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Elements of Theology, Proposition 5
Jun. 14th, 2024 09:40 amAll multitude is posterior to The One.
For if multitude is prior to The One, The One indeed will participate of multitude, but multitude which is prior will not participate of The One, since prior to the existence of The One that multitude was. For it does not participate of that which is not: because a participant of The One is one and at the same time not one — but, on the hypothesis, The One will not yet subsist, that which is first being multitude. But it is impossible that there should be a certain multitude which in no respect whatever participates of The One. Multitude, therefore, is not prior to The One. But if multitude and The One subsist simultaneously, they will be naturally co-ordinate with each other, and intimately related. Nothing in time prohibits this, since neither is The One essentially many, nor is multitude The One, because they are directly opposite to each other by nature, if neither is prior or posterior to the other. Hence multitude essentially will not be one, and each of the things which are in it will not be one, and this will be the case to infinity, which is impossible. Multitude, therefore, according to its own nature participates of The One, and there is no thing of it which is not one. For if it is not one it will be an infinite, consisting of infinites, as has been demonstrated. Hence it entirely participates of The One. If therefore The One, which is essentially one, in no possible respect participates of multitude, multitude will be wholly posterior to The One — participating indeed of The One, but not being participated by it. But if The One participates of multitude, subsisting indeed as one according to its essence, but as not one according to participation, The One will be multitude, just as multitude is united by reason of The One. The One therefore will communicate with multitude, and multitude with The One. But things which coalesce and communicate with each other in a certain respect, if they are impelled together by another, that is prior to them: but if they themselves harmonize they are not antagonistic to each other. For opposites do not hasten to each other. If therefore The One and multitude are oppositely divided, and multitude so far as it is multitude is not one, and The One so far as it is one is not multitude, neither will one of these subsisting in the other be one and at the same time two. And if there is something prior to them, which impells them to harmonize, this will be either one or not one. But if it is not one, it will be either many or nothing. But neither will it be many, lest multitude should be prior to The One, nor will it be nothing. For how could nothing impell together those things which are something or many? It is therefore one alone. For this one is not many, lest there should be a progression to infinity. It is therefore The One itself, and all multitude proceeds from The One itself.
COMMENTARY
In this proposition Proclus continues to demonstrate the dependence of Multitude, or the Many, on the One. If the first principle is Multitude, then there will only be an infinity of infinity infinities, nothing at all united to anything else. But this is impossible. In order for anything at all to exist, we must first have precisely this: the possiblity of anything at all. This is what is meant by "multitude participating in the One." The One cannot participate in Multitude the same way. If the One depended on Multitude for its existence, it would not be one-- precisely because Multitude is infinity infinitely multiplied.
It's important to note how opposite this is to the modern way of reasoning, rooted in materialist science. A scientist starts by looking at multitude, at the fragments of fragments, and extrapolates order from there. This isn't wrong in and of itself. In Plato's work it is precisely by starting with material creation that we ascend to the higher realms. The difference is that the materialist starts with the multitude, and effectively assumes Multitude to be the first principle. How this could be so is a question unasked and unanswered. Modern scientists sometimes treat the idea of "God" as a "scientific hypothesis." In other words, they would attempt to prove the existence or nonexistence of the One by searching nature for it, perhaps with a very large telescope, and then washing their hands of the idea when they failed to find anything.
The Platonic approach is different. The One-- or God, remember always that we can use that name as well-- is not a being among beings. He cannot be found in nature. He is not complex. He does not have a body. He does not have a detailed set of opinions, nor does he demand that others hold a set of opinions about historical events or be cast into the fire forever. He also does not fly into rages, damn entire cities, or obsessively watch young men to see if they masturbate. The God of modern Christianity, whether or not he exists, is no more capable of being the First God than the chaos of the Materialists can be the First Principle. The One is prior to Multitude, and so prior to all particularity. The way of Ascent to Him is both open to all, and a journey that never ends.
COMMENTARY
In this proposition Proclus continues to demonstrate the dependence of Multitude, or the Many, on the One. If the first principle is Multitude, then there will only be an infinity of infinity infinities, nothing at all united to anything else. But this is impossible. In order for anything at all to exist, we must first have precisely this: the possiblity of anything at all. This is what is meant by "multitude participating in the One." The One cannot participate in Multitude the same way. If the One depended on Multitude for its existence, it would not be one-- precisely because Multitude is infinity infinitely multiplied.
It's important to note how opposite this is to the modern way of reasoning, rooted in materialist science. A scientist starts by looking at multitude, at the fragments of fragments, and extrapolates order from there. This isn't wrong in and of itself. In Plato's work it is precisely by starting with material creation that we ascend to the higher realms. The difference is that the materialist starts with the multitude, and effectively assumes Multitude to be the first principle. How this could be so is a question unasked and unanswered. Modern scientists sometimes treat the idea of "God" as a "scientific hypothesis." In other words, they would attempt to prove the existence or nonexistence of the One by searching nature for it, perhaps with a very large telescope, and then washing their hands of the idea when they failed to find anything.
The Platonic approach is different. The One-- or God, remember always that we can use that name as well-- is not a being among beings. He cannot be found in nature. He is not complex. He does not have a body. He does not have a detailed set of opinions, nor does he demand that others hold a set of opinions about historical events or be cast into the fire forever. He also does not fly into rages, damn entire cities, or obsessively watch young men to see if they masturbate. The God of modern Christianity, whether or not he exists, is no more capable of being the First God than the chaos of the Materialists can be the First Principle. The One is prior to Multitude, and so prior to all particularity. The way of Ascent to Him is both open to all, and a journey that never ends.
