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Elements of Theology, Proposition 40
Sep. 13th, 2024 07:12 am Of all things which proceed from another cause, those which exist from themselves, and which are alotted a self-sufficient essence, are the leaders.
For if every nature which is self-sufficient, either by reason of its essence or energy, is more excellent than that which depends on another cause; and that which produces itself, since it produces the being of itself, is sufficient to itself with respect to essence; and that which is alone produced by another is not sufficient to itself; and the self-sufficient is more allied to The Good; and things more allied and similar to their causes subsist from cause prior to such as are dissimilar; — this being the case, the natures which are produced by themselves, and are self-subsistent, are more ancient than those which proceed into existence from another cause alone. For either there will be nothing self-subsistent, or The Good is a thing of this kind, or the first things which subsist from The Good. But if there is nothing self-subsistent, truly there will not be in anything self-sufficiency. It will not be in The Good, since that being The One is better than self-sufficiency: it is also The Good itself, and not that which possesses The Good. Nor will self-sufficiency be in things posterior to The Good: for all things will be indigent of that which is prior to their nature. But if The Good is self-subsistent, because it produces itself, it will not be The One. For that which proceeds from The One is not The One. And it would proceed from itself, if it was self-subsistent; so that The One would at the same time be one and not one. Hence it is necessary that the self-subsistent should be posterior to the First. And it is evident that it will be prior to things which alone proceed from another cause: for it has a more principal subsistence than these, and is more allied to The Good, as has been demonstrated.
COMMENTARY
Proclus's commentary on this proposition is, as is often the case, a mouthful, but it will turn out to be simpler than it looks once we break it down a bit.
What is self-sufficient? That is to say, it causes itself, rather than being caused by another.
It can't be the One. Why? Because the One is radically simple, above every sort of cause. It needs nothing. It does not even cause itself, because it is not caused but precedes every cause.
In our usual way of thinking, it would seem that the first beings after the One would be beings which are caused by the One. We're used to thinking this way, but it isn't Proclus's view. After the uncaused One come those beings which are most similar to the One and participate in the One, and therefore cause themselves. These are, of course, the Gods or Henads, the Unities.
It's interesting to think what happens if we accept Proclus's proposition, but insist on retaining the Holy Trinity within Christianity. The Trinity is three and one, an Undivided Unity. How can God be radically simple if God is also three?
The answer is that the theory of the Holy Trinity says that God is one in substance but three in person.
But how can this be? The three cannot be radically simple, and so that which they share must be radically simple, and that is their common substance.
What, then, is this substance?
It is nothing other than God, the Good, the One.
For Proclus the One is the Good, and is beyond every being. But it is not inert or dead; it is rather more like an overflowing fountain of life. At once everywhere, and yet nowhere at all. If we consider that the One is mere relation, then the first manifestation of the One will be a triad, or Trinity. And it must be noted that this is the case in Proclus as well.
For if every nature which is self-sufficient, either by reason of its essence or energy, is more excellent than that which depends on another cause; and that which produces itself, since it produces the being of itself, is sufficient to itself with respect to essence; and that which is alone produced by another is not sufficient to itself; and the self-sufficient is more allied to The Good; and things more allied and similar to their causes subsist from cause prior to such as are dissimilar; — this being the case, the natures which are produced by themselves, and are self-subsistent, are more ancient than those which proceed into existence from another cause alone. For either there will be nothing self-subsistent, or The Good is a thing of this kind, or the first things which subsist from The Good. But if there is nothing self-subsistent, truly there will not be in anything self-sufficiency. It will not be in The Good, since that being The One is better than self-sufficiency: it is also The Good itself, and not that which possesses The Good. Nor will self-sufficiency be in things posterior to The Good: for all things will be indigent of that which is prior to their nature. But if The Good is self-subsistent, because it produces itself, it will not be The One. For that which proceeds from The One is not The One. And it would proceed from itself, if it was self-subsistent; so that The One would at the same time be one and not one. Hence it is necessary that the self-subsistent should be posterior to the First. And it is evident that it will be prior to things which alone proceed from another cause: for it has a more principal subsistence than these, and is more allied to The Good, as has been demonstrated.
COMMENTARY
Proclus's commentary on this proposition is, as is often the case, a mouthful, but it will turn out to be simpler than it looks once we break it down a bit.
What is self-sufficient? That is to say, it causes itself, rather than being caused by another.
It can't be the One. Why? Because the One is radically simple, above every sort of cause. It needs nothing. It does not even cause itself, because it is not caused but precedes every cause.
In our usual way of thinking, it would seem that the first beings after the One would be beings which are caused by the One. We're used to thinking this way, but it isn't Proclus's view. After the uncaused One come those beings which are most similar to the One and participate in the One, and therefore cause themselves. These are, of course, the Gods or Henads, the Unities.
It's interesting to think what happens if we accept Proclus's proposition, but insist on retaining the Holy Trinity within Christianity. The Trinity is three and one, an Undivided Unity. How can God be radically simple if God is also three?
The answer is that the theory of the Holy Trinity says that God is one in substance but three in person.
But how can this be? The three cannot be radically simple, and so that which they share must be radically simple, and that is their common substance.
What, then, is this substance?
It is nothing other than God, the Good, the One.
But how, if it manifests as three?
The only possible way to understand it as a substance in which three participate is that it consists in Relation.
For Proclus the One is the Good, and is beyond every being. But it is not inert or dead; it is rather more like an overflowing fountain of life. At once everywhere, and yet nowhere at all. If we consider that the One is mere relation, then the first manifestation of the One will be a triad, or Trinity. And it must be noted that this is the case in Proclus as well.
