Plotinus 1:1:5
Dec. 12th, 2019 10:37 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png)
Welcome back to my attempt to make sense of that most difficult works of classical philosophy, the Enneads of Plotinus, with no formal training nor facility in the original language!
Today we're going to be looking at the 5th chapter, of the first tractate, of the first Ennead. As always you can follow along here.
I wrote about 80% of this blog post yesterday, then foolishly left my computer unattended overnight. In the meantime it appears to have restarted itself and, in the process, deleted everything I wrote. So this post might be abbreviated-- which might be for the beter.
Last time, Plotinus concluded that the Soul does not experience affectations-- particularly, it seems, negative ones such as suffering-- but that these are, rather, experienced by something called "the Animate." Again, I am assuming that "Animate" is our translator's way of rendering a Greek word meaning "ensouled being" or "living being." I am also assuming, or provisionally concluding, that Plotinus's reasoning is similar to the following:
Red is a concept or quality shared by red objects in general, such as a red book, a red candle, or a red bulb on a Christmas tree.
The Soul is similar to red, as a non-physical form.
Just as the color red as a whole is unaffected by the burning out of a red candle or by a red book being covered by a green dust jacket, so the soul is not affected by the experiences of the body.
Those experiences, instead, are had by something called "the Animate," which is the body-that-has-a-soul, in the same way that the candle is a candle-that-has-redness.
Plotinus has given other examples of non-corporeal forms which are united with matter to create something. For example, an axe is the union of iron and the form of an axe. I once broke two separate axes attempting to chop down a tree. The specific axes were affected, but the form-of-an-axe, being a concept that exists outside of embodiment, was not.
Now Plotinus is going to discuss the nature of this thing called "the Animate." As always, he gives us several possibilities:
Now this Animate might be merely the body as having life: it might be the Couplement of Soul and body: it might be a third and different entity formed from both.
The Animate could simply be the living body, or it could be the union or "Couplement" of Soul and Body, or it could be some third thing formed from both. Clear enough? The rest of the chapter is dedicated to considering the second two possibilities, starting with the "Couplement" of soul and body.
How could suffering, for example, be seated in this Couplement?
It may be suggested that some unwelcome state of the body produces a distress which reaches to a Sensitive-Faculty which in turn merges into Soul. But this account still leaves the origin of the sensation unexplained.
In other words, sensation may affect the soul. But we still haven't accounted for the existence of sensation.
Another suggestion might be that all is due to an opinion or judgement: some evil seems to have befallen the man or his belongings and this conviction sets up a state of trouble in the body and in the entire Animate. But this account leaves still a question as to the source and seat of the judgement: does it belong to the Soul or to the Couplement? Besides, the judgement that evil is present does not involve the feeling of grief: the judgement might very well arise and the grief by no means follow: one may think oneself slighted and yet not be angry; and the appetite is not necessarily excited by the thought of a pleasure. We are, thus, no nearer than before to any warrant for assigning these affections to the Couplement.
Is that clear? He's saying that we could suggest that "grief" or "pain" are just judgements. But who is it that has the judgment? Is it the Couplement or the Soul? And, furthermore, just the opinion that something is bad doesn't entail the actual feeling of the bad thing. I can read about a natural disaster on social media and judge, "That is bad," but that doesn't mean I actually have any experience of suffering over it. Therefore, the idea of suffering (or pleasure?) as a judgment doesn't allow us to say that it is the Couplement of Soul and body that actually experiences suffering or pleasure.
Is it any explanation to say that desire is vested in a Faculty-of-desire and anger in the Irascible-Faculty, and, collectively, that all tendency is seated in the Appetitive-Faculty? Such a statement of the facts does not help towards making the affections common to the Couplement; they might still be seated either in the Soul alone or in the body alone. On the one hand if the appetite is to be stirred, as in the carnal passion, there must be a heating of the blood and the bile, a well-defined state of the body; on the other hand, the impulse towards The Good cannot be a joint affection, but, like certain others, too, it would necessarily belong to the Soul alone.
That is, certain affections are definitely bodily-- you can't have sex, or even want to have sex, without your body doing serious work. Therefore, some affections are bodily at least in part. On the other hand, "the impulse toward The Good" must belong only to the Soul.
Now, why is that? Is this simply the prejudice of an era that was increasingly hostile toward physical matter? It's worth noting that at the time Plotinus is writing, virtually every religious system aims at getting away from embodiment in some way or another. Or is it a logical consequence of a metaphysical system in which concepts and ideals are seen as necessarily outside of physical embodiment?
It's both getting ahead of ourselves and stretching my knowledge of this stuff almost to the breaking point to talk about The One, but it may help. In the same way that red objects participate in a higher principle called red or red-ness, everything that exists as a unity must receive its unity from an eternal principle called Unity, Oneness, or The One. A later author in the same tradition writes that the One "is truly the first, and it lacks nothing, nor does it need anything else with it except itself; it is the cause of all other things, and does not receive its qualities from another. It is not a material body, nor is it compounded of material bodies, nor is it mixed with anything other than itself, but rather is all things in itself. Therefore it may not be called anything except the One."*
Now, Plotinus and other Platonic thinkers identified The One with The Good. The One, as you can see from the description above, is not a body and it is not made up of bodies. Therefore, to seek the One is to go beyond the body. If the Good is identical with the One, then to seek the Good is to go beyond the body. Therefore, the impulse toward the Good is an affection which is not bodily, while the impulse to have sex is an affection which is bodily. Plotinus's conclusion follows:
Reason, then, does not permit us to assign all the affections to the Couplement.
And he elaborates on the complications:
In the case of carnal desire, it will certainly be the Man that desires, and yet, on the other-hand, there must be desire in the Desiring-Faculty as well. How can this be? Are we to suppose that, when the man originates the desire, the Desiring-Faculty moves to order? How could the Man have come to desire at all unless through a prior activity in the Desiring-Faculty? Then it is the Desiring-Faculty that takes the lead? Yet how, unless the body be first in the appropriate condition?
The question, then, is one commonly asked to this day. Are your experiences simply responses to bodily states? But if so, where do the impulses to move the body come from?
Tune in next time, when maybe we'll find the answer!
*Picatrix Book 1 Ch 1, Greer and Warnock translation
Today we're going to be looking at the 5th chapter, of the first tractate, of the first Ennead. As always you can follow along here.
I wrote about 80% of this blog post yesterday, then foolishly left my computer unattended overnight. In the meantime it appears to have restarted itself and, in the process, deleted everything I wrote. So this post might be abbreviated-- which might be for the beter.
Last time, Plotinus concluded that the Soul does not experience affectations-- particularly, it seems, negative ones such as suffering-- but that these are, rather, experienced by something called "the Animate." Again, I am assuming that "Animate" is our translator's way of rendering a Greek word meaning "ensouled being" or "living being." I am also assuming, or provisionally concluding, that Plotinus's reasoning is similar to the following:
Red is a concept or quality shared by red objects in general, such as a red book, a red candle, or a red bulb on a Christmas tree.
The Soul is similar to red, as a non-physical form.
Just as the color red as a whole is unaffected by the burning out of a red candle or by a red book being covered by a green dust jacket, so the soul is not affected by the experiences of the body.
Those experiences, instead, are had by something called "the Animate," which is the body-that-has-a-soul, in the same way that the candle is a candle-that-has-redness.
Plotinus has given other examples of non-corporeal forms which are united with matter to create something. For example, an axe is the union of iron and the form of an axe. I once broke two separate axes attempting to chop down a tree. The specific axes were affected, but the form-of-an-axe, being a concept that exists outside of embodiment, was not.
Now Plotinus is going to discuss the nature of this thing called "the Animate." As always, he gives us several possibilities:
Now this Animate might be merely the body as having life: it might be the Couplement of Soul and body: it might be a third and different entity formed from both.
The Animate could simply be the living body, or it could be the union or "Couplement" of Soul and Body, or it could be some third thing formed from both. Clear enough? The rest of the chapter is dedicated to considering the second two possibilities, starting with the "Couplement" of soul and body.
How could suffering, for example, be seated in this Couplement?
It may be suggested that some unwelcome state of the body produces a distress which reaches to a Sensitive-Faculty which in turn merges into Soul. But this account still leaves the origin of the sensation unexplained.
In other words, sensation may affect the soul. But we still haven't accounted for the existence of sensation.
Another suggestion might be that all is due to an opinion or judgement: some evil seems to have befallen the man or his belongings and this conviction sets up a state of trouble in the body and in the entire Animate. But this account leaves still a question as to the source and seat of the judgement: does it belong to the Soul or to the Couplement? Besides, the judgement that evil is present does not involve the feeling of grief: the judgement might very well arise and the grief by no means follow: one may think oneself slighted and yet not be angry; and the appetite is not necessarily excited by the thought of a pleasure. We are, thus, no nearer than before to any warrant for assigning these affections to the Couplement.
Is that clear? He's saying that we could suggest that "grief" or "pain" are just judgements. But who is it that has the judgment? Is it the Couplement or the Soul? And, furthermore, just the opinion that something is bad doesn't entail the actual feeling of the bad thing. I can read about a natural disaster on social media and judge, "That is bad," but that doesn't mean I actually have any experience of suffering over it. Therefore, the idea of suffering (or pleasure?) as a judgment doesn't allow us to say that it is the Couplement of Soul and body that actually experiences suffering or pleasure.
Is it any explanation to say that desire is vested in a Faculty-of-desire and anger in the Irascible-Faculty, and, collectively, that all tendency is seated in the Appetitive-Faculty? Such a statement of the facts does not help towards making the affections common to the Couplement; they might still be seated either in the Soul alone or in the body alone. On the one hand if the appetite is to be stirred, as in the carnal passion, there must be a heating of the blood and the bile, a well-defined state of the body; on the other hand, the impulse towards The Good cannot be a joint affection, but, like certain others, too, it would necessarily belong to the Soul alone.
That is, certain affections are definitely bodily-- you can't have sex, or even want to have sex, without your body doing serious work. Therefore, some affections are bodily at least in part. On the other hand, "the impulse toward The Good" must belong only to the Soul.
Now, why is that? Is this simply the prejudice of an era that was increasingly hostile toward physical matter? It's worth noting that at the time Plotinus is writing, virtually every religious system aims at getting away from embodiment in some way or another. Or is it a logical consequence of a metaphysical system in which concepts and ideals are seen as necessarily outside of physical embodiment?
It's both getting ahead of ourselves and stretching my knowledge of this stuff almost to the breaking point to talk about The One, but it may help. In the same way that red objects participate in a higher principle called red or red-ness, everything that exists as a unity must receive its unity from an eternal principle called Unity, Oneness, or The One. A later author in the same tradition writes that the One "is truly the first, and it lacks nothing, nor does it need anything else with it except itself; it is the cause of all other things, and does not receive its qualities from another. It is not a material body, nor is it compounded of material bodies, nor is it mixed with anything other than itself, but rather is all things in itself. Therefore it may not be called anything except the One."*
Now, Plotinus and other Platonic thinkers identified The One with The Good. The One, as you can see from the description above, is not a body and it is not made up of bodies. Therefore, to seek the One is to go beyond the body. If the Good is identical with the One, then to seek the Good is to go beyond the body. Therefore, the impulse toward the Good is an affection which is not bodily, while the impulse to have sex is an affection which is bodily. Plotinus's conclusion follows:
Reason, then, does not permit us to assign all the affections to the Couplement.
And he elaborates on the complications:
In the case of carnal desire, it will certainly be the Man that desires, and yet, on the other-hand, there must be desire in the Desiring-Faculty as well. How can this be? Are we to suppose that, when the man originates the desire, the Desiring-Faculty moves to order? How could the Man have come to desire at all unless through a prior activity in the Desiring-Faculty? Then it is the Desiring-Faculty that takes the lead? Yet how, unless the body be first in the appropriate condition?
The question, then, is one commonly asked to this day. Are your experiences simply responses to bodily states? But if so, where do the impulses to move the body come from?
Tune in next time, when maybe we'll find the answer!
*Picatrix Book 1 Ch 1, Greer and Warnock translation