Elements of Theology, Proposition 23
Jul. 8th, 2024 10:31 am Every imparticipable produces the things which are participated: and all the natures which are participated strive for imparticipable essences.
For that which is imparticipable, having the relation of a monad, as subsisting from itself and not from another, and being exempt from participants, produces those things which may be participated. For either it is of itself barren, remaining within itself, and possessing nothing worthy of honor, or it will impart something from itself. And that which receives indeed from it will participate it; but that which was given will subsist. But everything participating of another by which it is generated, is secondary to that which is similarly present to [23] all things, and which fills all things from itself. For that which is in one only is not in others. But that which is similarly present to all things, in order that it may illuminate all, is not in one thing, but is prior to all things. For it is either in all things, or in one of all, or is prior to all. But that indeed which is in all things, being distributed into all, will again require another thing which may unite that which is distributed. And all things will no longer participate of the same thing, but this of one and that of another, the one being divided. But if it is in one alone of all things it will no longer be common to all, but to one thing. Hence, if it is common to all things able to participate, and is common to all, it will be prior to all. But this is imparticipable, [because it neither is nor can be participated by anything.]
For that which is imparticipable, having the relation of a monad, as subsisting from itself and not from another, and being exempt from participants, produces those things which may be participated. For either it is of itself barren, remaining within itself, and possessing nothing worthy of honor, or it will impart something from itself. And that which receives indeed from it will participate it; but that which was given will subsist. But everything participating of another by which it is generated, is secondary to that which is similarly present to [23] all things, and which fills all things from itself. For that which is in one only is not in others. But that which is similarly present to all things, in order that it may illuminate all, is not in one thing, but is prior to all things. For it is either in all things, or in one of all, or is prior to all. But that indeed which is in all things, being distributed into all, will again require another thing which may unite that which is distributed. And all things will no longer participate of the same thing, but this of one and that of another, the one being divided. But if it is in one alone of all things it will no longer be common to all, but to one thing. Hence, if it is common to all things able to participate, and is common to all, it will be prior to all. But this is imparticipable, [because it neither is nor can be participated by anything.]
Taylor's translation is a bit different:
Every imparticipable gives subsistence from itself to things which are participated. And all participated hypostases are extended to imparticipable hyparxes.
COMMENTARY
Taylor notes in his translation that the text is somewhat garbled in the original. Still, it's easy to see what Proclus is talking about here.
Previously we were introduced to the concept of movement through three terms:
- The Immovable
- The Self-Motive
- The Alter-Motive
Now we are being introduced to the same sort of structure, but this time it's being applied to the concept of participation. And so we have:
- The Imparticipable
- The Participated
- The Participants
- Being
- Intellect
- Soul
- Body
It might be easiest to understand this if we start form the lowest levels. Your body participates in soul; we know that because you're alive and reading these words. Your body is a participant; your soul, participated. But there are souls which are not in bodies, and which never descend to the level of body; moreover, Soul Itself is not a body of any kind. These are imparticipable.
Moreover, of souls, some reach upward to the level of Intellect, but others do not. Intellect or nous is a faculty which seems to be peculiar to human beings, and perhaps to some animals-- Today, we'd probably assume that means dolphins or elephants, but the only animal which Plato mentions as having a nous is the crane! Our souls participate in Intellect, but there are Intellects prior to soul which are not participated.
Finally, at the level of Being, we have the One, which is imparticipable, and the unities, which are participated. These are also called the First God and the particular Gods. Note that the One is actually prior to Being and to every particular being. As Thomas Taylor says, "imparticipable being, is that which participates nothing of being, but is the source of being to others."
An easy way to understand it may be to think of colors. On my desk there is a red lighter, a red box, a red cup, and a text-message on my phone bordered in red. All of these objects can be said to participate in the color red. The color red itself is not a red object-- and, what's more, you can never actually encounter it, because any specific instance of red you encountered wouldn't be Red Itself, but another red object. And so Red Itself is participated. But prior to Red Itself is Color Itself, which is even further removed from the world of our experience. Color Itself is not participated; you can see a white wall or a black cat, but never a color wall or a colored cat. Every color you encounter is particular. These are akin, on a very different level, to the One and the Unities. The One is like Color Itself, prior to every color; Red Itself and Blue Itself and Green Itself are like the Unities (Henads or Gods), which can be participated. Make sense?
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