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Elements of Theology, Proposition 43

Wed, 18 Dec 2024 12:30:11 GMT

Every thing which is able to return to itself is self-subsistent.

For if it returns to itself according to nature, it is perfect in the conversion to itself, and will possess essence from itself. For from every thing to which there is a return according to nature, there is equally a progression according to essence. If, therefore, it imparts well-being to itself, it will likewise undoubtedly impart being to itself, and will be the lord of its own hypostasis or nature. Hence that which is able to revert to itself is self-subsistent.

COMMENTARY

This is the straightforward corollary to the previous proposition. We're still discussing the Henads, the Unities or Gods. These are self-subsistent, meaning they are their own cause, and they return to themselves, because they are themselves the source of their own good. Last time we learned that self-subsistent things are converted, or return, to themselves; this time we learn that things that return to themselves are self-subsistent. This is the process of "epistrophe" or reversion, the third term in the triad Mone-Prohodos-Epistrophe, or Abiding-Proceeding-Returning, which, as we have seen, underlies the whole of Neoplatonic metaphysics.

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Two Announcements

Tue, 17 Dec 2024 18:26:21 GMT

What's that? I haven't updated this blog in several months? Well yes, I've been quite busy-- but we'll get to that. First I want to tell you about a few things.

The first thing is that I've started a Substack. Yes, Substack-- it's what everyone's doing now, and the team at the publishing house that I'm working with told me that I ought to also. They know more about these things than I do, and I do try to be teachable. So my new substack is called Sacramental Magic. The focus is going to be on Esoteric Christian magic and philosophy, but I'll be covering a much broader range of topics than I do here. If you've enjoyed my posts here, please come on over and support me there. In addition to new material, I'll be revising and re-publishing a number of older posts, including the series on the Gospel of Matthew that I did a few years back.

I'll eventually add in a paid subscription tier, but that's a ways out-- I'll probably use it to offer classes in installments.

The second thing is that I'm running a sale on all of my astrological and other divinatory services over at my Etsy. Okay, okay-- I've been running a sale since the first Sunday of Advent, but I'm just now getting around to telling you about it. If you've ever thought about getting a natal chart reading, or if you've got a burning question that only Geomancy can answer, head on over! The sale runs through Christmas, and if you order a natal chart, it's guaranteed to arrive in time for Epiphany-- that is, the Feast of the Astrologers.

This blog will continue for the foreseeable future, and maybe I'll start doing Proclus posts again tomorrow. Dreamwidth is a nice, mellow platform, and I very much enjoy using it. In the meantime, I expect that most of the stuff that you all find the most interesting to appear over on Substack. See you there!

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Elements of Theology, Proposition 42

Sat, 28 Sep 2024 16:34:42 GMT

Every thing self-subsistent is able to return to itself.

For if it proceeds from itself, it will likewise return to itself. For to that which is the source of a progression there is a return coordinate to the progression. For if it alone proceeded from itself, and did not return to itself, it would never strive for its characteristic good, and that which it is able to impart to itself. Every cause, however, is able to impart to that which proceeds from it both essence and well-being conjoined with this essence. Hence that which is self-subsistent will impart this to itself. This therefore is the proper good to that which is self-subsistent. And hence this will not be the object of desire to that which does not return to itself. But not desiring this good, it will not obtain it, and not obtaining it, it will be imperfect and not self-sufficient. If, however, self-sufficiency and perfection belong to anything, it must be to that which is self-subsistent. Hence it will desire and obtain its characteristic good, and will return to itself.

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Elements of Theology, Proposition 41

Sat, 21 Sep 2024 13:49:41 GMT

Every thing which is in another is alone produced, by another; but every thing which is in itself is self-subsistent.

For that which is in another and is indigent of a subject can never be generative of itself. For that which is naturally competent to generate itself does not require another base, because it is contained by itself, and is preserved in itself apart from a subject. But that which abides, and is able to be established in itself, is productive of itself, itself proceeding into itself, and being connective of itself: and thus it is in itself, as the thing caused is in its cause. For it is not in itself, as in place or as in a subject: since place is different from that which is in place, and that which is in a subject is different from the subject. But this which is in itself is the same with that in which it is inherent. It is therefore self-subsistent, and abides in itself as that which is from a cause is in the cause.

COMMENTARY

What does it mean for a thing to be "in itself"?

It is not the same, Proclus tells us, as being in a place, because "place" is different from "that which is in a place." A thing which is "in itself" is not located in itself. What then?

He tells us: "It is contained by itself, preserved in itself"... is "productive of itself, proceeding into itself, and connective of itself."

We must, then, be speaking of the Gods, the Henads: They are self-caused and self-convertive. They are still, if it can be said this way, subject to the threefold movement of abiding, proceeding, and returning, but that to which they return is themselves, that into which they proceed is themselves, they contain and produce themselves.

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Elements of Theology, Proposition 40

Fri, 13 Sep 2024 11:40:05 GMT

Of all things which proceed from another cause, those which exist from themselves, and which are alotted a self-sufficient essence, are the leaders.

For if every nature which is self-sufficient, either by reason of its essence or energy, is more excellent than that which depends on another cause; and that which produces itself, since it produces the being of itself, is sufficient to itself with respect to essence; and that which is alone produced by another is not sufficient to itself; and the self-sufficient is more allied to The Good; and things more allied and similar to their causes subsist from cause prior to such as are dissimilar; — this being the case, the natures which are produced by themselves, and are self-subsistent, are more ancient than those which proceed into existence from another cause alone. For either there will be nothing self-subsistent, or The Good is a thing of this kind, or the first things which subsist from The Good. But if there is nothing self-subsistent, truly there will not be in anything self-sufficiency. It will not be in The Good, since that being The One is better than self-sufficiency: it is also The Good itself, and not that which possesses The Good. Nor will self-sufficiency be in things posterior to The Good: for all things will be indigent of that which is prior to their nature. But if The Good is self-subsistent, because it produces itself, it will not be The One. For that which proceeds from The One is not The One. And it would proceed from itself, if it was self-subsistent; so that The One would at the same time be one and not one. Hence it is necessary that the self-subsistent should be posterior to the First. And it is evident that it will be prior to things which alone proceed from another cause: for it has a more principal subsistence than these, and is more allied to The Good, as has been demonstrated.

COMMENTARY

Proclus's commentary on this proposition is, as is often the case, a mouthful, but it will turn out to be simpler than it looks once we break it down a bit.

What is self-sufficient? That is to say, it causes itself, rather than being caused by another.

It can't be the One. Why? Because the One is radically simple, above every sort of cause. It needs nothing. It does not even cause itself, because it is not caused but precedes every cause.

In our usual way of thinking, it would seem that the first beings after the One would be beings which are caused by the One. We're used to thinking this way, but it isn't Proclus's view. After the uncaused One come those beings which are most similar to the One and participate in the One, and therefore cause themselves. These are, of course, the Gods or Henads, the Unities.

It's interesting to think what happens if we accept Proclus's proposition, but insist on retaining the Holy Trinity within Christianity. The Trinity is three and one, an Undivided Unity. How can God be radically simple if God is also three?

The answer is that the theory of the Holy Trinity says that God is one in substance but three in person.

But how can this be? The three cannot be radically simple, and so that which they share must be radically simple, and that is their common substance.

What, then, is this substance?

It is nothing other than God, the Good, the One.

But how, if it manifests as three?

The only possible way to understand it as a substance in which three participate is that it consists in Relation.

It is impossible for one thing to relate to itself or for two things to relate to one another. The moment there are two things in existence there are also three. Those three are the first thing, the second thing, and whatever they share which allows them to relate to one another.

For Proclus the One is the Good, and is beyond every being. But it is not inert or dead; it is rather more like an overflowing fountain of life. At once everywhere, and yet nowhere at all. If we consider that the One is mere relation, then the first manifestation of the One will be a triad, or Trinity. And it must be noted that this is the case in Proclus as well.

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Elements of Theology, Proposition 39

Thu, 12 Sep 2024 13:35:33 GMT

Every being either alone essentially returns, or vitally, or gnostically.

For either it alone possesses being from its cause, or life with being, or it receives from thence a gnostic power. So far, therefore, as every being alone is, it makes an essential conversion, but so far as it lives, a vital, and so far as it knows, a gnostic conversion. For as it proceeded from its cause, so does it return to it, and the measures of its conversion are limited by the measures according to its progression. The desire to return therefore is to some according to being alone, this desire being an aptitude for the participation of causes; but to others it is according to life, being a motion to more excellent natures; and to others it is according to knowledge, being a conscious perception of the goodness of their causes.

COMMENTARY

Here we have the familiar Intelligible Triad of Being, Life, and Intellect. These three are arranged hierarchically, with Being coming first, then Life, then Intellect. In late Platonist thought, the Intelligible Triad became the first three levels of existence, followed in order by Soul, Nature, and Matter.

Proclus give us three ways in which beings might return to their cause. Those which have being alone return through being, which Proclus calls "an aptitude for participation of causes." In other words, something about such a being's very nature inclines it towards its cause. Other beings both exist and are alive, and these have in them a natural "motion toward more excellent natures." Finally, there are those beings which exist, and are alive, and also know. These beings return through a conscious participation in their causes.

The reason that the Triad is arranged hierarchically is because it's clear from the examination of our universe that every thing exists, and so the power of being extends to all creation. But only some things both exist and live, and so the power of Life is less extensive than that of being. Finally, only a few sorts of beings exist, and live, and are capable of higher knowledge, and so Intellect's power is less extensive than either Life or Being.

The variation on this idea seen in modern occult traditions such as Rosicrucianism sees Life and Intellect as something toward which every being progresses over the course of aeons of evolution. As far as I know, this idea was unknown to Proclus. I quite like it, however, because it implies that created beings re-capitulate the creative sequence which begins in the Divine, but we do so in reverse. The One brings forth first being, then Life, then Intellect, and so on down to the last of things. The last of things then rise back toward the One, proceeding first into Being, and then into Life, and then into Intellect. Indeed, this same sequence is repeated in miniature over the course of every human life.

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Elements of Theology, Proposition 38

Wed, 11 Sep 2024 17:36:59 GMT

Every thing which proceeds from many causes returns through as many, and every conversion is through the same causes which produced the progression.

For since both progression and return become through similitude, that indeed which passes immediately from a certain thing likewise immediately returns to it. For the similitude here is without a medium. But that which requires a medium in proceeding requires also a medium in returning. For it is necessary that each should be effected with reference to the same thing. Hence the return will be first to the medium, and then to that which is better than the medium. Therefore the causes of being to each thing are equal in number to the causes of well-being, and vice versa.

COMMENTARY

Here again we have what was known in later times as the Great Chain of Being. Everything proceeds from the First Cause. For Proclus, the Gods come first, but these too unfold in a series of progressions. First there are the Intelligible Gods, then the Intelligible-Intellectual Gods, the Intellectual Gods, the Liberated Gods, the Supermundane Gods, and the Mundane Gods, and I'm probably forgetting a few. From the Gods are suspended angels, spirits (daimones), heroic souls, and ordinary souls, and so on on down to animals, plants, and minerals. (In the tradition of the Kaballah, this was simplified by placing in order the unknowable Ain Soph, the Names of God, the Archangels, the Choirs of angels, the astrological planets, and on down to types of people and the other things of our everyday experience).

In the Phaedrus, Plato wrote that each of our souls is like a charioteer which naturally follows in the train of one of the Twelve Olympian Gods. But the Twelve are not the summit of creation, either for Plato or his successors. At the end of an age of the world, every soul is gathered back to the God in which it has its origin, and follows the God to the realms beyond.

Proclus is telling us here that for all of us below the very highest of the hierarchies of gods, our process of conversion goes first to the powers immediately above us, and from there up the grades of being, to the One.

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Elements of Theology, Propositions 36 and 37

Mon, 09 Sep 2024 12:04:18 GMT

Of all things which are multiplied in progression the first are more perfect than the second, the second than those posterior to them, and after the same manner successively.

For if progressions separate productions from their causes, and there are diminutions of things secondary with respect to those which are first, it follows that first natures in proceeding are more conjoined with their causes, being as it were germinations from them. But secondary natures are more remote from their causes, and in a similar manner those which are successive. Things, however, which are nearer and more allied to their causes are more perfect. For causes are more perfect than things caused. But things which are more remote are more imperfect, because they are dissimilar to their causes.

COMMENTARY

Another very straightforward proposition. Of the things which proceed from their first causes into multiplication, the first are the most perfect. The further one proceeds from the First Cause itself, the more things are multiplied and the less perfect or complete they are. This is easy to understand if we visualize the universe as a pyramid, beginning in a single point, the One, and extending into a line of infinite extension, the Chaos at the bottom of things. In fact the One is not even a point, because then it would not be simply One, and the Chaos is not a line, because a line is one thing. At the end of things, there is no oneness, no unity, no identity, only fragments of fragments, infinitely divided.

As Proposition 36 deals with Progression, Proposition 37 deals with Conversion. These two mirror each other, so let's have Proposition 37 now:

Of all things which subsist according to conversion, the first are more imperfect than the second, and the second, than those that follow; but the last are the most perfect.

For if conversions are effected in a circle, and conversion or return is to that from which progression is derived, but progression is from that which is most perfect, hence conversion tends to the most perfect. And if conversion first begins from that in which progression terminates, but progression terminates in that which is most imperfect, conversion will begin from the most imperfect. Hence in things which subsist according to conversion, the most imperfect are the first, but the most perfect are the last.

COMMENTARY

In the previous Proposition, Proclus described the Universe from the top down; now he proceeds, as it were, from the bottom up. The last of things, as we saw, is the most imperfect. Taking it as the first of things converted, we see that the first in the series is the least perfect. Simple enough, yes?

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Elements of Theology, Proposition 35

Thu, 08 Aug 2024 15:18:10 GMT

Every thing caused abides in, proceeds from, and returns to, its cause.

For if it alone abided, it would in no respect differ from its cause, since it would be without separation and distinction from it. For progression is accompanied with separation. But if it alone proceeded, it would be unconjoined and deprived of sympathy with its cause, having no communication with it whatever. And if it were alone converted, how can that which has not its essence from the cause be essentially converted to that which is foreign to its nature? But if it should abide and proceed, but should not return, how will there be a natural desire to everything of well-being and of good, and an excitation to its generating cause? And if it should proceed and return, but should not abide, how, being separated from its cause, will it hasten to be conjoined with it? For it was unconjoined prior to its departure; since, if it had been conjoined, it would entirely have abided in it. But if it should abide and return, but should not proceed, how can that which is not separated be able to revert to its cause? For every thing which is converted resembles that which is resolved into the nature from which it is essentially divided. It is necessary, therefore, either that it should abide alone, or return alone, or alone proceed, or that the extremes should be bound to each other, or that the medium should be conjoined with each of the extremes, or that all should be conjoined. Hence it follows that every thing must abide in its cause, proceed from, and return to it.

COMMENTARY

There really isn't very much to say about this one. Basically, Proclus is summarizing the last several propositions and stating explicitly the threefold movement of abiding, proceeding, and returning.

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Elements of Theology, Proposition 34

Tue, 06 Aug 2024 04:54:59 GMT

Every thing which is converted according to nature makes its return to that from which it received the progression of its characteristic essence.

For if it is converted according to nature, it will have an essential desire for that to which it is converted. But if this be the case, the whole being of it depends on that to which it makes an essential conversion, and it is essentially similar to it. Hence also it has a natural sympathy with it because it is cognate to the essence of it. If this be so, either the being of each is the same, or the one is derived from the other, or both are allotted similitude from a certain other one. But if the being of each is the same, how is the one naturally converted to the other? And if both are from a certain one, it will be according to nature for each to be converted to that one. It remains, therefore, that the one must derive its being from the other. But if this be the case, the progression will be from that to which the conversion or return is according to nature.

Corollary.— From these things, therefore, it is evident that Intellect is the object of desire to all things, that all things proceed from intellect, and that the whole world, though it is eternal, possesses its essence from intellect. For the world is not prevented from proceeding from intellect because it is eternal: neither because it is always arranged is it not converted to intellect, but it always proceeds, is essentially eternal, always converted, and is indissoluble because it always remains in the same order.

COMMENTARY

We have a couple of different terms to unpack here, and I think it's best to take it a step at a time.

We start with conversion. We've already learned that conversion is the return of an effect to its cause. Everything caused is subject to the threefold movement of mone or abiding, prohodos or proceeding, and epistrophe or returning.

Now we have the phrase, "according to nature." What precisely does Proclus mean by this? He goes on to say that something converted by nature "will have an essential desire for that to which it is converted." That word essential is important. Essence is the very being of a thing. To be "converted by nature" means that, for anything converted, its conversion is part of its very being. The "desire" Proclus speaks of is precisely the movement of any given thing toward its source.

As we have seen, everything in the world of our experience has ultimately has its source in the higher world of Intellect. What this means is htat, in the final analysis, Intellect Itself is the object of desire for all things, because it is the source of all things.

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Elements of Theology, Proposition 33: The Secret Wisdom of the Western World

Thu, 25 Jul 2024 13:05:55 GMT

Every thing which proceeds from another and returns to it has a circular energy.

For if it returns to that from which it proceeds, it conjoins the end to the beginning, and the motion is one and continuous — emanating from the abiding cause and returning to it. Hence all things proceed in a circle from causes to causes: but there are greater and less circles of conversions (returns), some of which are to the natures immediately above the things which are converted, but others are to still higher natures, and so on to the Principle of all things. For all things proceed from this Principle, and return to it.

COMMENTARY

Everything which proceeds from another has a circular motion. Does this idea sound familiar? We encounter it frequently enough, but we always find it attributed to some foreign culture or to some sufficiently remote place.

Everything an Indian does is in a circle, and that is because the power of the World always works in circles, and everything tries to be round . . . The sky is round and I have heard the earth is round like a ball, and so are all the stars. The wind in its greatest power whirls, birds make their nest in circles, for theirs is the same religion as ours. The sun comes forth and goes down again in a circle. The moon does the same and both are round. Even the seasons form a great circle in their changing, and always come back again to where they were. Our teepees were round like the nests of birds. And they were always set in a circle, the nation’s hoop.

If you encounter this quotation from Chief Black Elk, it is invariably accompanied by a certain feeling which I think might be unique to the Western mind. It's a sense of encounter with wisdom, and with people who were wise; a sense of loss, nostalgia, regret; an admiration for a wisdom which has passed from the world; a certainty that we are not wise in this way, but only knowledgeable, only powerful; and yet, hidden beneath this, a re-affirmation of our own power.

One frequently encounters this combination of feeling. Sometimes other American Indians play the role that Chief Black Elk does here; sometimes, white writers masquerading as Indians; sometimes the wisdom is attributed to some other, sufficiently far away, people, such as the Tibetans or the Chinese Taoists or the Ancient Celts.

But here is Proclus, teaching us that all things move in a circle, proceeding in endless circles from the First Principle of All Things.

It must be so. All things abide in their cause; and proceed from it; and if they did not continuously return to it, they would be all together cut off from it. The three movements, abiding, proceeding, and returning, all happen together.

The Power of the World always works in circles. This is the sacred tradition of the Western world. Never fail to see this. Proclus is no outlier and his ideas were never lost. He himself is not an originator but a synthesizer of a tradition rooted in the ancients, in Pythagoras and Parmenides; Euclid and Empedocles; Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. His pagan faith may have faded-- it never really died-- but his philosophy endured in Dionysius the Areopagite, whose writings were treated nearly as scripture. In the West, these ideas were carried on by Eriugena, Aquinas, Bonaventure and Nicholas of Cusa; in the East, by Maximos the Confessor and many others.

And what of America, the child of the heretical and Protestant branch of the West, the limb that cut itself off from the tree that birthed it? Didn't we, at least, lose the tradition?

We never did. American culture was shot through with the old tradition from the beginning, or near enough. Look into the ideas of the early Quakers, who founded Pennsylvania and governed Delaware and Southern New Jersey. In their doctrine of the Inner Light and in their beliefs around reincarnation you see the echo of Plotinus. Pennsylvania became a refuge for Rosicrucians, occultists whose ideas were entirely rooted in Neoplatonism. In the 1700s, the Druid Revival itself was rooted in Neoplatonism, and Druids were found on both sides of the Atlantic. After the Revolution, the translations of Platonic and Neoplatonic texts by Thomas Taylor swept through the English-speaking world. The very words we read here were read also by Ralph Waldo Emerson-- Emerson, who was one of the founders not only of American letters but of American culture generally. This is our sacred wisdom.

Yes, there are fools who reject these ideas, and the worst by far are the supposed "Christians" who seek to purify their faith of "pagan" influence; and the worst by far of these, among our contemporaries, are adherents to the Catholic or the Orthodox churches. One well-known Orthodox convert YouTuber is found of regular panic attacks about the influence of Neoplatonism and the related Hermetic tradition in Holywood, apparently unaware of its influence on his own faith. One author on the "traditionalist" Catholic fringe spends his time railing about how the Church has been captured by the "Neoplatonic-Hermetic Gnosis," with this supposed to have happened in the Renaissance, seemingly unaware that the very text we are reading was also in the possession of Thomas Aquinas. A young convert to the Orthodox Church (an "Orthobro," as the current parlance has it) once told me that I ought to reject Platonism and instead look to such Orthodox thinkers as Maximos the Confessor. I ignored him until I'd finished reading through Plato's works, then took a look at Maximos, out of fairness. And found the ideas of Plato and Aristotle on every single page.

All things move in a circle, proceeding from the One Principle of All, and returning to it. This is our sacred wisdom.

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Summer Sale!

Wed, 24 Jul 2024 14:22:07 GMT

Oh hey,

Did you know I'm running a Summer Sale on my Etsy site?

Well, now you do! Everything is 33% off through August 9th.

If you've ever considered natal chart reading, or if you'd like to ask a question of Geomancy or the Tarot, head on over!

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Elements of Theology, Proposition 32

Tue, 23 Jul 2024 16:44:53 GMT

Every conversion or return is effected through the similitude of the things converted to that to which they are converted.

For every thing which is converted hastens to be conjoined with its cause, and desires communion and colligation with it. But similitude binds all things together, just as dissimilitude separates and disjoins all things. If, therefore, conversion or return is a certain communion and contact, but all communion and all contact are through similitude — if this be the case, every conversion will be effected through similitude.

COMMENTARY

Today we have another simple one. Everything aspires to its cause, but how is its conversion to its cause effected? We learned before that every effect is both the same as and different from its cause. That which brings about the conversion is this similitude or sameness.

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Elements of Theology, Proposition 31

Mon, 22 Jul 2024 20:05:11 GMT

Every thing which proceeds from another essentially, returns to that from which it proceeds.

For if it should proceed, indeed, but should not return to the cause of this progression, it would not desire its cause. For everything which desires is converted to the object of its desire. Moreover, every thing desires good, and to each thing the attainment of it is through the proximate cause. Every thing, therefore, desires its cause: and the cause of being to any particular thing is likewise the cause of well-being (good) to it. But desire is primarily directed to the cause of well-being: and conversion or return is to that to which desire primarily tends.

COMMENTARY

For Proclus, all things are subject to a threefold movement, viz. abiding, proceeding, and returning (mone, prohodos, epistrophe). In the previous Proposition he discussed remaining and proceeding. He now discusses the third movement, returning or conversion.

We have seen that all things must both abide in and proceed from their cause. Everything must be united to its cause in some way, or it can't be caused by it; therefore, it remains in its cause on some level. But everything must also proceed from its cause-- otherwise, we wouldn't be able to call it a separate thing. This is somewhat alien to our usual way of thinking, but easy enough to grasp.

But what about returning?

Proclus tells us that everything must return to its cause, because otherwise "it would not desire its cause." This is a little less familiar even than the idea of abiding while proceeding. They key to it lies in Plato's understanding of the Good. The Good, Plato tells us, is "that which all things desire." As human beings, we are sometimes mistaken about what our good actually is. We are hungry; we think that a cookie will satisfy our hunger. We eat the cookie, desire three more, eat them, and wind up with a crash in our energy and an upset stomach, followed in short order by inflammation and weight gain. We mistake an apparent good for our actual good. Learning, we have a steak salad instead of a cookie; our body becomes stronger, our energy increases, we feel better. Rising still further, we refuse our hunger entirely for an hour or for a day, seeking instead to discipline our appetites by fasting.

The Good, which is God Himself, is both our source and our end. Proclus discusses this in a very beautiful passage from his commentary on Plato's Timaeus:

All things that exist are offspring of the gods, are brought into existence without intermediation by them and have their foundation in them. For not only does the continuous procession of entities reach completion, as each of them successively obtains its subsistence from its proximate causes, but it is also from the very gods themselves that all things in a sense are generated, even if they are described as being at the furthest remove from the gods, [indeed] even if you were to speak of matter (hulê) itself. For the divine does not stand aloof from anything, but is present for all things alike. For this reason, even if you take the lowest levels [of reality], there too you will find the divine present. The One is in fact everywhere present, inasmuch as each of the beings derives its existence from the gods, and even though they proceed forth from the gods, they have not gone out from them but rather are rooted in them. Where, indeed, could they ‘go out’, when the gods have embraced all things and taken hold of them in advance and still retain them in themselves? For what is beyond the gods is That which is in no way existent, but all beings have been embraced in a circle by the gods and exist in them. In a wonderful way, therefore, all things both have and have not proceeded forth. They have not been cut off from the gods. If they had been cut off, they would not even exist, because all the offspring, once they were wrenched away from their fathers, would immediately hasten towards the gaping void of non-being. In fact they are somehow established in them [the gods], and, to put the matter in a nutshell, they have proceeded of their own accord, but [at the same time] they remain in the gods.

But those beings which proceed forth must also return, imitating the manifestation of the gods and their reversion to the cause, so that they too are ordered in accordance with the perfective triad, and are again embraced by the gods and the most primary henads. They receive a second kind of perfection from them, in accordance with which they are able to revert to the goodness of the gods, so that, being rooted at the outset in the gods, through their reversion they can be fixed in them once again, making this kind of circle which both begins from the gods and ends with them. All things, therefore, both remain in and revert to the gods, receiving this ability from them and obtaining in their very being a double signature, the one in order to remain there, the other so that what proceeds forth can return. And it is possible to observe these not only in souls, but also in the lifeless beings that follow them.

That all things desire God is not a doctrine limited to pagans, or even to professed Platonists. Thomas Aquinas was generally hostile to Plato himself, but his thinking was so shaped by Dionysius and Augustine-- and by Aristotle, who could never escape his master's way of thinking, no matter how hard he tried-- that his work is filled with Platonic ideas and is incomprehensible without them:

All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being... And so of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence.

On Prayer

A great help in our reversion to the gods is prayer. This also Proclus discusses at length in the Timaeus commentary:

This is the best end of true prayer, in order that the conversion of the soul may be conjoined with its permanency, and that every thing which proceeds from The One of the Gods, may again be established in The One, and the light which is in us may be comprehended in the light of the Gods.

Prayer therefore, is no small part of the whole ascent of souls. Nor is he who possesses virtue superior to the want of the good which proceeds from prayer; but on the contrary the ascent of the soul is effected through it, and together with this, piety to the Gods, which is the summit of virtue.

Nor is prayer limited to human beings. As all things desire the Good, for Proclus, all things pray. Even a flower or a stone, by its very nature adores the Gods who are the source of its existence.

But perhaps this is better expressed, again, by Proclus himself, in his hymn to the One:

O, Absolutely Transcendent! (what else is it rightful to call Thee?)

How shall I fittingly hymn Thee, that art of all things most exalted?

How would words speak Thy Splendor? For words cannot name or denote Thee,

Sole Unspeakable Being, since Thou art the cause of all speaking.

How might the mind know Thy Nature? For mind cannot grasp or conceive Thee,

Sole Unknowable Being, since Thou art the cause of all knowing.

All things existing, the speaking and speechless together proclaim Thee.

All things existing, the knowing and nescient together, adore Thee.

All keen desires or lust, all painful passions are yearnings

Only for Thee. Thine is the whole world’s prayer; to Thee all,

Sensing Thy tokens within them, utter a paean of silence.

Everything issues from Thee. Only Thou art dependent on nothing.

Everything nestles within Thee. Everything surges upon Thee.

For Thou art the Goal of all beings. And Thou art One Thing, and All Things,

And yet neither one thing, nor all things.

O, Most-Named, how then shall I name Thee?

That art alone the Unnamable? What even Heaven-born Mind then

Could possibly penetrate Thy distant Shroud? I Pray Thee, be gracious!

O, Absolutely Transcendent, what else is it rightful to call Thee?’

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Elements of Theology, Proposition 30

Sat, 20 Jul 2024 22:43:49 GMT

Everything which is produced from a certain thing without a medium, abides in its producing cause, and proceeds from it.

For if every progression is effected while primary natures remain permanent, and is accomplished through similitude, similars being constituted prior to dissimilars — if this be the case, that which is produced will in a certain respect abide in its producing cause. For that which entirely proceeds will have nothing which is the same with the abiding cause, but will be perfectly separated from it. But if it has anything in common with and united to it, it will abide in its cause in the same manner as that abides in itself. If, however, it abides only but does not proceed, it will in no respect differ from its cause, nor will it while that abides be generated something different from it. For if it is something different it is separated and apart from its cause. If, however, it is apart, but the cause abides, it will proceed from the cause in order that while it abides it may be separated from it. So far, therefore, as that which is produced has something which is the same with the producing cause, it abides in it; but so far as it is different, it proceeds from it. Being, however, similar, it is in a certain respect at once both the same and different. Hence it abides and at the same time proceeds, and does neither of these without the other.

COMMENTARY

Abiding and procession. Here we have two terms of another Platonic triad, that of Abiding, Proceeding, and Returning.

Proclus tells us that everything produced by any cause both abides in that cause and proceeds from it.

He demonstrates this using very simple logic. If A causes B, then we have three possibilities:

1. A and B are the same. If this is the case, then A doesn't cause B, A simply remains A, and there is no B to speak of. To return to the example of colors: Color As Such produces the various colors we know. But if there is nothing about them which is different from Color As Such, then there are no separate colors. They're all simply Color, or, we might say, simply Light.

2. A and B are entirely different. But if that is the case, then it is impossible for A to cause B, because they have nothing in common. Color as such produces red and green and blue, but it doesn't produce cats or 12 or the feeling of nostalgia.

3. A and B are both the same and different. So B has something of A in it, but also something which is different from A. Red is a color, but it is not Color Itself; it has something which is distinctly red about it. At the same time, a "part" of it-- not a physical part, of course-- remains color. That's why we call it "a color," and not a cat or the number 12 or an emotion.

Remember that this is a work of theology first and foremost. On this way of looking at things, every effect abides in its cause. And, as we have seen, this universe is hierarchically ordered, descending by degrees first from God through the panoply of Gods, then to intellectual Ideas, souls, natures, and all the things of our experience.

The One is the First Cause of all things.

And this means that a "part" of us-- not a physical part, of course-- always abides in the One. God is always present to us, by the very nature of reality; or we are always present to Him. An Orthodox saint or theologian-- I'm afraid I can't remember who, and can't find the reference-- once said that "If any soul suffers in Hell, you may be sure that Christ suffers with him." On Proclus's logic, this is necessarily the case. God is never distant; a part of us always abides with Him. "God," as Empedocles taught us, "is a circle whose center is everywhere, and whose circumference is nowhere."

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Elements of Theology, Proposition 29

Tue, 16 Jul 2024 18:17:39 GMT

Every progression is effected through a similitude of secondary to primary natures.

For if that which produces constitutes similars prior to dissimilars, the similitude derived from the producing causes will constitute the things produced. For similars are rendered similar through similitude, and not through dissimilitude. If, therefore, progression in its diminution preserves a certain sameness of that which is generated with that which generates, and shows that such as the generator is primarily so is that posterior to it secondarily, it will have its nature through similitude.

COMMENTARY

Here we continue our discussion of the fine details of the unfoldment of being from the One. This may only be a peculiarity of my psyche, but I find it easiest to see this in terms of colors. Red leads to orange before it leads to yellow, and yellow descends to green before blue. Of course, colors as such are arranged horizontally-- neither red nor blue nor yellow is ontologically prior to the other two. In the Platonic cosmos, this same idea applies to the vertical as well as the horizontal. Being brings forth Intellect before Soul. To get into the details of Proclus's pagan theology, the Solar Zeus constitutes the Sun, and Apollo proceeds from him, and from Apollo, Apollonian angels, daimones, heroic souls and ordinary souls-- the former category, of course, includes the souls both of Pythagoras and Plato himself; solar animals such as lions and roosters, solar plants such as marigolds and sunflowers, down to solar gems and minerals, like gold.

Of course, the Christian version of this simply substitutes a Name of God and an appropriate archangel of the Sun for Zeus, Helios and Apollo; typically this is YHVH Eloah Veh Da'ath and either Michael or Raphael. But the idea is the same, and for all we know, the beings involved are the same as well.

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Elements of Theology, Proposition 28

Mon, 15 Jul 2024 15:26:59 GMT

Every producing cause constitutes things similar to itself, prior to such as are dissimilar.

For since that which produces is necessarily more excellent than the thing produced, they can never be simply the same with each other and equal in power. But if they are not the same and equal, but different and unequal, they are either entirely separated from each other, or they are both united and separated. If, however, they are entirely separated, they will not accord with each other, and nowhere will that which proceeds from a cause sympathize with it. Hence, neither will one of these participate of the other, since they are entirely different from it. For that which is participated gives communion to its participant with reference to that of which it participates. Moreover, it is necessary that the thing caused should participate of its cause, as from thence deriving its essence.

But if that which is produced is partly separated from and partly united to its producing cause, — if, indeed, it experiences each of these equally, — it will equally participate and not participate: so that in the same manner it will have essence and not have it from the producing cause. And if it is more separated from than united to it, the thing generated will be more foreign than allied to that by which it is generated, will be more unadapted than adapted to it, and be more deprived of than possess sympathy with it. If, therefore, the things which proceed from causes are allied to them according to their very being, have sympathy with them, are naturally dependent on them, and aspire after contact with them, desiring good, and obtaining the object of their desire through the cause of their existence—if this be the case, it is evident that things produced are in a greater degree Med to their producing causes than separated from [28] them. Things, however, which are more united are more similar than dissimilar to the natures to which they are especially united. Every producing cause, therefore, constitutes things similar to itself prior to such as are dissimilar.

COMMENTARY

This proposition is the basis of a concept with which I believe most of us are familiar, that is, what was in medieval times called the Great Chain of Being. This was a universal concept in the European middle ages and through the early modern period. It is the image of the Universe hierarchically ordered, with God at its apex; angels following God in their successive orders; man after the angels; and, below Man, the beasts, plants, and minerals.

The basis of this whole idea is the very simple concept that every producing cause produces things similar to itself before things which are different from itself. In Pythagorean terms, the One first produces the duality of the One and the Dyad. These two, which are also Limit and Unlimited, then bring forth the Mixture, which is Being Itself. The Neoplatonists-- or some of them-- mythologically identified these principles with Chronos, the First One, bringing forth the dyad of Aether and Chaos, and then, in cooperating with Aether, producing a cosmic egg. The egg itself is an image of being, as it is a simple and limited form in which resides unlimited potentiality. From these, the whole panoply of deities of whom we've heard emerge. From the Gods are emanated angels and daimones, human souls, animals, plants, and minerals, down to the last of things.

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Elements of Theology, Proposition 27

Sat, 13 Jul 2024 13:35:40 GMT

Every producing cause, by reason of its perfection and abundance of power, is productive of secondary natures.

For if it produced not on account of the perfect, but through a defect of power, it would not be able to preserve its own order immovable. For that which imparts being to another thing through defect and imbecility imparts subsistence to it through its own mutation and change in quality. But every thing which produces remains such as it is, and in consequence of thus remaining that which is posterior to it proceeds into existence. Hence, being full and perfect, it constitutes secondary natures immovably and without diminution, it being that which it is, and neither being changed into them nor diminished. For that which is produced is not a distribution into parts of the producing cause; since this is neither appropriate to generation, nor to generating causes. Nor is it a transition of one nature into another: for it does not become the matter of that which proceeds; since it remains such as it is, and that which is produced is different from it. Hence that which generates abides without alteration and undiminished; through prolific power multiplies itself, and from itself imparts secondary hypostases or natures.

COMMENTARY

I think that we have here a subtle point of Platonic metaphysics.

How are the succeeding levels of existence created? The One itself gives subsistence to everything, but after the one we have the whole series of Henads, and after the Henads, the Intellectual forms. Does the One change when it creates the universe? Or does the One become the universe? If it creates from itself, is there less of it afterward, in the way that a child might take half of the play-dough out of a bucket?

No.

Creation, in this account of the universe, is a consequence of perfection. To be Good, or to be Perfect, which is to imitiate the Good, is to be productive. God and the Gods are always actively creating and upholding the universe, by their very nature. As Proclus tells us, "that which is produced is not a distribution into parts of the producing cause," like the play-dough being taken from the tub and divided in half. "Nor is it a transition of one nature into another." The color Red isn't divided into the red cup, the red candle and the red lighter. If you wanted to add a red crayon, you wouldn't have to check and see if enough red was left over in the universe. For Proclus, everything is like this, even the very highest things. "Everything which produces remains such as it is, and in consequence of thus remaining that which is posterior to it proceeds into existence." It is from the One that all things come to be. Remaining perfectly what it is, the One causes Being; Being causes Intellect; Intellect causes Soul; Soul causes Body.

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Elements of Theology, Proposition 26

Thu, 11 Jul 2024 13:03:31 GMT

Every cause which is productive of other things, itself abiding in itself, produces the natures posterior to itself, and those which are successive.

For if it imitates The One, but that immovably constitutes the things posterior to itself, everything which produces will possess in a similar manner the cause of productive energy. But The One constitutes things immovably. For if through motion, the motion will be in it; and, being moved, it will no longer be The One, because it will be changed from The One. But if motion subsists together with or after it, it will also be from The One, and either there will be a progression to infinity, or The One will produce immovably, and every thing which produces will imitate the producing cause of all things. For everywhere from that which is primarily that which is not primarily derives its subsistence; so that the nature which is productive of certain things originates from that which is productive of all things. Hence every producing cause produces subsequent natures from itself. And while productive natures abide in themselves undiminished, secondary natures are produced by them. For that which is in any respect diminished cannot abide such as it is.

COMMENTARY

This proposition is less about introducing new ideas than about reiterating and clarifying ideas we've already encountered, specifically the relationshp between the One and the Unities (Henads, Gods.)

Two concepts seem to me to be key:

The One constitutes things immovably

and

from that which is primarily that which is not primarily derives its subsistence

and

the nature which is productive of certain things originates from that which is productive of all things

The One gives existence to everything, and It does so from its very nature. It's worth noting that some, though not all, Christians object to this point, because they want the act of creating the universe to have been a decision by God. A decision takes place at a certain time, according to certain considerations; it's a particular act, not a constant act or a constant state of being. For Proclus the One is like an overflowing fountain which never ceases. In my own thinking, God is a river whose mouth is everywhere and whose source is nowhere.

The Unities are secondarily what the One is primarily. To say it differently, the Gods are secondarily what God is primarily. From God, the Gods derive their subsistence. As the One, or God, produces all things primarily, the Gods, who originate from God, produce particular things. This, by the way, is one way that a Christian Platonist can reconcile Genesis with Plato's Timaeus. In the Timaeus, the Demiurge creates the universe, but delegates to the particular Gods the job of creating material forms; in Genesis, God does all the heavy lifting himself. But these can be seen as different ways of talking about the same thing, as, on Proclus's account, the Gods will cause secondarily what God Himself causes primarily. Of course, Proclus's own view of the creation story in the Timaeus is rather different, as he assigns the role of Demiurge to Jupiter, who derives his creative power from Saturn, the leader of the Intellectual Triad of which is the final term.

One other thing which is worth considering. For Proclus, the One constitutes all things; the One is also radically simple. The Unities produce certain things, deriving their subsistence from the One. And, as we learned last time, everything perfect generates things like itself, imitating the First Cause. There is thus a sense here in which real being is necessarily creative. Being, in this sense, and the endpoint of beings like us who are doing the work here in the world of Time, is also creative power. This is precisely what is meant by "Will" or "True Will" in modern magical traditions. It's not about doing what you want, or getting what you want. The "wants" are of the lower phase of the soul, enmeshed in matter; these are passions, not actions. True Being is not in any way passive, but active, and the closer we approach to it, the more united we ourselves become, the more we become active.

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Elements of Theology, Proposition 25

Wed, 10 Jul 2024 16:03:52 GMT

On the Perfect

Everything perfect proceeds to the generation of those things which it is able to produce, imitating the One Principle of all.

For as the one Principle by reason of its own goodness is unically constitutive of all beings, — for The Good and The One are the same, so that the boniform is the same with the unical, — thus, also, those things which are posterior to the First Principle, on account of their perfection, hasten to generate beings inferior to their own essence: for perfection is a certain part or quality of The Good, and the perfect so far as it is perfect imitates The Good. But The Good is constitutive of all things: so that the perfect is likewise productive according to its nature of those things which it is able to produce. And that indeed which is more perfect, the more perfect it is the more numerous are the progeny of which it is the cause. For that which is more perfect participates in a greater degree of The Good. It is therefore nearer to The Good, is more allied to the cause of all, and is the cause of a greater number of effects. That, however, which is more imperfect, the more imperfect it is the less numerous are the effects of which it is the cause; for, being more remote from the producer of everything, it is the cause of fewer effects. For to that which constitutes, or adorns, or perfects, or connects, or vivifies, or fabricates all things, that nature is most allied which produces a greater number of each of these; but that is more remote which produces a less number of each.

Corollary.— From the premises it is evident that the nature which is most remote from the Principle of all is unprolific and is not the cause of anything. For if it generated a certain thing, and had something posterior to itself, it is evident that it would no longer be the most remote, but that which it produced would be more remote than itself from the Principle of all things; it would therefore be nearer to productive power, and, in addition, would imitate the cause which is productive of all beings.

COMMENTARY

As promised, today we have a discussion of the Perfect, and what is meant, in Proclus's system, by "perfection."

We should take a minute to remember that the word "perfect" in its traditional sense means "complete." This is important because we tend to use it in common English to mean something like "super duper good." But, while I don't have access to the Greek, our original translators would not have selected the word "perfect" unless they intended the original meaning of the word. Something which is perfect is something which is complete.

This has important implications before we even get into the rest of the proposition. Last time, we learned that Participants "receive their perfection from" that which they Participate. That is, to be a Participant is also to be completed by something else-- by that which is Participated.

Furthermore, we learn:

To be complete is to be productive. To be complete or perfect is not to cease, but to produce, "in imitation of the First Principle of All."

Therefore, the Perfect is not the same as the One Itself. Perfection, rather, "is a certain part or quality of The Good." And to be perfect is to imitate the Good. As the Good is the cause of all things, therefore, everything perfect is productive of natures inferior to itself.

Bearing in mind what we learned last time, we can now add another term to our hierarchy. It's worth reviewing what we've seen so far. Our levels of being are:

The Immovable The Imparticipable The One The Good The Cause Superessential (Above Being)

The Self-Motive The Participated The Unities The Perfect The Concause Being

The Alter-Motive The Participants The United The Perfected The Caused Becoming

In this Proposition, we are introduced, finally, to a level of being lower than these. Proclus tells us, "the nature which is most remote from the Principle of all is unprolific and is not the cause of anything." This is the Last of Things, the extremity which effectively forms the bottom of reality. This Last is distinguished from other things in that it is not perfected. How do we know this? Because if it were to be perfected, it would then become productive. Being productive, it would not longer be the last of things-- something else, which it had caused, would become the last. Therefore, there must be a final level which, in these terms, we could call the imperfect or, better, the Unperfected. If we then add this fourth level to the series, we come up with:

The Unmoved The Unparticipating The Disunited The Unperfected The Uncaused Nonbeing

Being most remote from the One, we can also call it the Chaos; being most remote from the Good, we can also call it Evil. Evil, then, is identical with Nonbeing.

Speculation

Those of us who are in contact with matter and live in the world of time are necessarily part of the world of Becoming. As all of these terms are identical to one another, or different ways of talking about the same thing, we are also part of the world of the Perfected, and, as the Perfected, we receive our perfection from outside of ourselves. From what? The Perfect, as concauses with the Good Itself. The Good, remember, is that which causes all things, and that which all things desire. As members of the group of All Things, our ultimate desire is for the Good. And how do we achieve the Good? We become Perfect, which is the same as becoming United. And we do this not, or not entirely, through our own efforts, but by the activity of the Perfect. "Activity" or "Act" is another way of saying "energy," or, to put it in Christian terms, Grace. What is, in the Christian religion, called sanctity, sainthood or divinization, is precisely this perfection. Moreover, all this being the case, it is also the case that what Christians call a saint is made so by participation in God. Every saint, therefore, becomes productive in the same way that the Good Itself, or God, is productive.

In Greek terms, we could substitute the word "Hero" for saint. The same is also what is meant by the word xian in Chinese and Boddhisattva in the Buddhist tradition. All these are beings who have become perfected, and now participate in the creative process which unfolds the universe.

It's easy to prove to ourself that this is true. One of the effects of a new saint is a new cult, which is to say, a new set of activities appearing here in the world of Becoming that were not to be found prior to this particular saint's the attainment of sainthood. Here, for example, is a shrine to St. Therese of Lisieux. Therese lived from 1873 to 1897; she was canonized in 1925. Prior to this, there were no shrines to her, and the particular devotions, images, and motifs associated with her cult did not exist. We had a large chapel dedicated to her near where I grew up in Pennsylvania; when I was a boy I was taken there on her Feast Day and afterwards given rose petals blessed by a priest. This could not have happened prior to her canonization, an event in time which signifies her perfection, which is her ascension to a world beyond time and becoming.

According to many Christians, the world of becoming will come to an end, and the dead will be reunited with the bodies left behind on Earth. This idea isn't original to Christianity. The same idea is found in Plato's Politicus, where it appears as a myth. Many of Plato's dialogues contain myths, but these are never to be read as literal descriptions of historical events but rather as sacred teaching stories. According to the myth of the Politicus, the day shall come when the Sun will reverse his course in the Heavens. And on that day Time will begin to turn backward. Jupiter will step down from the rulership of the Universe and return his throne to his father, Saturn. And on that day the Dead will rise from their graves, the Earth will give up her fruits without struggle, and the Golden Age will come round again.

In his Platonic Theology-- a different volume from this one, I should mention-- Proclus discussed this myth, which is so similar to the Final Judgment in Christian tradition. But he explained that it is not an event in time. Rather, those who rise from their graves have returned to an existence outside of time, restored to the kingdom of the Father, Saturn, who preceeds the universe of becoming.

It's my view that this is precisely what the saints are. They aren't sanctified souls waiting in Heaven for a pro-forma judgment; they aren't lawyers who can plead your case before God if you get to know them. They are the perfected souls, who now abide outside of time, participating in the government of the Universe.

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Elements of Theology, Proposition 24

Tue, 09 Jul 2024 14:50:28 GMT

Every thing which participates is inferior to that which is participated by it; and that which is participated is inferior to that which is imparticipable.

For that which participates, since it is imperfect prior to participation, but becomes perfect through participation, is entirely secondary to that which is participated so far as it is perfect by participating. For so far as it was imperfect it is inferior to that which it participates, which causes it to become perfect. But that which is participated by a certain one and not by all, is on this account allotted an hyparxis or essence subordinate to that which is common to all things, and not to a certain one thing: for the latter is more allied but the former less to the cause of all.

The imparticipable, therefore, is the leader of things which are participated; but the latter are the leaders of participants. For, in short, the imparticipable is one prior to the many; but that which is participated in the many is one and at the same time not one; and everything which participates is not one and at the same time one.

COMMENTARY

This proposition is spelling out the ideas that we've already encountered in straightforward and simple terms. This is a hierarchical ontology, with forms having their cause on one level of being and proceeding through succeeding levels of being, down to the last of things.

I'm going to repeat something that I've discussed before. This may be unnecessary, but it's worth reminding ourselves that when we talk about "superior" and "inferior," we're not talking about "better" and "worse" in some kind of abstract sense. To think of God as a king and the highest gods or angels as spirits surrounding his throne is a metaphor. (As a metaphor, it may have worked better for people who were actually governed by kings.) Participants come after the Participated; the Participated come after the Imparticipable. This is an ontological description, not a political hierarchy. To return to the imagery we used last time, Color Itself (or Light Itself, which is invisible) is the Imparticipable. The Color Red Itself is Participated. The Red Pen is a Participant. Participants don't look cross-eyed from under their Red Sox hats at the Participated and say "You think you're betta than me!?" Things simply are as they are.

Proclus also introduces another idea in this proposition of which we'll be hearing more soon: The perfect. Participants, we are told, "are imperfect prior to participation," but "become perfect through participation." We will have more to say on this in the future.

Moreover, among the Participated and the Imparticipable, the very highest are those whose reach extends the furthest. Color Itself, for example, is manifest in the color spectrum and in one particular quality shared by physical objects, viz. visible color. Color is only one of many physical qualities; physical qualities are only one subset of all qualities. Quality Itself is thus prior to color. And the One is prior to all things.

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Elements of Theology, Proposition 23

Mon, 08 Jul 2024 15:34:15 GMT

Every imparticipable produces the things which are participated: and all the natures which are participated strive for imparticipable essences.

For that which is imparticipable, having the relation of a monad, as subsisting from itself and not from another, and being exempt from participants, produces those things which may be participated. For either it is of itself barren, remaining within itself, and possessing nothing worthy of honor, or it will impart something from itself. And that which receives indeed from it will participate it; but that which was given will subsist. But everything participating of another by which it is generated, is secondary to that which is similarly present to [23] all things, and which fills all things from itself. For that which is in one only is not in others. But that which is similarly present to all things, in order that it may illuminate all, is not in one thing, but is prior to all things. For it is either in all things, or in one of all, or is prior to all. But that indeed which is in all things, being distributed into all, will again require another thing which may unite that which is distributed. And all things will no longer participate of the same thing, but this of one and that of another, the one being divided. But if it is in one alone of all things it will no longer be common to all, but to one thing. Hence, if it is common to all things able to participate, and is common to all, it will be prior to all. But this is imparticipable, [because it neither is nor can be participated by anything.]

Taylor's translation is a bit different:

Every imparticipable gives subsistence from itself to things which are participated. And all participated hypostases are extended to imparticipable hyparxes.

COMMENTARY

Taylor notes in his translation that the text is somewhat garbled in the original. Still, it's easy to see what Proclus is talking about here.

Previously we were introduced to the concept of movement through three terms:

The Immovable

The Self-Motive

The Alter-Motive

The Immovable does not move, but moves others. The self-motive moves itself and others. The alter-motive is only moved. These three exist in a hierarchy, beginning with the immovable, proceeding through the self-motive, ending in the alter-motive.

Now we are being introduced to the same sort of structure, but this time it's being applied to the concept of participation. And so we have:

The Imparticipable

The Participated

The Participants

To understand what he is talking about, we need to return to our whole picture of the universe, which consists, as we have seen, of several different levels. First we have the level of Being. After Being, we have Intellect. After Intellect, Soul. After Soul, Body. Actually, there are two more levels which we can fit in there, but that's a subject for another time. Let's stick with four for now:

Being

Intellect

Soul

Body

At every level, there is that which is participated, and that which is imparticipable. To be participated means that it has contact with the level beneath it. To be imparticipable means that it does not.

It might be easiest to understand this if we start form the lowest levels. Your body participates in soul; we know that because you're alive and reading these words. Your body is a participant; your soul, participated. But there are souls which are not in bodies, and which never descend to the level of body; moreover, Soul Itself is not a body of any kind. These are imparticipable.

Moreover, of souls, some reach upward to the level of Intellect, but others do not. Intellect or nous is a faculty which seems to be peculiar to human beings, and perhaps to some animals-- Today, we'd probably assume that means dolphins or elephants, but the only animal which Plato mentions as having a nous is the crane! Our souls participate in Intellect, but there are Intellects prior to soul which are not participated.

Finally, at the level of Being, we have the One, which is imparticipable, and the unities, which are participated. These are also called the First God and the particular Gods. Note that the One is actually prior to Being and to every particular being. As Thomas Taylor says, "imparticipable being, is that which participates nothing of being, but is the source of being to others."

An easy way to understand it may be to think of colors. On my desk there is a red lighter, a red box, a red cup, and a text-message on my phone bordered in red. All of these objects can be said to participate in the color red. The color red itself is not a red object-- and, what's more, you can never actually encounter it, because any specific instance of red you encountered wouldn't be Red Itself, but another red object. And so Red Itself is participated. But prior to Red Itself is Color Itself, which is even further removed from the world of our experience. Color Itself is not participated; you can see a white wall or a black cat, but never a color wall or a colored cat. Every color you encounter is particular. These are akin, on a very different level, to the One and the Unities. The One is like Color Itself, prior to every color; Red Itself and Blue Itself and Green Itself are like the Unities (Henads or Gods), which can be participated. Make sense?

***

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Elements of Theology, Proposition 22

Sun, 07 Jul 2024 18:35:45 GMT

Every thing which subsists primarily and principally in each order is one, and is neither two, nor more than two, but is wholly one alone.

For, if it be possible, let there be two things which thus subsist, since there will be the same impossibility if there are more than two; or let that which subsists primarily consist of each of these. But if, indeed, it consists of each it will again be one, and there will not be two things which are first. And if it be one of the two, each will not be first. Nor, if both are equally primary, will each have a principal subsistence. For if one of them is primary, but this is not the same with the other, what will it be in that order? For that subsists primarily which is nothing else than that which it is said to be. But each of these being different is, and at the same time is not, that which it is said to be.

If, therefore, these differ from each other, but they do not primarily differ so far as they are that which they are said to be, — for this primarily experiences that which is the same, — both will not be first, but will be that of which both participating are thereby said to subsist primarily.

Corollary.— From these things it is evident that what is primarily being is one alone, and that there are not two primary beings, or more than two; that the first intellect is one alone, and that there are not two first intellects; and that the first soul is one. This is also the case with every form, such as the primarily beautiful and the primarily equal. Thus, too, with respect to the form of animals, and the form of man, the first of each is one; for the demonstration is the same.

COMMENTARY

This one is also straightforward enough. At every level of being, the level itself is one and one alone. Being Itself is one. Why? Because if there were two principle beings, they would both share Being Itself, which would then be... Being. Itself. The same holds at the levels of Intellect and Soul. The First Intellect is one, and the subsequent intellects proceed from it; the First Soul (the Universal or World Soul) is one, and subsequent souls proceed from it.

This same structure holds at the level of forms or ideas. The Beautiful is one; if two things both share beauty, then the Beauty that they share is Beauty Itself. Note that a whole series of beautiful things are not beauty itself; as an idea, Beauty subsists at a different ontological level from things which are beautiful. The same is true of Equal itself, which is that by virtue of which equality can be found in subsequent objects. And we can say the same for the whole series of forms. The Good, the True, and the Beautiful; the Same and the Different; Justice Itself, Wisdom, Courage, and Temperance Themselves are all one and prior to those things which participate in them.

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Elements of Theology, Proposition 21

Sat, 06 Jul 2024 13:21:03 GMT

Every order, beginning from a monad, proceeds into a multitude co-ordinate to the monad, and the multitude of every order is referred to one monad.

For the monad, having the relation of a principle, generates a multitude allied to itself. Hence one causal chain and one whole order has a decrement into multitude from the monad. For there would no longer be an order, or a chain, if the monad remained of itself un-prolific. But multitude is again referred to the one common cause of all coordinate natures. For that in every multitude which is the same has not its progression from one of those things of which the multitude consists. For that which subsists from one alone of the many is not common to all, but eminently possesses the peculiarity of that one alone. Hence, since in every order there is a certain communion, connection, and sameness, through which some things are said to be coordinate, but others of a different order, it is evident that sameness comes to every order from one principle. In each order, therefore there is one monad prior to the multitude, which imparts one ratio and connection to the natures arranged in it, both to each other and to the whole.

For let one thing be the cause of another, among things that are under the same causal chain or series; but that which ranks as the cause of the one series must necessarily be prior to all in that series, and all things must be generated by it as coordinate, not so that each will be a certain particular thing, but that each will belong to this order.

Corollary.— From these things it is evident that both one and multitude are inherent in the nature of body; that nature has many natures co-dependent on it; and that many natures proceed from the one nature of the universe. Further, that the order of souls originates from one first soul, proceeds with diminution into the multitude of souls, and reduces multitude into one; that in the intellectual essence there is an intellectual monad, and a multitude of intellects proceeding from one intellect, and returning to it; that there is a multitude of unities in The One which is prior to all things; and that in these unities there is a striving for The One. Hence, after the Primal One there are unities; after the First Intellect there are intellects; after the First Soul there are souls; and after Total Nature there are natures.

COMMENTARY

Here again we have a relatively straightforward proposition. In the Platonic cosmos, everything existing proceeds from the One. This same order is reflected at every level of being. The first order which proceeds from the One are Ones-- or, rather, Unities (Henads), since in them there is both oneness and multiplicity.

After the level of the Unities we have Intellect. Here again we have a unity, Intellect Itself, which proceeds into the multitude of particular Intellects. After Intellect we have Soul. We begin with the Universal Soul, and expand outward into individual souls.

Finally we have Nature. It's worth taking a moment to consider how we use that word. In a very real sense, our own language is in fragments. We've inherited concepts from the Renaissance and medieval worlds, from the Classical world, from pagan antiquity. By the late Middle Ages, in our society, these concepts were gathered into a coherent world-picture. (It is worth noting that, in the West, that world-picture was the idea which underlay a civilization, which can be called Christendom.) Modernity in a real sense has been nothing but the shattering of that world-picture, and modern philosophy has been nothing more than a sustained attack on our inheritance. The result is that we speak and think with a jumble of fragmentary words whose original definitions lie half-understood in the context. "Are you feeling enthusiastic?" "He's in high spirits today." "What a great idea!" "I'm feeling somewhat melancholy." "Do you have the energy?" "She has got a lot of potential." "What inspired you?" "He's very intelligent." "That's just, like, your opinion, man!" All these sentences contain concepts of which the speaker often has only a vague awareness of their original meaning.

So too with that word, "nature." We use this term in two different senses. If someone asks me why the cat won't stop laying on my keyboard while I'm trying to write, I might respond, "It's just his nature." If I feel like going for a walk in the woods, I might say, "I'd like to spend some time in nature."

For the Neoplatonists, Nature refers to a level of being, proceeding from Soul. The meaning of the term is captured far better in the sentence "It's just his nature" than "I'd like to spend some time in Nature," though the latter is part of it. The cat has a nature, both as a cat and as this particular cat, just as you have a nature, as a human being, a man or woman, this particular man or woman. All of these proceed from Nature Itself, just as all individual souls proceed from Soul Itself, all Intellects from Intellect Itself, all unities from the One Itself.

It's also worth noting that there are at least two ways to conceive of that first and final level of being, the level of Unity. For Proclus and his confederates, the unities who proceed from the One are the Gods who proceed from God. But Christian, Jewish, and Islamic thinkers have also worked with these ideas. For Dionysius, the unities are not conceived as separate gods, but as names of God, which are themselves expressions of divine activity. A similar concept is found in the Kaballah, in which every Sphere of the Tree of Life is governed by one of the names of God. The Names are not separate Gods, but neither are they arbitrary distinctions; Adonai Ha'Aretz is the Divine Name of Malkuth, the sphere of the physical world, while Shadai El Chai is the Name that governs Yesod, the sphere of the Moon. The Islamic world, too, took up these ideas on various occasions and worked with them. From the 10th through the 12th centuries, the powerful Fatimid Caliphate relied on a theology derived ultimately from Plotinus, Proclus's predecessor, that saw Allah as the Primal One, with the 99 Names of God as Proclus's henads. Though Proclus himself is a pagan, all of his students are not. The Great Tradition is not a religion but a philosophy, and gives us a way to approach any religious tradition.

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Elements of Theology, Proposition 20

Wed, 03 Jul 2024 15:52:14 GMT

The essence of soul is beyond all bodies, the intellectual nature is beyond all souls, and The One is beyond, all intellectual hypostases.

For every body is movable by another, but is not naturally competent to move itself, but by the presence of soul it is moved of itself, lives through soul, and, when soul is present is in a certain respect self-movable, but when it is absent is alter-movable, because any self-movable nature which it may have it receives from soul, which is allotted a self-movable essence: since, to whatever nature soul is present, to this it imparts self-motion. Soul is, however, by a much greater priority that which it imparts by its very being. Hence it is beyond bodies, which become self-movable by participation, because it is essentially self-movable. Again, however, soul which is moved from itself has an order secondary to the immovable nature, which subsists immovable, in activity or energy. Because of all the natures that are moved, the self-movable essence is the leader; but of all that move, the immovable is the leader. If, therefore, soul, being moved from itself moves other things, it is necessary that prior to it there should be that which moves immovably. But intellect moves, being immovable, and energizing always in the same manner. For soul through intellect participates of perpetual thought, just as body through soul possesses the power of moving itself. For if perpetual intellection or thinking was primarily in soul, it would be inherent in all souls, in the same manner as the self-motive power. Hence perpetual thinking is not primarily in soul. It is necessary, therefore, that prior to it there should be that which is primarily intelligent: and hence intellect is prior to souls.

Moreover, The One is prior to intellect. For intellect, though it is immovable, yet is not The One; for it thinks itself, and energizes about itself. And of The One indeed all beings, in whatever way they may exist, participate; but all beings do not participate of intellect. For those beings to whom intellect is present by participation necessarily participate of knowledge; because intellectual knowledge is the principle and first cause of gnostic energy. The One, therefore, is beyond intellect, nor is there anything beyond The One: for The One and The Good are the same. But The Good, as has been demonstrated, is the principle of all things.

COMMENTARY

This one is a mouthful, but it breaks down the entire Neoplatonic cosmology. Taking it term by term, Proclus leads us from material bodies to the nature of the One itself, employing the terms and ideas that he's already taught us. Let's go through it piece by piece.

Now we're back to the discussion of motion: the unmovable, the self-motive, and the alter-motive, and here we see how these terms line up with the levels of being. The nature of body is to be moved by another, but it is not naturally able to move itself. Body is therefore the naturally alter-motive.

Under certain conditions, however, body becomes self-motive in a sense. That condition is precisely the presence of Soul. Soul is naturally self-motive, and its presence allows bodies to be self-motive by participation in Soul.

Now, it's worth noting that there is some disagreement among the thinkers who followed Plotinus as to the nature of that participation. Some contemporary scholars have suggested that Neoplatonism can be divided, in a way, into an Eastern and a Western school. The Western school is represented especially by Plotinus himself and by his disciple Porphyry. The Eastern is represented by Iamblichus, a student of both Plotinus and Porphyry and sometime rival of the latter.

For Plotinus and his school, for an embodied soul is similar to a light shining on a wall. The wall become illuminated, but the source of the light is outside, and the light itself remains effectively outside. Proclus's view, derived from Iamblichus, is somewhat different. For the "Eastern School" the living body is truly what it seems-- a body in which soul is really present.

Gregory Shaw, one of the great living scholars of the Neoplatonic tradition, suggests that this is because Iamblichus and those who followed him were more accepting of the ideas of Aristotle, and more committed to the idea of a harmony ("symphonia") between Plato and Aristotle. For Aristotle, the soul is the cause of the body, in every sense-- including the source of movement within the body (De Anima 415b). But Aristotle's soul isn't outside of the body-- elsewhere, he compares the relationship between body and soul to the relationship between the wax and the candle. The wax is the material substance, the candle the form, nor does it make any sense to talk about one candle inhabiting more than one body of wax. Proclus's education began with a complete reading of Aristotle as a kind of "Outer Mystery;" only once Aristotle's ideas were mastered was he then introduced to the "Inner Mysteries" of Plato. I believe his cosmology as expressed here reflects this. The ensouled body really is ensouled by a form as present to it as the shape of the candle is to the wax. But that isn't the end of it.

Above Soul is Intellect (nous). Soul moves itself, and, embodied, moves matter. Intellect, however, is immovable. Intellect is "perpetual thought," and is therefore not primarily in souls. We can know this because not all souls participate in thought or intellection (which is higher than thought), any more than all bodies participate in soul. Consider a soulless body, like Aristotle's candle, and then consider a body with the simplest form of soul, such as a plant. The plant does not think, has no sensation, and does not even move. It does, however, feed and reproduce itself. Aristotle tells us (De Anima 415a) that "the nutritive soul is found along with all the others and is the most primitive and widely distributed power of soul, being indeed that one in virtue of which all are said to have life." This is the difference between the plant and the candle. If Intellect were in souls naturally or primarily, then the plant would think and would perceive the forms above thought as readily as a sage. This is not the case, however. Therefore Intellect is prior to Soul, as Soul is prior to Body.

Prior to Intellect is the One. Here Proclus tells us something interesting, which will come up again later. Everything whatsoever which has any being of any kind participates of the One, but not all beings participate in Soul or Intellect. The power of the One therefore extends as far as to the very last of things, while that of Intellect and Soul are limited. Again, the implications of this are important-- but we'll come to them in due time.

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