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Elements of Theology, Proposition 14
Jun. 25th, 2024 08:16 amON THE IMMOVABLE SELF-MOTIVE PRINCIPLE OR CAUSE
COMMENTARY
I have to admit that I don't completely understand Proclus's reasoning in this proposition. Let's talk it through and see what we can come up with.
This proposition deals with motion. I'm sure he means more than physical motion, but it's probably easiest to picture physical motion.
Some things are moved by other things. This is what is called being "alter-motive." Imagine a billiard ball, hit by another ball. This is alter-motion, being moved by something outside of oneself.
Other things are immovable. These do not move. At the absolute we can imagine the One, which we cannot affect in any way, which we certainly cannot push and move about, but which can move all things.
Between these two are things which can be moved by others, but which can also move themselves. As an example, we can imagine the man playing pool. Obviously he can be moved by forces outside of himself. But he also moves himself, moves his stick into place, and, via the stick, moves the balls.
The trouble is that I cannot figure out why it's necessary, on this proposition alone, to posit three terms. We can say that the man playing pool moves himself, and is thus a third type. But we can also say that his will, which is a property of his soul, moves his body, which is a composition of matter. If we do that, we will be back to two terms: The will will move, and the body will be moved; the existence of a third will be an illusion.
Or is it the case that the immovable is always moving other things, because to be "immovable" is to be immune to change, while the soul is sometimes moving, sometimes not moving? And yet the soul is set into motion by itself, and comes to rest by itself. Thus it acts as a medium between Intellect, which moves, and bodies, which are moved.
I suspect Proclus also has astrology in mind. Everything below the sphere of the Moon is in motion, and everything beyond the sphere of the Fixed Stars is moving other things. But between these two we have the planets and stars, which appear to move themselves, and also act upon things here below. We can work with this idea, but we don't need to.
The trouble with this is that it's clearly the case from observation that the self-motive exists, but it's not clear to me why it should be logically necessary, as Proclus claims.
He tells us to imagine that all things should stop. The balls on the pool table, shortly after breaking, stop their motion, the stick is still in the man's hand, a curl of smoke from his cigarette-- I always imagine smoking a cigarette while playing pool, because I think it looks cool, even though I don't smoke cigarettes and I'm terrible at pool-- a curl of smoke stops halfway to the ceiling. If everything were to freeze, what sets it into motion again? It cannot be something material. Two rocks next to one another on the road will not move unless set into motion. As people of the 21st century, we know that something material will come along and set them into motion, or else we know that they're already really in motion as the Earth moves about the Sun. But material things cannot set themselves into motion, unless there is motion already existing from eternity. If you need to think of it as the "Big Bang," a giant explosion that starts things up, someone has to push the button. Or something. It can be a "Law of Physics." But a Law of Physics is not an Act of Physics. It also can't be a Law of Physics, though, because a Law of Physics is always in place or it isn't a law. It must be both like a Law of Physics, which is an Intellectual Principle, and yet able to move material things, like a Physical Object. Call it an Act of Physics. Even in modern thought, it must exist-- but only one time, at the beginning, after which it conveniently snuck off stage. This is the third term, the self-motive.
Let's start again. Proclus tells us to imagine that all things should stop. In that case, what is the first thing to move? If motion comes from the immovable, it's not clear that it matters. Or is it the case that we should imagine one thing moving first, before other things, and ask where it got that ability? Because clearly, unlike material things, it is capable of acting, and not merely being acted upon. But unlike (I assume) divine or Intellectual things, it is capable of change: being sometimes in motion, sometimes not in motion. Intellect is Active; Matter is Passive. Intellect is not subject to time, but matter is subject to time. Between these two, there must be something which is Active, but which is also in Time, so that it can act, but act in time. If we've been paying attention thus far, we have to conclude that it will derive its capacity to Act from Intellect and will derive it through Participation. But its act will be within the changeable world of Time, which will give it the capacity to affect things which are subject to Time.
And so we have-- I think-- Soul as our connecting principle; like the Immovable, it acts upon things of a lower order; like Matter, it is capable of acting and ceasing within the world of time.
Anyone familiar with Thomas Aquinas will know that he worked with these same ideas, but came up with only two terms, the immovable and the in-motion. This is his "first proof" for the existence of God, the simplified form of which goes: All things are in motion; If all things are in motion, something not-in-motion must have set them into motion, or else motion progresses to infinity; That something is what all men call God.
What do you think, everyone?
Every being is either immovable or moved. And if moved, it is either moved by itself, or by another: and if it is moved by itself it is self-motive, but if by another it is alter-motive. Every nature, therefore, is either immovable, self-motive, or alter-motive.
For it is necessary, since there are alter-motive natures, that there also should be that which is immovable, and the self-motive nature, which is a medium between them. For if every alter-motive thing is moved because it is moved by another, motions will be either in a circle, or they will proceed to infinity. But neither will they be in a circle, nor proceed ad infinitum, since all beings are limited by the Principle of things, and that which moves is better than that which is moved. Hence there will be something immovable, which first moves. But if this be so, it is necessary that the self-motive exist. For if all things should stop, what will that be which is first moved? It cannot be the immovable, for this is not naturally adapted to be moved; nor the alter-motive, for that is moved by another. It remains, therefore, that the self-motive nature is that which is primarily moved. It is this, too, which unites alter-motive natures to that which is immovable, being in a certain respect a medium, moving and at the same time being moved: for of these, the immovable moves only, but the alter-motive is moved only. Every thing, therefore, is either immovable, or self-motive, or alter-motive.
Corollary.— From the premises, therefore, it is evident, that of things which are moved, the self-motive nature is the first; but that of things which move other things the immovable is the first.
COMMENTARY
I have to admit that I don't completely understand Proclus's reasoning in this proposition. Let's talk it through and see what we can come up with.
This proposition deals with motion. I'm sure he means more than physical motion, but it's probably easiest to picture physical motion.
Some things are moved by other things. This is what is called being "alter-motive." Imagine a billiard ball, hit by another ball. This is alter-motion, being moved by something outside of oneself.
Other things are immovable. These do not move. At the absolute we can imagine the One, which we cannot affect in any way, which we certainly cannot push and move about, but which can move all things.
Between these two are things which can be moved by others, but which can also move themselves. As an example, we can imagine the man playing pool. Obviously he can be moved by forces outside of himself. But he also moves himself, moves his stick into place, and, via the stick, moves the balls.
The trouble is that I cannot figure out why it's necessary, on this proposition alone, to posit three terms. We can say that the man playing pool moves himself, and is thus a third type. But we can also say that his will, which is a property of his soul, moves his body, which is a composition of matter. If we do that, we will be back to two terms: The will will move, and the body will be moved; the existence of a third will be an illusion.
Or is it the case that the immovable is always moving other things, because to be "immovable" is to be immune to change, while the soul is sometimes moving, sometimes not moving? And yet the soul is set into motion by itself, and comes to rest by itself. Thus it acts as a medium between Intellect, which moves, and bodies, which are moved.
I suspect Proclus also has astrology in mind. Everything below the sphere of the Moon is in motion, and everything beyond the sphere of the Fixed Stars is moving other things. But between these two we have the planets and stars, which appear to move themselves, and also act upon things here below. We can work with this idea, but we don't need to.
The trouble with this is that it's clearly the case from observation that the self-motive exists, but it's not clear to me why it should be logically necessary, as Proclus claims.
He tells us to imagine that all things should stop. The balls on the pool table, shortly after breaking, stop their motion, the stick is still in the man's hand, a curl of smoke from his cigarette-- I always imagine smoking a cigarette while playing pool, because I think it looks cool, even though I don't smoke cigarettes and I'm terrible at pool-- a curl of smoke stops halfway to the ceiling. If everything were to freeze, what sets it into motion again? It cannot be something material. Two rocks next to one another on the road will not move unless set into motion. As people of the 21st century, we know that something material will come along and set them into motion, or else we know that they're already really in motion as the Earth moves about the Sun. But material things cannot set themselves into motion, unless there is motion already existing from eternity. If you need to think of it as the "Big Bang," a giant explosion that starts things up, someone has to push the button. Or something. It can be a "Law of Physics." But a Law of Physics is not an Act of Physics. It also can't be a Law of Physics, though, because a Law of Physics is always in place or it isn't a law. It must be both like a Law of Physics, which is an Intellectual Principle, and yet able to move material things, like a Physical Object. Call it an Act of Physics. Even in modern thought, it must exist-- but only one time, at the beginning, after which it conveniently snuck off stage. This is the third term, the self-motive.
Let's start again. Proclus tells us to imagine that all things should stop. In that case, what is the first thing to move? If motion comes from the immovable, it's not clear that it matters. Or is it the case that we should imagine one thing moving first, before other things, and ask where it got that ability? Because clearly, unlike material things, it is capable of acting, and not merely being acted upon. But unlike (I assume) divine or Intellectual things, it is capable of change: being sometimes in motion, sometimes not in motion. Intellect is Active; Matter is Passive. Intellect is not subject to time, but matter is subject to time. Between these two, there must be something which is Active, but which is also in Time, so that it can act, but act in time. If we've been paying attention thus far, we have to conclude that it will derive its capacity to Act from Intellect and will derive it through Participation. But its act will be within the changeable world of Time, which will give it the capacity to affect things which are subject to Time.
And so we have-- I think-- Soul as our connecting principle; like the Immovable, it acts upon things of a lower order; like Matter, it is capable of acting and ceasing within the world of time.
Anyone familiar with Thomas Aquinas will know that he worked with these same ideas, but came up with only two terms, the immovable and the in-motion. This is his "first proof" for the existence of God, the simplified form of which goes: All things are in motion; If all things are in motion, something not-in-motion must have set them into motion, or else motion progresses to infinity; That something is what all men call God.
What do you think, everyone?
