, anything which can move itself is incorporeal and has an essence which is free of any body whatsoever.
It follows that anything which is self-motive is incorporeal, and has an essence which is free of any body whatsoever.
A reader here, JP Russell, pointed out that the existence of the "self-motive" frees Proclus's cosmology from determinism. That is, if everything were only immovable or alter-motive, nothing could move itself; even allowing the Immovable to be God, the universe would be a clock set into motion once, with everything determined beforehand. The self-motive, therefore, is what we normally think of as the will. From this proposition we learn that the will itself is incorporeal and free of the body. The body, which cannot return to itself, cannot move itself; it is alter-motive.
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Date: 2024-06-29 09:18 pm (UTC)And thanks for the mention!
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Date: 2024-06-29 11:56 pm (UTC)Also, I took a look at the work you're doing. I love the All Father prayers!
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Date: 2024-06-30 03:43 am (UTC)