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Plotinus 1:1:3
Dec. 9th, 2019 07:09 amWelcome back!
Last time, we looked at the second chapter of the first tractate of the first of Plotinus's Enneads. To recap, in that chapter, Plotinus talked about the soul, and wondered whether it was identical with something called Essential Soul. If that was true, it would mean that the Soul is an ideal form or eternal quality, unable to be affected by changes within time. And so, that would mean that the soul is not the seat of our sensory experience. But is this, in fact, the case? Let's read on and find out.
As always, keep in mind that I'm approaching this as an interested layman, and not anything resembling an expert in Plotinus, Neoplatonism, Ancient Greek philosophy, or anything else for that matter. If you'd like to follow along, the translation I'm using is online here. With that said, let's jump right into Ennead 1, Tracate 1, Chapter 3.
Plotinus starts by telling us that
We may treat of the Soul as in the body-- whether it be set above it or actually within it-- since the association of the two constitutes the one thing called the living organism, the Animate.
So, whether or not the Soul is truly within the body or not, we can treat it as if it were in the body, since the body and soul together are what make up a living thing, or Animate. (It's probably worth recalling that the word "anima" means "soul." "Animate" or "animated," then, would mean "ensouled." I don't read or speak Greek, but it seems likely enough that the translator is rendering a word which means "ensouled being" with the English word "Animate," capitalized to emphasize its importance.)
Now from this relation, from the Soul using the body as an instrument, it does not follow that the Soul must share the body's experiences: a man does not himself feel all the experiences of the tools with which he is working.
Okay, here is where I begin to become a little confused.
From my perspective, experience is something that I have-- my fingers contact the keyboard, and I perceive the shape and texture of the keys. I look out the window, and experience an image of the sidewalk outside the cafe where I'm writing. From this point of view, there are either two or three things involved in any experience. There is the sensory experience-- the image of the sidewalk, the feeling of the keyboard-- and there is the thing that has the experience. That's two.
On the other hand, I can close my eyes and picture the sidewalk in detail-- and then, if I like, I can add in all kinds of things that aren't there in the physical world, like a parade of stormtroopers lead by Great Cthulhu, all singing the Internationale. The Stormtooper Parade isn't there in the material world, but I can experience an image of it. The image can be shown to coincide with the movement of chemicals in my brain-- but it isn't a movement of chemicals in my brain, it's a parade of Stormtroopers led by Great Cthulhu singing the Internationale. Mental imagery, then, might be a third thing. Or, it might not be-- the fact is that the image of the sidewalk that I seem to perceive with my eyes is also a mental image, produced in my mind. So there may be only two types of things.
...From my perspective at least. But I'm not trying to understand how I already think about things-- I'm trying to understand how Plotinus thinks about things. For him, it doesn't necessarily follow that the Soul shares the body's experiences. He uses the image of a man using a tool. You can hit a nail with a hammer, but you don't experience the nail in the way the hammer does. The Soul may use the body in the same way-- and this must be the case, if the soul is an Ideal Form, existing beyond time and change.
Let's go on, though, and see what else Plotinus has to tell us.
It may be objected that the Soul must, however, have Sense-Perception, since its use of its instruments must acquaint it with the external conditions, and such knowledge comes by way of sense. Thus, it will be argued, the eyes are the instrument of seeing, and seeing may bring distress to the soul: hence the Soul may feel sorrow and pain and every other affection that belongs to the body; and from this again will spring desire, the Soul seeking the mending of its instrument.
If the Soul uses the body, then it must be able to perceive what the body perceives. And if this is the case, then the Soul might feel sorrow or distress when the body does. And from that, desire would come from the Soul "seeking to mend its instrument." Plotinus says that someone might propose this as an objection, and that seems straightforward enough to me. How is he going to get around it?
But, we ask, how, possibly, can these affections pass from body to Soul? Body may communicate qualities or conditions to another body: but-- body to Soul? Something happens to A; does that make it happen to B? As long as we have agent and instrument, there are two distinct entities; if the Soul uses the body it is separate from it.
I've got to tell you, I'm resisting Mr. Plotinus here very strongly. In his assertion that a body can't communicate qualities or conditions to another body, I'm reminded of half-remembered college lectures on Descartes and (rather worse) Patricia Churchland. The fact remains that we experience either all or most things via the body-- how can there be a "we" apart from this?
I think the key to understanding what he means here is this: "As long as we have agent and instrument, there are two distinct entities." Is this necessarily the case? Why?
Since our goal is to try to understand what the old man is talking about, let's provisionally accept it for now. If the Soul is a distinct type of thing from the body, then it isn't affected by the body. I think, also, that we need to keep the ancient Greek metaphysics that I discussed in the last post in mind. If the body has a soul in the way that a red candle has redness, then the soul isn't affected by change in the body, anymore than the color red is affected by a red candle being burned up, thrown in the trash, or painted green.
As it turns out, Plotinus is going to address these issues now:
But apart from the philosophical separation how does Soul stand to body?
Clearly there is a combination. And for this several modes are possible. There might be a complete coalescence: Soul might be interwoven through the body: or it might be an Ideal-Form detached or an Ideal-Form in governing contact like a pilot: or there might be part of the Soul detached and another part in contact, the disjoined part being the agent or user, the conjoined part ranking with the instrument or thing used.
In order for the forgoing to work, we need to provisionally accept that the Soul cannot be affected by the body, for the reasons given. If this is the case, how do the Soul and the body relate?
Plotinus answers, "by combination."
But what does this combination look like?
Here are the possibilities he gives:
1. A complete coalescence. In this case, I suppose, the Soul and body would indeed be blended into a whole.
2. The soul might be interwoven through the body. It's unclear how this is different from Option 1.
3. The Soul might be an Ideal Form, detached from the body.
4. The Soul might be an Ideal Form, governing the body as a pilot governs a ship.
5. Part of the Soul might be detached from the body, while the other part is in contact with it. If this is the case, the attached part would "rank with," or be on the level of, the body itself.
Of these options, which seems most likely, at the outset?
Plotinus concludes this section with the following, very interesting words:
In this last case it will be the double task of philosophy to direct this lower Soul towards the higher, the agent, and except in so far as the conjunction is absolutely necessary, to sever the agent from the instrument, the body, so that it need not forever have its Acts upon or through this inferior.
It seems to me that there is a whole lot to unpack in this one sentence.
First, remember that he's referring to the possibility that the Soul has separate parts-- one part attached to the body, the other separate from it. In that case, part of the soul acts as the agent, the thing that operates the body. The other part would then have to be the part that perceives what the body perceives. Importantly, this would include distress, sorrow, and suffering.
Given this, he tells us, the task of philosophy will be to direct the lower Soul toward the higher. Now, this points to an idea which I've encountered before, which is that "philosophy" meant something different in ancient times than it does in ours. What Plotinus is talking about sounds, to me, more like a spiritual discipline than like a preoccupation of overpaid college professors.
Another author,* writing some 7 or 800 years later, but in the same tradition, wrote, "He alone is perfect who attains the highest level of knowledge, and delights in and loves that level of knowledge. They were called 'philosophers' in Greek, and in Latin this word is properly interpreted 'lovers of knowledge.' Whoever does not strive for knowledge is defective and weak in authority, and therefore ought not to be called human, despite having the name, form, and figure of a human."
And so, the work of Philosophy, if the Soul has separate parts, is to unite the lower part of the Soul to the higher, and to detach it from the body as much as possible "so that it need not forever have its Acts upon or through this inferior."
How could that be, and what would that mean?
(*Picatrix Bk 1 Ch 6, Greer and Warnock translation.)
Last time, we looked at the second chapter of the first tractate of the first of Plotinus's Enneads. To recap, in that chapter, Plotinus talked about the soul, and wondered whether it was identical with something called Essential Soul. If that was true, it would mean that the Soul is an ideal form or eternal quality, unable to be affected by changes within time. And so, that would mean that the soul is not the seat of our sensory experience. But is this, in fact, the case? Let's read on and find out.
As always, keep in mind that I'm approaching this as an interested layman, and not anything resembling an expert in Plotinus, Neoplatonism, Ancient Greek philosophy, or anything else for that matter. If you'd like to follow along, the translation I'm using is online here. With that said, let's jump right into Ennead 1, Tracate 1, Chapter 3.
Plotinus starts by telling us that
We may treat of the Soul as in the body-- whether it be set above it or actually within it-- since the association of the two constitutes the one thing called the living organism, the Animate.
So, whether or not the Soul is truly within the body or not, we can treat it as if it were in the body, since the body and soul together are what make up a living thing, or Animate. (It's probably worth recalling that the word "anima" means "soul." "Animate" or "animated," then, would mean "ensouled." I don't read or speak Greek, but it seems likely enough that the translator is rendering a word which means "ensouled being" with the English word "Animate," capitalized to emphasize its importance.)
Now from this relation, from the Soul using the body as an instrument, it does not follow that the Soul must share the body's experiences: a man does not himself feel all the experiences of the tools with which he is working.
Okay, here is where I begin to become a little confused.
From my perspective, experience is something that I have-- my fingers contact the keyboard, and I perceive the shape and texture of the keys. I look out the window, and experience an image of the sidewalk outside the cafe where I'm writing. From this point of view, there are either two or three things involved in any experience. There is the sensory experience-- the image of the sidewalk, the feeling of the keyboard-- and there is the thing that has the experience. That's two.
On the other hand, I can close my eyes and picture the sidewalk in detail-- and then, if I like, I can add in all kinds of things that aren't there in the physical world, like a parade of stormtroopers lead by Great Cthulhu, all singing the Internationale. The Stormtooper Parade isn't there in the material world, but I can experience an image of it. The image can be shown to coincide with the movement of chemicals in my brain-- but it isn't a movement of chemicals in my brain, it's a parade of Stormtroopers led by Great Cthulhu singing the Internationale. Mental imagery, then, might be a third thing. Or, it might not be-- the fact is that the image of the sidewalk that I seem to perceive with my eyes is also a mental image, produced in my mind. So there may be only two types of things.
...From my perspective at least. But I'm not trying to understand how I already think about things-- I'm trying to understand how Plotinus thinks about things. For him, it doesn't necessarily follow that the Soul shares the body's experiences. He uses the image of a man using a tool. You can hit a nail with a hammer, but you don't experience the nail in the way the hammer does. The Soul may use the body in the same way-- and this must be the case, if the soul is an Ideal Form, existing beyond time and change.
Let's go on, though, and see what else Plotinus has to tell us.
It may be objected that the Soul must, however, have Sense-Perception, since its use of its instruments must acquaint it with the external conditions, and such knowledge comes by way of sense. Thus, it will be argued, the eyes are the instrument of seeing, and seeing may bring distress to the soul: hence the Soul may feel sorrow and pain and every other affection that belongs to the body; and from this again will spring desire, the Soul seeking the mending of its instrument.
If the Soul uses the body, then it must be able to perceive what the body perceives. And if this is the case, then the Soul might feel sorrow or distress when the body does. And from that, desire would come from the Soul "seeking to mend its instrument." Plotinus says that someone might propose this as an objection, and that seems straightforward enough to me. How is he going to get around it?
But, we ask, how, possibly, can these affections pass from body to Soul? Body may communicate qualities or conditions to another body: but-- body to Soul? Something happens to A; does that make it happen to B? As long as we have agent and instrument, there are two distinct entities; if the Soul uses the body it is separate from it.
I've got to tell you, I'm resisting Mr. Plotinus here very strongly. In his assertion that a body can't communicate qualities or conditions to another body, I'm reminded of half-remembered college lectures on Descartes and (rather worse) Patricia Churchland. The fact remains that we experience either all or most things via the body-- how can there be a "we" apart from this?
I think the key to understanding what he means here is this: "As long as we have agent and instrument, there are two distinct entities." Is this necessarily the case? Why?
Since our goal is to try to understand what the old man is talking about, let's provisionally accept it for now. If the Soul is a distinct type of thing from the body, then it isn't affected by the body. I think, also, that we need to keep the ancient Greek metaphysics that I discussed in the last post in mind. If the body has a soul in the way that a red candle has redness, then the soul isn't affected by change in the body, anymore than the color red is affected by a red candle being burned up, thrown in the trash, or painted green.
As it turns out, Plotinus is going to address these issues now:
But apart from the philosophical separation how does Soul stand to body?
Clearly there is a combination. And for this several modes are possible. There might be a complete coalescence: Soul might be interwoven through the body: or it might be an Ideal-Form detached or an Ideal-Form in governing contact like a pilot: or there might be part of the Soul detached and another part in contact, the disjoined part being the agent or user, the conjoined part ranking with the instrument or thing used.
In order for the forgoing to work, we need to provisionally accept that the Soul cannot be affected by the body, for the reasons given. If this is the case, how do the Soul and the body relate?
Plotinus answers, "by combination."
But what does this combination look like?
Here are the possibilities he gives:
1. A complete coalescence. In this case, I suppose, the Soul and body would indeed be blended into a whole.
2. The soul might be interwoven through the body. It's unclear how this is different from Option 1.
3. The Soul might be an Ideal Form, detached from the body.
4. The Soul might be an Ideal Form, governing the body as a pilot governs a ship.
5. Part of the Soul might be detached from the body, while the other part is in contact with it. If this is the case, the attached part would "rank with," or be on the level of, the body itself.
Of these options, which seems most likely, at the outset?
Plotinus concludes this section with the following, very interesting words:
In this last case it will be the double task of philosophy to direct this lower Soul towards the higher, the agent, and except in so far as the conjunction is absolutely necessary, to sever the agent from the instrument, the body, so that it need not forever have its Acts upon or through this inferior.
It seems to me that there is a whole lot to unpack in this one sentence.
First, remember that he's referring to the possibility that the Soul has separate parts-- one part attached to the body, the other separate from it. In that case, part of the soul acts as the agent, the thing that operates the body. The other part would then have to be the part that perceives what the body perceives. Importantly, this would include distress, sorrow, and suffering.
Given this, he tells us, the task of philosophy will be to direct the lower Soul toward the higher. Now, this points to an idea which I've encountered before, which is that "philosophy" meant something different in ancient times than it does in ours. What Plotinus is talking about sounds, to me, more like a spiritual discipline than like a preoccupation of overpaid college professors.
Another author,* writing some 7 or 800 years later, but in the same tradition, wrote, "He alone is perfect who attains the highest level of knowledge, and delights in and loves that level of knowledge. They were called 'philosophers' in Greek, and in Latin this word is properly interpreted 'lovers of knowledge.' Whoever does not strive for knowledge is defective and weak in authority, and therefore ought not to be called human, despite having the name, form, and figure of a human."
And so, the work of Philosophy, if the Soul has separate parts, is to unite the lower part of the Soul to the higher, and to detach it from the body as much as possible "so that it need not forever have its Acts upon or through this inferior."
How could that be, and what would that mean?
(*Picatrix Bk 1 Ch 6, Greer and Warnock translation.)
